Rewriting the Constitution::A Critique of 'Postphenomenology''

This paper builds a three part argument in favour of a more transcendentally focused form of 'postphenomenology' than is currently practised in philosophy of technology. It does so by problematising two key terms, 'constitution' and 'postphenomenology', then by arguing in favour of a 'transcendental empiricist' approach that draws on the work of Foucault, Derrida, and, in particular, Deleuze. Part one examines 'constitution', as it moves from the context of Husserl's phenomenology to Ihde and Verbeek's 'postphenomenology'. I argue that the term tends towards different senses in these contexts, and that this renders its sense more problematic than the work of Ihde and Verbeek makes it appear. Part two examines 'postphenomenology'. I argue that putatively 'poststructuralist' thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze may be better characterised as 'postphenomenologists', and that approaching them in this way may allow better access to their work from a philosophy of technology perspective. Part three argues for a 'transcendental empiricist' approach to philosophy of technology. In doing so, it argues for a rewriting of contemporary philosophy of technology's political constitution: since an 'empirical turn' in the 1990s, I argue, philosophy of technology has been too narrowly focused on 'empirical' issues of fact, and not focused enough on 'transcendental' issues concerning conditions for these facts.<br/

Lifeworld Inc. : and what to do about it

Can we detect changes in the way that the world turns up as they turn up? This paper makes such an attempt. The first part of the paper argues that a wide-ranging change is occurring in the ontological preconditions of Euro-American cultures, based in reworking what and how an event is produced. Driven by the security – entertainment complex, the aim is to mass produce phenomenological encounter: Lifeworld Inc as I call it. Swimming in a sea of data, such an aim requires the construction of just enough authenticity over and over again. In the second part of the paper, I go on to argue that this new world requires a different kind of social science, one that is experimental in its orientation—just as Lifeworld Inc is—but with a mission to provoke awareness in untoward ways in order to produce new means of association. Only thus, or so I argue, can social science add to the world we are now beginning to live in

Telepresence and the Role of the Senses

The telepresence experience can be evoked in a number of ways. A well-known example is a player of videogames who reports about a telepresence experience, a subjective experience of being in one place or environment, even when physically situated in another place. In this paper we set the phenomenon of telepresence into a theoretical framework. As people react subjectively to stimuli from telepresence, empirical studies can give more evidence about the phenomenon. Thus, our contribution is to bridge the theoretical with the empirical. We discuss theories of perception with an emphasis on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gibson, the role of the senses and the Spinozian belief procedure. The aim is to contribute to our understanding of this phenomenon. A telepresence-study that included the affordance concept is used to empirically study how players report sense-reactions to virtual sightseeing in two cities. We investigate and explore the interplay of the philosophical and the empirical. The findings indicate that it is not only the visual sense that plays a role in this experience, but all senses

Doing it differently: Engaging interview participants with imaginative variation

Imaginative variation was identified by Husserl (1936/1970) as a phenomenological technique for the purpose of elucidating the manner in which phenomena appear to consciousness. Briefly, by engaging in the phenomenological reduction and using imaginative variation, phenomenologists are able to describe the experience of consciousness, having stepped outside of the natural attitude through the epochē. Imaginative variation is a stage aimed at explicating the structures of experience, and is best described as a mental experiment. Features of the experience are imaginatively altered in order to view the phenomenon under investigation from varying perspectives. Husserl argued that this process will reveal the essences of an experience, as only those aspects that are invariant to the experience of the phenomenon will not be able to change through the variation. Often in qualitative research interviews, participants struggle to articulate or verbalise their experiences. The purpose of this article is to detail a radical and novel way of using imaginative variation with interview participants, by asking the participants to engage with imaginative variation, in order to produce a rich and insightful experiential account of a phenomenon. We will discuss how the first author successfully used imaginative variation in this way in her study of the erotic experience of bondage, discipline, dominance & submission, and sadism & masochism (BDSM), before considering the usefulness of this technique when applied to areas of study beyond sexuality

Survival of dental implants in patients with oral cancer treated by surgery and radiotherapy: a retrospective study

