ORGANIC AGRICULTURE - rural development measures aimed at organic production of vegetables, fruits and grapes

Ekološka poljoprivredna proizvodnja se u Hrvatskoj provodi od 2001. godine. Do sada je financirana iz nacionalnih izvora, poštujući pri tome pravila koja vrijede na nivou EU. Ista se pravila ekološke proizvodnje nastavljaju, dok su se uvjeti i obveze za ostvarenje potpore neznatno promijenili. Zbog nezagađene prirode, tla, zraka i vode, ekološko povrćarstvo, voćarstvo i vinogradarstvo predstavljaju ogroman potencijal za razvoj.Organic agricultural production has been implemented in Croatia in 2001. So far it was financed from national resources, while complying with the rules that apply on the EU level at the same time. Although the same rules of organic production continue to apply, the terms and conditions to receive financial aid have slightly changed. Organic vegetables, fruits and grapes have a considerable potential to develop further due to unpolluted soil, air, water and environment in general

ManyDogs Project: A Big Team Science Approach to Investigating Canine Behavior and Cognition

Dogs have a special place in human history as the first domesticated species and play important roles in many cultures around the world. However, their role in scientific studies has been relatively recent. With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Darwin, Pavlov, Scott, and Fuller), domestic dogs were not commonly the subject of rigorous scientific investigation of behavior until the late 1990s. Although the number of canine science studies has increased dramatically over the last 20 years, most research groups are limited in the inferences they can draw because of the relatively small sample sizes used, along with the exceptional diversity observed in dogs (e.g., breed, geographic location, experience). To this end, we introduce the ManyDogs Project, an international consortium of researchers interested in taking a big team science approach to understanding canine behavioral science. We begin by discussing why studying dogs provides valuable insights into behavior and cognition, evolutionary processes, human health, and applications for animal welfare. We then highlight other big team science projects that have previously been conducted in canine science and emphasize the benefits of our approach. Finally, we introduce the ManyDogs Project and our mission: (a) replicating important findings, (b) investigating moderators that need a large sample size such as breed differences, (c) reaching methodological consensus, (d) investigating cross-cultural differences, and (e) setting a standard for replication studies in general. In doing so, we hope to address previous limitations in individual lab studies and previous big team science frameworks to deepen our understanding of canine behavior and cognition

Leveraging brain-body scaling relationships for comparative studies

In Horschler et al. (Anim Cognit 22(2):187-198, 2019), we found that two components of executive function (short-term memory and self-control) were strongly associated with estimated absolute brain weight across dog breeds, and argued that dogs present a powerful model for studying evolutionary links between cognition and neuroanatomy due to their extraordinary degree of intraspecific morphological variation. In a commentary on this work, Montgomery (Anim Cognit, 2019) raises concerns about the practice of estimating brain weights from brain-body scaling relationships. Montgomery explores the practical significance of this approach, ultimately concluding that such estimations should be avoided. In this response, we point out some limitations of the analyses presented by Montgomery and consider his conclusions in light of these issues. We then explore the extent to which body weight serves as a valid proxy for brain weight under varying conditions. Through simulations, we show that the consequences of using body weight as a proxy for brain weight depend on parameters including effect size, the correlation between brain and body weight, and the variance in brain and body weight within a sample. Under conditions approximating those in Horschler et al. (Anim Cognit 22(2):187-198, 2019), we find that body weight is a reliable proxy for brain weight, and that statistical results from models using either brain weight or body weight as predictor variables are highly convergent. Nonetheless, we wholeheartedly agree with Montgomery that empirical data on brain weight, structure, and cellular composition will be critical for creating new opportunities to investigate the relationships between neuroanatomy and cognition in dogs.12 month embargo; published online: 11 October 2019This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden?

Although non-human primates (NHPs) generally appear to predict how knowledgeable agents use knowledge to guide their behavior, the cognitive mechanisms that enable this remain poorly understood. We assessed the conditions under which NHPs' representations of an agent's awareness break down. Free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) watched as an agent observed a target object being hidden in one of two boxes. While the agent could no longer see the boxes, the box containing the object flipped open and the object either changed in size/shape (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2). Monkeys looked longer when the agent searched for the object incorrectly rather than correctly following the color change (a non-geometric manipulation), but not the size/shape change (a geometric manipulation). Even though the agent maintained knowledge of the object's location in both cases, monkeys no longer expected the agent to search correctly after it had been geometrically (but not non-geometrically) manipulated. Experiment 3 confirmed that monkeys were sensitive to the color manipulation used in Experiment 2, making it unlikely that a failure to perceive the color manipulation accounted for our findings. Our results show that NHPs do not always expect that knowledgeable agents will act on their knowledge to obtain their goals, consistent with heuristic-based accounts of how NHPs represent others' mental states. These findings also suggest that geometric changes that occur outside the agent's perceptual access may disrupt attribution of awareness more so than non-geometric changes. © 2021 Elsevier B.V.National Center for Research Resources12 month embargo; available online 24 March 2021This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Do non-human primates really represent others' ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis

