Governance or Poverty Reduction? Assessing Budget Support in Nicaragua

__Abstract__ General Budget Support (GBS) is assumed to lead to more effective poverty reduction through non-earmarking of the money and through recipient country ownership. A second and more hidden objective of GBS, however, is to influence policies and governance of recipient countries. This paper develops an evaluation framework that takes the tensions between these two objectives into account. It then assesses the results of GBS in Nicaragua under two administrations. It concludes that for most donors, the aim of improving governance was more important than poverty reduction, in both government periods, thus reducing the effect of GBS on poverty reduction. In addition, donor influence on governance was limited

Foreign Aid Transaction Costs: What are they and when are they minimised?

'Transaction costs' are commonly referred to in the recent literature on aid effectiveness. Aid transaction costs, however, have been neither consistently defined nor measured. This article defines aid transaction costs as all the economic costs associated with aid management that add no value to aid delivery. This enables the 'net' transaction costs that should be minimised to be identified. An analytical framework is then developed for assessing these costs. This allows the effectiveness of different aid modalities to be compared, according to the characteristics of the aid transaction. The article shows that the choice of aid modality should depend on these characteristics and, therefore, that the minimisation of transaction costs should not be an end in itself.Peer reviewe

The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid

Motivation: Budget support is the form of aid most commonly associated with recipient‐country ownership. However, a number of scholars and practitioners have criticized the approach as masking new forms of conditionality. Was budget support simply a guise for increasing donor influence in recipient countries? How can we explain the rapid shift towards budget support, as well as the rapid decline in its popularity after only a few years? Purpose: We use a bargaining framework to explain the rise and fall of budget support. Contrary to explanations that suggest that budget support was a normative decision by donors designed to increase aid effectiveness by fostering ownership, a bargaining framework emphasizes that aid policy is the result of sustained negotiations between donors and recipients. These negotiations, however, are constrained by donors' inability to deliver aid as promised. Approach: We use a Nash bargaining framework to formalize the predictions of a bargaining model. From the model, two testable predictions emerge: (1) in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient governments are willing to selectively offer donor agencies greater access to and influence over domestic policy decision-making; and (2) in exchange for such influence, donor agencies are willing to exert less pressure on recipients to be politically inclusive. We then test the implications of the model using case‐study evidence from Rwanda and Tanzania. Findings: The empirical data, based on over 80 interviews with practitioners over several periods of research in both countries, provide substantial evidence in support of the model's core assumptions and predictions. Contrary to claims that budget support increased recipient‐country ownership, interviews (identified as personal communications) suggest that, in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient governments were willing to grant donors greater access and influence. In return, donor agencies reduced demands on the recipient government regarding political inclusivity, tacitly accepting arrangements that centralized decision‐making and excluded civil society. When donor agencies could no longer provide budget support as promised, these negotiated arrangements broke down. Policy Implications: The findings challenge a common narrative that donors embraced budget support because of a normative commitment to ownership. They also demonstrate the value of a bargaining framework. To understand why particular forms of aid, like budget support, rise in popularity only to quickly fall by the wayside, we need to understand what donor agencies and recipient governments bargain over and why

Not such a good bargain for (the evidence on) budget support

This is a comment on the article by Haley Swedlund and Malte Lierl, “The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid” (2020), which appeared in a special issue on “Ownership in a post-aid effectiveness era: Comparative perspectives” edited by Niels Keijzer and David Black

Performance-Based Aid: Why it will probably not meet promises

Performance-based aid (PBA) is increasingly advocated as a way to improve development aid effectiveness through resolving incentive issues inherent in aid relationships. Some donors use PBA together with performance-based financing arrangements within partner countries. Expectations from PBA are high – yet, while its rationale may look appealing, it is grounded on a restrictive model and flawed when taking account of real-world context. A number of problems associated to PBA have already been advanced as jeopardising its success. More fundamentally, one may question the mere appropriateness of PBA to provide incentives all along the chain from recipient governments to those who are supposed to produce results. Thus believing that PBA can have a mechanistic trickle-down incentive effect seems an illusion.GRAP-PA Sant

From policy to practice: changing government attitudes towards the private sector in Malawi

This paper reviews relations between government and the private sector in Malawi from independence to the present. The analysis charts the changing emphasis that official policy has attached to the role of the private sector throughout the transition from dictatorship to democracy; and from a PRSP that effectively ignored the role of the private sector in national development, to the current more balanced approach that recognises the private sector as the 'engine of economic growth' and the best means of achieving poverty reduction. However, in spite of progress, Malawi's private sector remains fragile and while the rhetoric from the highest levels of government towards the private sector has evolved, the enabling environment for private sector development is still inhospitable. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.