Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies

Cooperation and defection may be considered as two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means of continuous strategies defining the extent of the contributions of each individual player to the common pool. If strategies are chosen from the unit interval, where 0 corresponds to pure defection and 1 corresponds to the maximal contribution, the question is what is the characteristic level of individual investments to the common pool that emerges if the evolution is guided by different benefit functions. Here we consider the steepness and the threshold as two parameters defining an array of generalized benefit functions, and we show that in a structured population there exist intermediate values of both at which the collective contributions are maximal. However, as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation increases the characteristic threshold decreases, while the corresponding steepness increases. Our observations remain valid if more complex sigmoid functions are used, thus reenforcing the importance of carefully adjusted benefits for high levels of public cooperation.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Correlation of Positive and Negative Reciprocity Fails to Confer an Evolutionary Advantage: Phase Transitions to Elementary Strategies

Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types of conditional cooperators compete for space. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the public good only if other players within the group are likely to cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Depending on the number of other cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of a conditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as many types as there are players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, such that require all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators, are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary process, even at very low synergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is due primarily to the spontaneous emergence of quarantining of defectors, which become surrounded by conditional cooperators and are forced into isolated convex "bubbles" from where they are unable to exploit the public good. This phenomenon can be observed only in structured populations, thus adding to the relevance of pattern formation for the successful evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding

Our wellbeing depends as much on our personal success, as it does on the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation a very much needed trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remain elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite of its success, rewarding is not as firmly weaved into our societal organization as punishment.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

The Role of Mesotocin on Social Bonding in Pinyon Jays

The neuropeptide oxytocin influences mammalian social bonding by facilitating the building and maintenance of parental, sexual, and same‐sex social relationships. However, we do not know whether the function of the avian homologue mesotocin is evolutionarily conserved across birds. While it does influence avian prosocial behavior, mesotocin\u27s role in avian social bonding remains unclear. Here, we investigated whether mesotocin regulates the formation and maintenance of same‐sex social bonding in pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus), a member of the crow family. We formed squads of four individually housed birds. In the first, “pair‐formation” phase of the experiment, we repeatedly placed pairs of birds from within the squad together in a cage for short periods of time. Prior to entering the cage, we intranasally administered one of three hormone solutions to both members of the pair: mesotocin, oxytocin antagonist, or saline. Pairs received repeated sessions with administration of the same hormone. In the second, “pair‐maintenance” phase of the experiment, all four members of the squad were placed together in a large cage, and no hormones were administered. For both phases, we measured the physical proximity between pairs as our proxy for social bonding. We found that, compared with saline, administering mesotocin or oxytocin antagonist did not result in different proximities in either the pair‐formation or pair‐maintenance phase of the experiment. Therefore, at the dosages and time frames used here, exogenously introduced mesotocin did not influence same‐sex social bond formation or maintenance. Like oxytocin in mammals, mesotocin regulates avian prosocial behavior; however, unlike oxytocin, we do not have evidence that mesotocin regulates social bonds in birds

Expanding Transformative Experience

We develop a broader, more fine-grained taxonomy of forms of transformative experience, inspired by the work of L. A. Paul. Our vulnerability to such experiences arises, we argue, due to the vulnerability, dependence, and affliction intrinsic to the human condition. We use this trio to distinguish a variety of positively, negatively, and ambivalently valenced forms of epistemically and/or personally transformative experiences. Moreover, we argue that many transformative experiences can arise gradually and cumulatively, unfolding over the course of longer periods of time

Middleborns disadvantaged? testing birth-order effects on fitness in pre-industrial finns

Parental investment is a limited resource for which offspring compete in order to increase their own survival and reproductive success. However, parents might be selected to influence the outcome of sibling competition through differential investment. While evidence for this is widespread in egg-laying species, whether or not this may also be the case in viviparous species is more difficult to determine. We use pre-industrial Finns as our model system and an equal investment model as our null hypothesis, which predicts that (all else being equal) middleborns should be disadvantaged through competition. We found no overall evidence to suggest that middleborns in a family are disadvantaged in terms of their survival, age at first reproduction or lifetime reproductive success. However, when considering birth-order only among same-sexed siblings, first-, middle-and lastborn sons significantly differed in the number of offspring they were able to rear to adulthood, although there was no similar effect among females. Middleborn sons appeared to produce significantly less offspring than first-or lastborn sons, but they did not significantly differ from lastborn sons in the number of offspring reared to adulthood. Our results thus show that taking sex differences into account is important when modelling birth-order effects. We found clear evidence of firstborn sons being advantaged over other sons in the family, and over firstborn daughters. Therefore, our results suggest that parents invest differentially in their offspring in order to both preferentially favour particular offspring or reduce offspring inequalities arising from sibling competition

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in neutral populations

Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the formation of homogeneous clusters, which is the hallmark of network reciprocity. Here we go beyond this traditional setup and study the spatiotemporal dynamics of cooperation in a population of populations. We use the prisoner's dilemma game as the mathematical model and show that considering several populations simultaneously give rise to fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics and pattern formation. Even the simplest assumption that strategies between different populations are payoff-neutral with one another results in the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, where defectors of one population become prey of cooperators in the other population, and vice versa. Moreover, if social interactions within different populations are characterized by significantly different temptations to defect, we observe that defectors in the population with the largest temptation counterintuitively vanish the fastest, while cooperators that hang on eventually take over the whole available space. Our results reveal that considering the simultaneous presence of different populations significantly expands the complexity of evolutionary dynamics in structured populations, and it allow us to understand the stability of cooperation under adverse conditions that could never be bridged by network reciprocity alone.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

Grandparental Child Care in Europe : Evidence for Preferential Investment in More Certain Kin

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