How did the Welsh government manage to reform council tax in 2005?

Repeated calls have been made for council tax (CT) in the UK to be reformed. A ‘tyranny of the status quo’ suggests that politicians will avoid this because they fear a backlash from the losers of reform. This paper claims that the tyranny of the status quo is not a fixed law. The Welsh government revalued CT in 2005 but did not communicate the complexity of reform sufficiently. Reform requires greater efforts to communicate the complexity of winning and losing

Competition and regulatory policy: 2012

This paper provides a short introduction to the papers in the special section below on economic regulation in infrastructure industries. The papers are from the CCRP Research Workshop held at City University, London in January 2012. The topics covered include (i) supply-side competition for airports (Bilotkatch and Mueller); (ii) resource cost pricing in the water supply industry and how best to establish the value of water (Stern and Mirrlees-Black); and (iii) the role and regulation of hydro pumped storage for electricity in an environment where the role of intermittent renewable generation is growing (Rangoni)

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications

We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered

Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!

Premi a l'excel·lència investigadora. 2010Publicat també com a : CEPR Discussion Paper - ISSN 0265-8003 Núm. 5929 (2006), p. 1-55We quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity differences of households. The optimal capital income tax rate is significantly positive at 36 percent. The optimal progressive labor income tax is, roughly, a flat tax of 23 percent with a deduction of #7,200 (relative to average household income of #42,000). The high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life-cycle structure of the model, whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system. (JEL E13, H21, H24, H25

Viable tax constitutions

Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an outside party enforcing contracts between members of a group, no arrangement within groups can be considered to be a binding contract, and therefore the power of tax must be sanctioned by individuals on an ongoing basis. In this paper we offer, for the first time, a theoretical analysis of this fundamental compliance problem associated with taxation, obtaining predictions that in some cases point to a re-interptretation of the theoretical constructions of the public finance tradition while in others call them into question

Rectifiability of Optimal Transportation Plans

The purpose of this note is to show that the solution to the Kantorovich optimal transportation problem is supported on a Lipschitz manifold, provided the cost is $C^{2}$ with non-singular mixed second derivative. We use this result to provide a simple proof that solutions to Monge's optimal transportation problem satisfy a change of variables equation almost everywhere

Constraints on profit income distribution and production efficiency in private ownership economies with Ramsey taxation

Author's draft published as discussion paper by University of Exeter Department of Economics. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn economies with Ramsey taxation, decreasing returns to scale, and private ownership, we show that second-best production efficiency is desirable when the grouping of private firms induced by the profit taxation power of the government is at least as fine as the grouping of firms induced by the institutional rules of profit distribution in the economy. The classic results of Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1972] (of firm-specific profit taxation) and Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] and Guesnerie [1995] (of uniform one-hundred percent profit taxation) follow as special cases of our model. Moreover, second-best analysis shows that optimal profit taxation is a substitute for optimal intermediate input taxation. In smooth economies, proportional, lump-sum, and affine modes of profit taxation are equivalent. We rework Mirrlees [1972] counterexample, which is posed in the context of a non-smooth economy, to show that second-best production efficiency continues to remain desirable under an affine structure of profit taxation