Exploring the Motivations for Punishment: Framing and Country-Level Effects

Identifying the motives underpinning punishment is crucial for understanding its evolved function. In principle, punishment of distributional inequality could be motivated by the desire to reciprocate losses ('revenge') or by the desire to reduce payoff asymmetries between the punisher and the target ('inequality aversion'). By separating these two possible motivations, recent work suggests that punishment is more likely to be motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion than by a desire for revenge. Nevertheless, these findings have not consistently replicated across different studies. Here, we suggest that considering country of origin—previously overlooked as a possible source of variation in responses—is important for understanding when and why individuals punish one another. We conducted a two-player stealing game with punishment, using data from 2,400 subjects recruited from the USA and India. US-based subjects punished in response to losses and disadvantageous inequality, but seldom invested in antisocial punishment (defined here as punishment of non-stealing partners). India-based subjects, on the other hand, punished at higher levels than US-based subjects and, so long as they did not experience disadvantageous inequality, punished stealing and non-stealing partners indiscriminately. Nevertheless, as in the USA, when stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality, India-based subjects punished stealing partners more than non-stealing partners. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that variation in punitive behavior varies across societies, and support the idea that punishment might sometimes function to improve relative status, rather than to enforce cooperation

Cooperation and Punishment in Humans: Exploring the Effect of Power Asymmetries and the Motivations Underpinning Punishment

People willingly pay to harm cheats in economic games. Although, punishment ostensibly increases cooperation levels, consensus is lacking over when punishment can increase individual or group payoffs and what motivates punishment decisions. Most previous studies have assumed that all individuals are equal. However, in reality individuals often vary in terms of power, such that some players are able to inflict a greater cost on their partner than their partner is able to reciprocate. I investigated the effect of power asymmetries on cooperation and punishment in repeated prisoner's dilemma games with punishment both where cooperation investment was binary and where cooperation investment was variable. I found that punishment did not promote cooperation from targets in any conditions. Several studies have suggested that punishment may be motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion. These findings raise the possibility that individuals use punishment to restore equality. However, the alternative that punishment is simply motivated by a desire for revenge and is not tailored to achieve equality, cannot be ruled out. I used a modified dictator game with punishment to disentangle these two possibilities. I found evidence that punishment was motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality. Individuals often punish those who deviate from social norms. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possibility is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. Alternatively, individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals punished. To test these hypotheses, I used a modified public goods game with third party punishment. My results suggest that punishment of atypical behaviour might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators. In summary, my thesis sheds light on the conditions in which punishment is most likely to promote cooperation and on the motivations underpinning punishment decisions

Power asymmetries and punishment in a prisoner's dilemma with variable cooperative investment

In many two-player games, players that invest in punishment finish with lower payoffs than those who abstain from punishing. These results question the effectiveness of punishment at promoting cooperation, especially when retaliation is possible. It has been suggested that these findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal in terms of power. However, a previous empirical study which incorporated power asymmetries into an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game failed to show that power asymmetries stabilize cooperation when punishment is possible. Instead, players cooperated in response to their partner cooperating, and punishment did not yield any additional increase in tendency to cooperate. Nevertheless, this previous study only allowed an all-or-nothing–rather than a variable–cooperation investment. It is possible that power asymmetries increase the effectiveness of punishment from strong players only when players are able to vary their investment in cooperation. We tested this hypothesis using a modified IPD game which allowed players to vary their investment in cooperation in response to being punished. As in the previous study, punishment from strong players did not increase cooperation under any circumstances. Thus, in two-player games with symmetric strategy sets, punishment does not appear to increase cooperation

Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality

Humans willingly pay a cost to punish defecting partners in experimental games. However, the psychological motives underpinning punishment are unclear. Punishment could stem from the desire to reciprocally harm a cheat (i.e. revenge) which is arguably indicative of a deterrent function. Alternatively, punishment could be motivated by the desire to redress the balance between punisher and cheat. Such a desire for equality might be more indicative of a fitness-leveling function. We used a two player experimental game to disentangle these two possibilities. In this game, one player could choose to steal $0.20 from their partner. Depending on the treatment, players interacting with a stealing partner experienced either advantageous inequality, equal outcomes or disadvantageous inequality. Players could punish stealing partners, but some players had access to effective punishment (1:3 fee to fine) whereas others could only use ineffective punishment (1:1). Players who had access to effective punishment could reduce disadvantageous inequality by tailoring their investment in punishment whereas ineffective punishment did not change the relative payoffs of the individuals in the game but could be used to exact revenge. Players punished regardless of whether stealing created outcome inequality or whether punishment was ineffective at removing payoff differentials, suggesting that punishment was at least partly motivated by the desire to inflict reciprocal harm. However, in the effective punishment condition, players' tendency to punish increased if stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality and, when possible, punishers tailored their investment in punishment to create equal outcomes. Together these findings suggest that punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality. The implications of these findings are discussed

Social setting, intuition, and experience in lab experiments interact to shape cooperative decision-making

