The Relationship Between Belief and Credence

Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one’s subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far

The stubborn non-probabilist : "negation incoherence" and a new way to block the Dutch Book argument

We rigorously specify the class of nonprobabilistic agents which are, we argue, immune to the classical Dutch Book argument. We also discuss the notion of expected value used in the argument as well as sketch future research connecting our results to those concerning incoherence measures

Reasoning with heuristics

Which rules should guide our reasoning? Human reasoners often use reasoning shortcuts, called heuristics, which function well in some contexts but lack the universality of reasoning rules like deductive implication or inference to the best explanation. Does it follow that human reasoning is hopelessly irrational? I argue: no. Heuristic reasoning often represents human reasoners reaching a local rational maximum, reasoning more accurately than if they try to implement more “ideal” rules of reasoning. I argue this is a genuine rational achievement. Our ideal rational advisors would advise us to reason with heuristic rules, not more complicated ideal rules. I argue we do not need a radical new account of epistemic norms to make sense of the success of heuristic reasoning

A Theory of Bayesian Groups

A group is often construed as a single agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated contribution “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) apply the Bayesian paradigm to groups by requiring group credences to undergo a Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever the individual credences undergo a Bayesian revision based on this information. Bayesians should often strengthen this requirement by extending it to non-public or even private information (learnt by not all or just one individual), or to non-representable information (not corresponding to an event in the algebra on which credences are held). I propose a taxonomy of six kinds of `group Bayesianism', which differ in the type of information for which Bayesian revision of group credences is required: public representable information, private representable information, public non-representable information, and so on. Six corresponding theorems establish exactly how individual credences must (not) be aggregated such that the resulting group credences obey group Bayesianism of any given type, respectively. Aggregating individual credences through averaging is never permitted. One of the theorems – the one concerned with public representable information – is essentially Russell et al.'s central result (with minor corrections)

7th SOSORT consensus paper: conservative treatment of idiopathic & Scheuermann's kyphosis

<p>Abstract</p> <p/> <p>Thoracic hyperkyphosis is a frequent problem and can impact greatly on patient's quality of life during adolescence. This condition can be idiopathic or secondary to Scheuermann disease, a disease disturbing vertebral growth. To date, there is no sound scientific data available on the management of this condition. Some studies discuss the effects of bracing, however no guidelines, protocols or indication's of treatment for this condition were found. The aim of this paper was to develop and verify the consensus on managing thoracic hyperkyphosis patients treated with braces and/or physiotherapy.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>The Delphi process was utilised in four steps gradually modified according to the results of a set of recommendations: we involved the SOSORT Board twice, then all SOSORT members twice, with a Pre-Meeting Questionnaire (PMQ), and during a Consensus Session at the SOSORT Lyon Meeting with a Meeting Questionnaire (MQ).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>There was an unanimous agreement on the general efficacy of bracing and physiotherapy for this condition. Most experts suggested the use of 4-5 point bracing systems, however there was some controversy with regards to physiotherapeutic aims and modalities.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The SOSORT panel of experts suggest the use of rigid braces and physiotherapy to correct thoracic hyperkyphosis during adolescence. The evaluation of specific braces and physiotherapy techniques has been recommended.</p

A Modified Sagittal Spine Postural Classification and Its Relationship to Deformities and Spinal Mobility in a Chinese Osteoporotic Population

BACKGROUND: Abnormal posture and spinal mobility have been demonstrated to cause functional impairment in the quality of life, especially in the postmenopausal osteoporotic population. Most of the literature studies focus on either thoracic kyphosis or lumbar lordosis, but not on the change of the entire spinal alignment. Very few articles reported the spinal alignment of Chinese people. The purpose of this study was threefold: to classify the spinal curvature based on the classification system defined by Satoh consisting of the entire spine alignment; to identify the change of trunk mobility; and to relate spinal curvature to balance disorder in a Chinese population. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: 450 osteoporotic volunteers were recruited for this study. Spinal range of motion and global curvature were evaluated noninvasively using the Spinal-Mouse® system and sagittal postural deformities were characterized. RESULTS: We found a new spine postural alignment consisting of an increased thoracic kyphosis and decreased lumbar lordosis which we classified as our modified round back. We did not find any of Satoh's type 5 classification in our population. Type 2 sagittal alignment was the most common spinal deformity (38.44%). In standing, thoracic kyphosis angles in types 2 (58.34°) and 3 (58.03°) were the largest and lumbar lordosis angles in types 4 (13.95°) and 5 (-8.61°) were the smallest. The range of flexion (ROF) and range of flexion-extension (ROFE) of types 2 and 3 were usually greater than types 4 and 5, with type 1 being the largest. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: The present study classified and compared for the first time the mobility, curvature and balance in a Chinese population based on the entire spine alignment and found types 4 and 5 to present the worst balance and mobility. This study included a new spine postural alignment classification that should be considered in future population studies

Fragmentation and logical omniscience

It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality — standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber 1983, Hacking 1967). To that end we develop a “fragmented” decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis 1982, Stalnaker 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as an agent's attention shifts, successive batches of "obvious" logical information become available to her. A rule of expected utility maximization can then be applied to the decision of what to attend to next during a train of thought. On the resulting theory, rationality requires ordinary agents to be logically competent and to often engage in trains of thought that increase the unification of their states of mind. But rationality does not require ordinary agents to be logically omniscient

Belief without Credence

One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. A prominent consideration in favor of credence-based epistemology is the ease with which it appears to account for rational action. In contrast, cases with risky payoff structures threaten to break the link between rational belief and rational action. This threat poses a challenge to traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief. The core problem, we suggest, is that belief may not be enough to register all aspects of a subject’s epistemic position with respect to any given proposition. We claim this problem can be solved by introducing other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations—that differ in strength from belief. The resulting alternative picture, a kind of doxastic states pluralism, retains the central features of traditional epistemology—most saliently, an emphasis on truth as a kind of objective accuracy—while adequately accounting for rational action

Di che cosa si parla: contro la coalizione dei nemici interni ed esterni adesso marciano insieme il grande Reich e la nuova Italia

Soldato italiano e soldato tedesco con bandiere; a sinistra un gruppo di uomini con cartello: Noi siamo ribelli; a destra un gruppo di cinque uomini composto da Vittorio Emanuele III, due inglesi, un americano e un sovietico con cartello: Noi siamo liberatori Firma dell'autore sul recto. Cerchio barrato/IV/48 e data: 26-4-44 sul recto. Il cerchio indica la produzione germanica (Propaganda Staffel, scaglioni militari preposti alla propaganda germanica); la cifra romana indica il numero dello scaglione. Per l'autore cfr.: 1943-45 : l'immagine della RSI nella propaganda / a cura della Fondazione Luigi Micheletti. - Milano : Mazzotta, 1985. - P. 15.Tecnica di stampa: fotolitografi