BACKGROUND: The aim of this retrospective study was to evaluate the survival of dental implants placed after ablative surgery, in patients affected by oral cancer treated with or without radiotherapy. METHODS: We collected data for 34 subjects (22 females, 12 males; mean age: 51 ± 19) with malignant oral tumors who had been treated with ablative surgery and received dental implant rehabilitation between 2007 and 2012. Postoperative radiation therapy (less than 50 Gy) was delivered before implant placement in 12 patients. A total of 144 titanium implants were placed, at a minimum interval of 12 months, in irradiated and non-irradiated residual bone. RESULTS: Implant loss was dependent on the position and location of the implants (P = 0.05-0.1). Moreover, implant survival was dependent on whether the patient had received radiotherapy. This result was highly statistically significant (P < 0.01). Whether the implant was loaded is another highly significant (P < 0.01) factor determinin

Papier-mach(in)e: Thinking with “sticky” paper in the cloud

There is nothing less about paper and its use when it comes to academic study as we experience increasingly converging media spaces and functionalities of online applications within the screens of our laptops, mobile phones and tablet devices. The paper persists, and the paperless office, classroom and pedagogy become nothing but pure rhetoric. Hence, it is most pertinent to focus on paper and its “stickiness” in maintaining educational structures and practices. Usually hidden from view or neglected in educational technology studies is a consideration on how we think and interact not only with our mind but also with our heads and limbs. This paper will argue that paper has a composite place or bearing, a kind of stickiness to our technologised bodies, digital mobilities and hybrid practices in what I have coined here as papier-mach(in)e. This claim will be supported by evidence that demonstrates how we simply think both practically and pathically and that our mobilities in media and physical spaces are in one form or another meshed with paper. In fact, a drive towards a paperless classroom or pedagogy is without much foundation when it comes to mobilising a sustainable agenda for technology-enhanced learning

The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects

In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of artifacts in our environment. Lifelogs, photos, videos, journals, diaries, souvenirs, jewelry, books, works of art, and many other meaningful objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally-laden autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memory is thus distributed across embodied agents and various environmental structures. To defend this claim, I draw on and integrate distributed cognition theory and empirical research in human-technology interaction. Based on this, I conclude that the self is neither defined by psychological states realized by the brain nor by biological states realized by the organism, but should be seen as a distributed and relational construct

The (im)materiality of literacy : the significance of subjectivity to new literacies research.

This article deconstructs the online and offline experience to show its complexities and idiosyncratic nature. It proposes a theoretical framework designed to conceptualise aspects of meaning-making across on- and offline contexts. In arguing for the ‘(im)materiality’ of literacy, it makes four propositions which highlight the complex and diverse relationships between the immaterial and material associated with meaning-making. Complementing existing sociocultural perspectives on literacy, the article draws attention to the significance of relationships between space, mediation, materiality and embodiment to literacy practices. This in turn emphasises the importance of the subjective in understanding how different locations, experiences and so forth inflect literacy practice. The article concludes by drawing on the Deleuzian concept of the ‘baroque’ to suggest that this focus on articulations between the material and immaterial helps us to see literacy as multiply and flexibly situated

Enacting the Soft Automaton: Empirical Ontologies of Two Soft Robots from Technical Research and Media Art

This paper examines two soft robots from technical research and media art respectively and the practices through which they come into being. Departing from a juxtaposition of video presentations of the two robots, the empirical ontologies of a soft robot enacted in practice are analysed. The paper argues that two different versions of softness are being done and that the two sets of practices concomitantly respecify “knowledge” and “autonomy” as concepts, with different ethical and political implications.This paper examines two soft robots from technical research and media art respectively and the practices through which they come into being. Departing from a juxtaposition of video presentations of the two robots, the empirical ontologies of a soft robot enacted in practice are analysed. The paper argues that two different versions of softness are being done and that the two sets of practices concomitantly respecify “knowledge” and “autonomy” as concepts, with different ethical and political implications

Visualism and technification—the patient behind the screen

At stake in this study is the patient's credibility. The Cartesian philosophical standpoint, which holds sway in western thinking, questions with scepticism whether the reported symptoms are “real.” Do they reside in the body, or are they mentally concocted. However, from the caring perspective any symptom must be both listened and attended to in its own right, not just scrutinized as evidence for an accurate diagnosis