The information phase of accountability : The role of management boards in European Union agencies

The creation of European Union agencies has prompted normative and theoretical discussions about their accountability and democratic legitimacy. This study examines the extent to which different features concerning the institutional design of agencies incentivize information provision on their performance. To do so, it measures four aspects for which their governing bodies are expected to provide information: governance decisions, policy performance, financial issues, and interactions with stakeholders. Using a new data set of informative statements included in 199 annual activity reports of 29 agencies during the period 2010-2016, this study demonstrates that formal accountability positively affects information provision on governance and policy issues, and that the establishment of scientific bodies within agencies improves information provision on governance aspects, policy performance and their interactions with stakeholders. Finally, this article finds that agencies that perform more direct regulation are subject to greater transparency demands about their governance decisions and stakeholder interactions. Points for practitioners: The study provides practitioners with an analytical tool for assessing the provision of information about the decisions and actions of management boards on governance issues, policy performance, financial aspects and their interactions with stakeholders

The European Parliament oversight of EU agencies through written questions

The reinforcement of the legislative and oversight powers of the European Parliament by virtue of successive treaty reforms over the last two decades has been in parallel with an expanding process of agency creation at the European Union (EU) level. While these two institutional developments entail major transformations of legislative-executive relations in the EU, the European Parliament oversight of EU agencies remains an underexplored topic of research. Based on an original dataset on parliamentary written questions overseeing EU agencies asked during the 2009-14 Legislature, the article analyses members of the European Parliament (MEPs) questioning activity overseeing EU agencies. The article argues that legislative oversight of agencies through written questions is driven by MEPs national party opposition status as well as by agency salience and size

Accountability for public policies the case of health policy in Spain

This research is a contribution to the analysis, measurement and explanation of accountability for public policies. Firstly, I develop a proposal to analyze and measure accountability for public policies. This proposal is innovative since it provides an analytical framework that can be used to measure and compare levels of accountability in different kinds of policies (e.g., health, education, pensions, etc.) or in different contexts (from countries or regions to complex multi-layered authority structures). Secondly, I test the validity of my proposal with an empirical application centered in the health policy in Spain, whose decentralized design allows analyzing the differences in levels of accountability of health policies in each of the 17 autonomous communities. Finally, I analyze the causal conditions that can -or can not- lead to the accountability of this public policy.Esta investigación es una contribución al análisis, la medición y la explicación de la rendición de cuentas de las políticas públicas. En primer lugar, desarrollo una propuesta para analizar y medir la rendición de cuentas de las políticas públicas. Esta propuesta es innovadora, ya que proporciona un marco analítico que puede ser utilizado para medir y comparar niveles de rendición de cuentas en diferentes áreas de políticas (por ejemplo, salud, educación, pensiones) y en diferentes contextos (por ejemplo, entre distintos países, regiones o gobiernos multinivel). En segundo lugar, pongo a prueba la validez de mi propuesta con una aplicación empírica centrada en la política de salud en España, cuyo diseño descentralizado permite analizar las diferencias en los niveles de rendición de cuentas de esta política en cada una de las diecisiete comunidades autónomas. Finalmente, analizo las variables que pueden favorecer o dificultar la rendición de cuentas de esta política pública

Interest group representation in the formal design of EU agencies

This article examines the decision to include interest group representation (IGR) in the most important decisionmaking bodies of European Union agencies (EAs). The study shows that there is considerable variation among agencies: some agencies have no IGR, others have formal rules that establish a clear distribution of the number of representatives among stakeholders, while other agencies are ambiguous with regard to the number of representatives that each group should have. In addition, interest group representatives have the right to vote in some of the agencies with IGR, while in others they only have an advisory role. This article identifies three broad types of groups normally represented: representatives of capital (e.g. industry), representatives of labor (e.g. trade unions), and citizens' representatives (e.g. non‐governmental organizations, consumer groups). The findings suggest that informative agencies are more likely to have IGR than agencies performing operational/management tasks. The findings also suggest that the involvement of the European Parliament in the design of EAs is more likely to lead to a provision for the representation of stakeholders. Finally, case studies of the European Food Safety Agency and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work demonstrate that interest groups could play an important role by pushing European Union institutions to include stakeholder representatives in EAs

Accountability from the perspective of the forum: citizens’ attitudes towards accountability in Europe

The aim of this article is to analyse citizens’ attitudes towards governmental accountability in 24 European countries and to examine the influence of contextual and individual factors on perceptions of accountability. Using as a dataset the 2012 European Social Survey, the results show that citizens respond positively when the media provides reliable information on which to judge the government, when individuals perceive that governments perform well, when individuals live in more extensive and generous welfare states and when they live in countries where the rule of law is firmly established. In addition, the findings also provide evidence that compared to politically left-wing citizens, right-wing supporters have, on average, a higher perception of governmental accountability. In particular, the findings show strong positive evaluations of right-wing governments by right-wing voters in comparison with left-wing governments by left-wing voters

Efectos del diseño electoral municipal en la formación y en el ejercicio del poder en México

El objetivo central de este análisis es plantear que el diseño institucional del sistema electoral adoptado en los gobiernos municipales en México influye y produce efectos políticos y públicos tanto en la formación del poder, como en el ejercicio de éste. Haber elegido un cuerpo colegiado con fuertes poderes legales y partidarios en manos del alcalde, un sistema de representación proporcional como corrección, formas de candidaturas mediante listas cerradas y bloqueadas en la elección de regidores y síndicos municipales, así como la imposibilidad de reelección inmediata de los miembros del ayuntamiento, genera consecuencias durante la formación del poder, pero también durante el ejercicio de éste, influyendo así en algunos de los problemas que se desarrollan en dicho ejercicio

Political and stakeholder’s ties in European Union agencies

<p>Some scholars consider that European Union agencies (EAs) were created as independent bodies in order to enhance the credibility of the European Union decision-making process. Scholars have typically focused on analysing the relationship that these agencies have with politicians. However, relatively little attention has been paid to their relationship with stakeholders. This study examines the professional trajectory of EA board members, identifying their career ties with politicians and stakeholders. Using an original dataset on the career trajectories of 338 top officials in 33 EAs, the findings provide evidence that the type of appointing body matters: on the one hand, the European Parliament is more likely – than the Commission – to appoint individuals having career ties to politicians; on the other hand, multiple veto players are less likely to designate board members linked to political players. Additionally, the findings suggest that agencies performing regulatory tasks seem to be more inclined to have lower levels of <i>de facto</i> independence from politicians.</p