Fichte and Hegel on Recognition

In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In the first three sections of the paper I argue that Fichte’s account of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s conception of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with recognition as a moral attitude

APIE FILOSOFINĖS KRITIKOS ESMĘ IR JOS SANTYKĮ SU ŠIUOLAIKINĖS FILOSOFIJOS SITUACIJA

Versta iš: Hegel, G. W. F. Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritiküberhaupt und ihr Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophieinsbesondere. In Sämtliche Werke, Bd 2. Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807.Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970.Vertė Brigita Gelžinyt

Textos selecionados de Preleções sobre a filosofia da religião

Tradução de Textos selecionados de Preleções sobre a filosofia da religiãoTranslation to Portuguese:  Textos selecionados de Preleções sobre a filosofia da religiã

Idealism and the metaphysics of individuality

© 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. What is arguably the central criticism of Hegel’s philosophical system by the Continental tradition, a criticism which represents a unifying thread in the diverse work of Schelling, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Adorno, is that Hegel fails to do justice to the notion of individuality. My aim in this article is to counter the claim that Hegel’s idea of the concrete universal fails to properly explain the real uniqueness of individuals. In what follows, I argue that while the Continental critique (as it is particularly expressed by Adorno) is prima facie attractive, it is ultimately misguided.This is because the critics of Hegel fail to correctly understand (1) his principal argument in ‘Sense-Certainty’; (2) crucial features of his logico-metaphysics; and (3) his notion of wholeness. I contend that carefully explicating these important parts of the Hegelian system not only shows that Hegel’s metaphysical commitments are not those that do not leave meaningful room for or make adequate sense of individuality, but that they also reveal a sophisticated treatment of the interdependency between the categories of individuality, particularity and universality in a way which conceives of individuality robustly