Recent studies suggest that cooperative decision-making in one-shot interactions is a history-dependent dynamic process: promoting intuition versus deliberation has typically a positive effect on cooperation (dynamism) among people living in a coop- erative setting and with no previous experience in economic games on cooperation (history-dependence). Here we report on a lab experiment exploring how these findings transfer to a non-cooperative setting. We find two major results: (i) promoting intuition versus deliberation has no effect on cooperative behavior among inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting; (ii) experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only under time pressure. These results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an instinctive impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates primarily via the channel of intuition. In doing so, our findings shed further light on the cognitive basis of human cooperative decision-making and provide further support for the recently proposed Social Heuristics Hypothesis

The impact of bisphosphonates on the osteoblast proliferation and Collagen gene expression in vitro

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Bisphosphonates are widely used in the clinical treatment of bone diseases with increased bone resorption. In terms of side effects, they are known to be associated with osteonecrosis of the jaw (BONJ).</p> <p>The objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of bisphosphonates on osteoblast proliferation by cell count and gene expression analysis of cyclin D1 <it>in vitro</it>. Furthermore, the gene expression of the extracellular matrix protein collagen type I was evaluated. Nitrogen-containing and non-nitrogen-containing bisphosphonates have been compared on gene expression levels.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Human osteoblast obtained from hip bone were stimulated with zoledronate, ibandronate and clodronate at concentrations of 5 × 10^-5M over the experimental periods of 1, 2, 5, 10 and 14 days. At each point in time, the cells were dissolved, the mRNA extracted, and the gene expression level of cyclin D1 and collagen type I were quantified by Real-Time RT-PCR. The gene expression was compared to an unstimulated osteoblast cell culture for control.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>The proliferation appeared to have been influenced only to a small degree by bisphosphonates. Zolendronate led to a lower cyclin D1 gene expression after 10 days. The collagen gene expression was enhanced by nitrogen containing bisphosphonates, decreased however after day 10. The non-nitrogen-containing bisphosphonate clodronate, however, did not significantly influence cyclin D1 and collagen gene expression.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>The above data suggest a limited influence of bisphosphonates on osteoblast proliferation, except for zoledronate. The extracellular matrix production seems to be initially advanced and inhibited after 10 days. Interestingly, clodronate has little influence on osteoblast proliferation and extracellular matrix production in terms of cyclin D1 and collagen gene expression.</p

A Phase Ib dose-escalation study to evaluate safety and tolerability of the addition of the aminopeptidase inhibitor tosedostat (CHR-2797) to paclitaxel in patients with advanced solid tumours

Contains fulltext : 89517timmer-bonte.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)BACKGROUND: This Phase Ib dose-escalating study investigated safety, maximum tolerated dose (MTD), dose-limiting toxicity (DLT), pharmacokinetics (PK) and clinical antitumour activity of tosedostat (CHR-2797), an orally bioavailable aminopeptidase inhibitor, in combination with paclitaxel. METHODS: A total of 22 patients received paclitaxel (135-175 mg m(-2)) intravenously, administered once every three weeks for up to six cycles, with oral tosedostat (90-240 mg) daily. RESULTS: One DLT (grade 3 dyspnoea) was observed in one patient with tosedostat 180 mg combined with paclitaxel 175 mg m(-2). A high number of paclitaxel infusion reactions was noted during the second administration (59%) and this prompted interruption of tosedostat dosing for 5 days around every second and subsequent paclitaxel infusion. No formal MTD was determined because of the high frequency of paclitaxel infusion reactions that may have been influenced by tosedostat. Most frequently observed drug-related adverse events were alopecia, fatigue (95% each), peripheral sensory neuropathy (59%), paclitaxel hypersensitivity (59%) and rash (55%). One patient died because of eosinophilic myocarditis, possibly related to study medication. There was no PK interaction between tosedostat and paclitaxel. In all, 3 patients had a partial response and 12 patients had stable disease lasting >3 months. CONCLUSION: The combination of tosedostat with paclitaxel was well tolerated except for the high incidence of paclitaxel-related infusion reactions

The predictive role of serum and bronchoalveolar lavage cytokines and adhesion molecules for acute respiratory distress syndrome development and outcome

BACKGROUND: The predictive role of many cytokines and adhesion molecules has not been studied systematically in acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). METHODS: We measured prospectively tumour necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α), interleukin (IL)-1, soluble vascular adhesion molecule-1 (VCAM-1) and soluble intercellular adhesion molecule-1 (ICAM-1) in serum and bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) within 2 hours following admission, in 65 patients. The patients were divided into: those fulfilling the criteria for ARDS (n = 23, group A), those who were pre-ARDS and who developed ARDS within 24 hours (n = 14, group B), and those on pre-ARDS but who never developed ARDS (n = 28, group C). RESULTS: All the measured molecules were only found at higher levels in the serum of patients that died either with or without ARDS (P < 0.05 – P < 0.0001). Patients at risk exhibited a good negative predictive value (NPV) of the measured molecules for ARDS development both in their serum (89 to 95%) and BALF (86 to 92%) levels. In contrast to BALF, serum levels of IL-1 and adhesion molecules exhibited a good NPV (68 to 96%), sensitivity (60 to 88%) and survival specificity (74 to 96%) in all groups. All molecules in serum and BALF IL-1 were correlated with the APACHE II (P < 0.05 – P < 0.0001). Serum and BALF IL-1 as well as BALF TNF-α were negatively correlated to PaO(2)/FiO(2) (all P < 0.05). CONCLUSIONS: The studied molecules have good NPV for ARDS development both in serum and BALF. Serum rather than BALF levels seem to be related to outcome