Avatars and arrows in the brain.

In this Commentary article we critically assess the claims made by Schurz, Kronbichler, Weissengrubler, Surtees, Samson and Perner (2015) relating to the neural processes underlying theory of mind and visual perspective taking. They attempt to integrate research findings in these two areas of social neuroscience using a perspective taking task contrasting mentalistic agents ('avatars'), with non-mentalistic control stimuli ('arrows'), during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. We support this endeavour whole-heartedly, agreeing that the integration of findings in these areas has been neglected in research on the social brain. However, we cannot find among the behavioural or neuroimaging data presented by Schurz et al. evidence supporting their claim of 'implicit mentalizing'-the automatic ascription of mental states to another representing what they can see. Indeed, we suggest that neuroimaging methods may be ill-suited to address the existence of implicit mentalizing, and suggest that approaches utilizing neurostimulation methods are likely to be more successful.This is the author accepted manuscript. It is currently under an indefinite embargo pending publication by Elsevier

COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE Through the looking glass: counter-mirror activation following incompatible sensorimotor learning

Abstract The mirror system, comprising cortical areas that allow the actions of others to be represented in the observer's own motor system, is thought to be crucial for the development of social cognition in humans. Despite the importance of the human mirror system, little is known about its origins. We investigated the role of sensorimotor experience in the development of the mirror system. Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to measure neural responses to observed hand and foot actions following one of two types of training. During training, participants in the Compatible (control) group made mirror responses to observed actions (hand responses were made to hand stimuli and foot responses to foot stimuli), whereas the Incompatible group made counter-mirror responses (hand to foot and foot to hand). Comparison of these groups revealed that, after training to respond in a counter-mirror fashion, the relative action observation properties of the mirror system were reversed; areas that showed greater responses to observation of hand actions in the Compatible group responded more strongly to observation of foot actions in the Incompatible group. These results suggest that, rather than being innate or the product of unimodal visual or motor experience, the mirror properties of the mirror system are acquired through sensorimotor learning

fMRI evidence of ‘mirror’ responses to geometric shapes

Mirror neurons may be a genetic adaptation for social interaction [1]. Alternatively, the associative hypothesis [2], [3] proposes that the development of mirror neurons is driven by sensorimotor learning, and that, given suitable experience, mirror neurons will respond to any stimulus. This hypothesis was tested using fMRI adaptation to index populations of cells with mirror properties. After sensorimotor training, where geometric shapes were paired with hand actions, BOLD response was measured while human participants experienced runs of events in which shape observation alternated with action execution or observation. Adaptation from shapes to action execution, and critically, observation, occurred in ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL). Adaptation from shapes to execution indicates that neuronal populations responding to the shapes had motor properties, while adaptation to observation demonstrates that these populations had mirror properties. These results indicate that sensorimotor training induced populations of cells with mirror properties in PMv and IPL to respond to the observation of arbitrary shapes. They suggest that the mirror system has not been shaped by evolution to respond in a mirror fashion to biological actions; instead, its development is mediated by stimulus-general processes of learning within a system adapted for visuomotor control

Sensorimotor learning and the ontogeny of the mirror neuron system

Mirror neurons, which have now been found in the human and songbird as well as the macaque, respond to both the observation and the performance of the same action. It has been suggested that their matching response properties have evolved as an adaptation for action understanding; alternatively, these properties may arise through sensorimotor experience. Here I review mirror neuron response characteristics from the perspective of ontogeny; I discuss the limited evidence for mirror neurons in early development; and I describe the growing body of evidence suggesting that mirror neuron responses can be modified through experience, and that sensorimotor experience is the critical type of experience for producing mirror neuron responses.</p

From heart to mind: Linking interoception, emotion, and theory of mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) is traditionally characterized as the ability to represent mental states. Such a characterization leaves little room for studying individual differences in ToM – individuals either can, or cannot, represent mental states – and this binary classification cannot quantify the subtle individual differences observed in typical and atypical populations. In recognition of this problem, attempts have been made to provide a more detailed characterization of the constituent psychological processes which support the representation of mental states, and the neurocomputational principles underpinning ToM, in order to identify the source of individual differences. A recent model is of interest as it forwards the novel argument that interoception, perception of the internal state of the body, is a fundamental component of ToM. Here we report the first test of the link between interoception and ToM

Observed bodies generate object-based spatial codes

Contemporary studies of spatial and social cognition frequently use human figures as stimuli. The interpretation of such studies may be complicated by spatial compatibility effects that emerge when researchers employ spatial responses, and participants spontaneously code spatial relationships about an observed body. Yet, the nature of these spatial codes – whether they are location- or object-based, and coded from the perspective of the observer or the figure – has not been determined. Here, we investigated this issue by exploring spatial compatibility effects arising for objects held by a visually presented whole-bodied schematic human figure. In three experiments, participants responded to the colour of the object held in the figure’s left or right hand, using left or right key presses. Left-right compatibility effects were found relative to the participant’s egocentric perspective, rather than the figure’s. These effects occurred even when the figure was rotated by 90 degrees to the left or to the right, and the coloured objects were aligned with the participant’s midline. These findings are consistent with spontaneous spatial coding from the participant’s perspective and relative to the normal upright orientation of the body. This evidence for object-based spatial coding implies that the domain general cognitive mechanisms that result in spatial compatibility effects may contribute to certain spatial perspective-taking and social cognition phenomena

The role of language in alexithymia: moving towards a multi-route model of alexithymia

Alexithymia is characterised by difficulty identifying and describing one’s own emotion. Identifying and describing one’s emotion involves several cognitive processes, so alexithymia may result from a number of impairments. Here we propose the alexithymia language hypothesis - the hypothesis that language impairment can give rise to alexithymia - and critically review relevant evidence from healthy populations, developmental disorders, adult-onset illness and acquired brain injury. We conclude that the available evidence is supportive of the alexithymia-language hypothesis, and therefore that language impairment may represent one of multiple routes to alexithymia. Where evidence is lacking, we outline which approaches will be useful in testing this hypothesis