Non-human primates can often predict how another agent will behave based on that agent's knowledge about the world. But how do non-human primates represent others' knowledge states? Researchers have recently proposed that non-human primates form "awareness relations" to attribute objectively true information to other minds, as opposed to human-like representations that track others' ignorance or false belief states. We present the first explicit test of the awareness relations hypothesis by examining when rhesus macaques' understanding of other agents' knowledge falters. In Experiment 1, monkeys watched an agent observe a piece of fruit (the target object) being hidden in one of two boxes. While the agent's view was occluded, either the fruit moved out of its box and directly back into it, or the box containing the fruit opened and immediately closed. We found that monkeys looked significantly longer when the agent reached incorrectly rather than correctly after the box's movement, but not after the fruit's movement. This result suggests that monkeys did not expect the agent to know the fruit's location when it briefly and arbitrarily moved while the agent could not see it, but did expect the agent to know the fruit's location when only the box moved while the agent could not see it. In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended both findings with a larger sample, a different target object, and opposite directions of motion in the test trials. These findings suggest that monkeys reason about others' knowledge of objects by forming awareness relations which are disrupted by arbitrary spatial manipulation of the target object while an agent has no perceptual access to it.NIMH [R01MH096875]; NCRR [CM-5-P40FtR003640-13]; Emil W. Haury Fellowship from the School of Anthropology at the University of Arizona; Graduate College at the University of Arizona; Yale University12 month embargo; available online 24 April 2019This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Multiple representational theories explain non-human primate perspective-taking: Evidence from computational modeling

Humans’ ability to attribute mental states to agents has been hypothesized to underpin our unique social behaviors. However, questions remain about the extent to which our representational Theory of Mind (ToM) is shared with non-human primates (NHPs). Here, we present a set of computational models each built to formalize a different representational theory of a foundational ToM component—understanding what others can see—and compare each model’s performance to that of NHPs across a range of previously published perspective-taking experiments. Our results show that multiple competing theories can account for NHPs’ perspective-taking abilities, including both human-like ToM and less complex mentalistic theories, but not simpler, non-mentalistic theories. This work supports the idea that NHPs may reason about others’ mental states when assessing their visual perspectives, and provides promising avenues for future work using computational modeling to determine if and how NHPs represent more complex mental states (e.g., ignorance, belief)

Probing Nonhuman Primate Errors on False Belief Tasks to Explore the Evolutionary Roots of Theory of Mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to human social cognition, yet the roots of this capacity remain poorly understood. Both infants and nonhuman primates perform inconsistently on false belief tasks, limiting our understanding of the representations that characterize their ToM. Here, we seek to better understand this often-contradictory literature by dissecting these failures. Specifically, we focus on primates’ characteristic null performance on false belief tasks. Across three studies, we find that—despite succeeding on a closely-matched control—rhesus monkeys fail to predict how agents with false beliefs will behave even when the agents perform highly unexpected, unlikely actions. We interpret this pattern of performance as evidence that monkeys have no representation of another agent’s past awareness once the scene changes outside of that agent’s view. This work moves beyond the success/failure dichotomy typically used to assess ToM, and instead gives a more precise characterization of primates’ signature limits in ToM

Absolute brain size predicts dog breed differences in executive function

Large-scale phylogenetic studies of animal cognition have revealed robust links between absolute brain volume and species differences in executive function. However, past comparative samples have been composed largely of primates, which are characterized by evolutionarily derived neural scaling rules. Therefore, it is currently unknown whether positive associations between brain volume and executive function reflect a broad-scale evolutionary phenomenon, or alternatively, a unique consequence of primate brain evolution. Domestic dogs provide a powerful opportunity for investigating this question due to their close genetic relatedness, but vast intraspecific variation. Using citizen science data on more than 7000 purebred dogs from 74 breeds, and controlling for genetic relatedness between breeds, we identify strong relationships between estimated absolute brain weight and breed differences in cognition. Specifically, larger-brained breeds performed significantly better on measures of short-term memory and self-control. However, the relationships between estimated brain weight and other cognitive measures varied widely, supporting domain-specific accounts of cognitive evolution. Our results suggest that evolutionary increases in brain size are positively associated with taxonomic differences in executive function, even in the absence of primate-like neuroanatomy. These findings also suggest that variation between dog breeds may present a powerful model for investigating correlated changes in neuroanatomy and cognition among closely related taxa.</p

Dogs re-engage human partners when joint social play is interrupted: a behavioural signature of shared intentionality?

Hypotheses regarding the evolution of uniquely human social cognition often emphasize not only mental state representation, but also mental state sharing. Mental state sharing is evident in instances of joint intentionality – mutual understanding between individuals of each other's simultaneous and interdependent commitment to a shared activity or goal. Comparative studies supporting the human uniqueness of joint intentionality show that, as compared to human children, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, who engage with humans as cooperative partners do not altruistically help others achieve their goals across the same range of contexts, do not attempt to re-engage cooperative partners in problem-solving or social games at the same rate and do not show spontaneous role reversal. Although recent work supports the possibility that bonobos, Pan paniscus, may re-engage conspecific partners after interrupted social grooming, the extent to which other animals show similar behaviour across more diverse contexts remains largely unexplored. Domestic dogs', Canis familiaris, propensity to interact with humans in cooperative contexts makes them a potentially promising comparative model of prosocial mental state sharing. Here, we investigated a behavioural signature of joint intentionality during social play between humans and dogs (N = 82). Our results present the first experimental evidence of re-engagement behaviour in dogs, as dogs preferentially attempted to reinitiate an interrupted social game with their previous partner relative to a passive bystander. These findings suggest that dogs exhibit a key marker of joint intentionality and open the door for future research on the cognitive mechanisms supporting this behaviour.School of Anthropology, University of Arizona24 month embargo; available online: 16 December 2021This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]