Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral Hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventiocollaboration, basic research, applied research, project, firms, universities, partnership governance

Incentives for Interdisciplinary Research

This paper is a positive analysis of the driving forces in interdisciplinary research. I take the perspective of a research institution that has to decide how to apply its resources among the production of two types of knowledge: specialized or interdisciplinary. Using a prize mechanism of compensation, I show that the choice of interdisciplinarity is compatible with profit maximization when the requirement for the production is sufficiently demanding, and when the new interdisciplinary field is not too neutral. Productive gains due to complementarities of efforts is the main advantage of interdisciplinary organization.scientific research, specialization, interdisciplinarity, adaptative-skills, prizes, standards

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventi

Incentives for interdisciplinary research

This paper is a positive analysis of the driving forces in interdisciplinary research. I take the perspective of a research institution that has to decide how to apply its resources among the production of two types of knowledge: specialized or interdisciplinary. Using a prize mechanism of compensation, I show that the choice of interdisciplinarity is compatible with profit maximization when the requirement for the production is sufficiently demanding, and when the new interdisciplinary field is not too neutral. Productive gains due to complementarities of efforts is the main advantage of interdisciplinary organization

Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral Hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds (...) .Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (Portugal), BEC2003-01132 (Spain), and Centre Tecnològic Forestal de Catalunya (Spain) are gratefully acknowledged.Peer reviewe

Topics on the (Re)organization of Knowledge

Mi trabajo de investigación se centra en el estudio de problemas organizacionales en situaciones de colaboración. En particular, esta tesis se compone de tres capítulos en los que analizo problemas de incentivos en la investigación interdisciplinar y en acuerdos de colaboración entre empresas y universidades. El primero capitulo de mi tesis, "Incentives for Interdisciplinary Research", es (hasta el momento y según mi conocimiento) el primero trabajo que caracteriza formalmente la investigación interdisciplinar a través de complementariedad en la producción y desventaja innata en los costes para el desarrollo de una nueva área científica. Mi trabajo demuestra que cuando los objetivos de la investigación son suficientemente exigentes, la investigación interdiciplinar es preferible a la investigación especializada. En el segundo capítulo de la tesis, "Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral-Hazard", analizo cómo las características de acuerdos de colaboración son el resultado de un contrato óptimo entre las partes contratantes. Además, el tipo de acuerdo puede ser un importante instrumento de incentivo cuando algún (algunos) de los recursos importantes para la colaboración no son contratables. El análisis se hace en dos dimensiones: de la estructura del gobierno del acuerdo (descentralizada o centralizada), y de los problemas de información que esa estructura enfrenta. Aunque una estructura descentralizada siempre elije proyectos que están más cercanos a los intereses de la parte gobernante, las dos estructuras podrán utilizar el proyecto como mecanismo para reducir el efecto de riesgo moral. El tercero capítulo de la tesis, "Patents and Business-Science Research Partnership" (escrito en conjunto con Walter Garcia-Fontes), presenta un estudio empírico que relaciona las características de patentes con el proceso de investigación que las precedieron. Utilizando datos de patentes europeas, los resultados de este capítulo están de acuerdo con las predicciones teóricas del capítulo anterior de esta tesis: la identidad institucional de las organizaciones que hacen la investigación se hacen visibles en las características de las patentes.The research of my PhD dissertation focuses on the study of organizational problems, in the context of collaborative relations. In particular, the dissertation is composed by three chapters, in which I analyze incentives problems in interdisciplinary research and in collaboration agreements between firms and universities. The first chapter of the thesis, "Incentives for Interdisciplinary Research", is (up to the moment and to my knowledge), the first article that formally characterizes interdisciplinary research: through the presence of complementarities in the production and through an innate cost disadvantage, when developing a new scientific area. My work shows that when the goals for the research are sufficiently demanding, interdisciplinarity is preferred to specialization. In the second chapter of the thesis, "Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral-Hazard", I analyze on how the characteristics of a research agreement can be the optimal outcome of a contract between the parties. Furthermore, the type of project can also be an importance incentive tool when some of the resources that are important for the success are non-verifiable and non-contractibe. The analysis is developed in two dimensions: the structure of partnership governance (decentralized and centralized), and the informational constraints that such structures may face. Even if a decentralized structure chooses a type of project that is closer to the interests of the governing party, both structures may optimally use the project as a mechanism to reduce the impact of moral-hazard. In the third chapter of the thesis, "Patents and Business-Science Research Partnership" (jointly written with Walter Garcia-Fontes), I present an empirical study that relates the characteristics of the patents with the research process that lead to the inventions. Using data from the European Inventors Survey, PatVal-EU, the results of this chapter are aligned with the theoretical predictions of the previous chapter of the thesis: the institutional identity of the research organizations are associated with different basicness levels of the patens

Incentives for Interdisciplinary Research

This paper is a positive analysis of the driving forces in interdisciplinary research. I take the perspective of a research institution that has to decide how to apply its resources among the production of two types of knowledge: specialized or interdisciplinary. Using a prize mechanism of compensation, I show that the choice of interdisciplinarity is compatible with profit maximization when the requirement for the production is sufficiently demanding, and when the new interdisciplinary field is not too neutral. Productive gains due to complementarities of efforts is the main advantage of interdisciplinary organization.I am grateful to the fellowship of Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (Portugal), and to the financial support from BEC2003-01132 (Spain).Peer reviewe

Incentives for interdisciplinary research

This paper is a positive analysis of the driving forces in interdisciplinary research. I take the perspective of a research institution that has to decide how to apply its resources among the production of two types of knowledge: specialized or interdisciplinary. Using a prize mechanism of compensation, I show that the choice of interdisciplinarity is compatible with profit maximization when the requirement for the production is sufficiently demanding, and when the new interdisciplinary field is not too neutral. Productive gains due to complementarities of efforts is the main advantage of interdisciplinary organization

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventi