Intentionality, sense and the mind

To say that thought is intentional is to say that thought is directed to some object. Objects to which thought is directed are problematic: unlike the objects of physical acts - like hitting - they need not exist in reality: I may think of a unicorn, or imagine a centaur, even though such objects do not exist. However, in most cases my thoughts are directed to existing objects: I may think of President Carter or I may envy Mrs. Thatcher. In such cases the object of my thought is none other than the existing individual that might also be the object of a physical act such as hitting or kicking. A theory of intentionality must allow us to say both that thought can succeed in achieving objective reference and that the objects of thought need not exist in reality. Brentano's essential insight was to show that the latter - the possible non-existence of the object - is the distinctive feature of the mental. However, he saw this as a problem concerning the ontological status of objects of thought, which he attempted to resolve by ascribing to such objects a mode of "existence-in-the-mind", thereby denying that mental acts can succeed in achieving objective reference. This problem can be avoided however if intentionality is seen as a feature of language rather than of phenomena. On the linguistic version of the intentionality thesis, the criteria for intentionality are stated as logical features of the sentences lie use to talk about the psychological. We can assert both that thought can succeed in achieving objective reference and that the objects of thought need not exist in reality, by appealing to Frege's notion of sense. This means that the semantical frame"1ork for our theory of intentionality must be the Fregean three-levelled framework consisting of sign, sense and referent. In terms of this framework, "objective references” which is a possibility in the case of the mental, must be understood in terns of Frege’s notion of reference as that which is mediated by sense; the distinctive feature of the psychological- viz., possible non-existence of the object - must be understood by appeal to the Fregean semantic model of signs which have a sense but which do not refer to anything. Serious problems arise for a theory of intentionality when the notion of "objective reference" is explicated without appeal to Frege‘s notion of sense. For example, if "objective referencell is characterised in terms of the Russellian two-levelled semantical framework which admits only sign and referent, then we are forced to deny the intentionality of some or, perhaps1 all psychological acts. Alternatively, if we attempt to maintain the irreducibility of the intentional, then there are seemingly intractable problems in providing a coherent account of the intentionality of acts which do succeed in achieving objective reference, when "objective reference” is characterised in the absence of the notion of sense. It has been argued by some philosophers including Quine and Putnam, that sense is itself a “mentalistic” notion a notion tied to a mentalistic theory of meaning. If this objection can be sustained, then a theory of the intentionality of the mental which appeals to the notion of sense, will be circular. This kind of objection exposes a serious shortcoming in Frege's own theory of sense. Frege provides us with no theory of how it is that sense, which is a means to reference, relates to the mind. To meet the charge of “mentalism" which is levelled against Frege's theory of sense, we Must supplement his account with a theory of how sense (or meaning) can be both "mind-related" and the means to objective reference. This supplementation can be provided by Husserl's theory of intentionality. Husserl's account of the intentionality of consciousness, and the theory of linguistic meaning and reference which is a consequence of this account, allows us to treat Fregean sense as an intentional notion; one that is thereby both mind-related and the means to objective reference

Remote control of an impact demonstration vehicle

Uplink and downlink telemetry systems were installed in a Boeing 720 aircraft that was remotely flown from Rogers Dry Lake at Edwards Air Force Base and impacted into a designated crash site on the lake bed. The controlled impact demonstration (CID) program was a joint venture by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to test passenger survivability using antimisting kerosene (AMK) to inhibit postcrash fires, improve passenger seats and restraints, and improve fire-retardent materials. The uplink telemetry system was used to remotely control the aircraft and activate onboard systems from takeoff until after impact. Aircraft systems for remote control, aircraft structural response, passenger seat and restraint systems, and anthropomorphic dummy responses were recorded and displayed by the downlink stems. The instrumentation uplink and downlink systems are described

Developing ‘process pragmatism’ to underpin engaged research in human geography

This is the final version of the article. Available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record.This paper explores the contribution that pragmatist philosophy can make to the way that we do research and teaching in human geography. It provides a historical overview of the key ideas in the tradition, their influence on the Chicago School of Sociology and community organizing, and the implications of this work for epistemological practice. The paper then looks at the variety of ways in which human geographers are using research as a means to engage in the world today, focusing in particular on the contributions of participatory action research (PAR), before making the case for ‘process pragmatism’ as a framework for doing this kind of research. To illustrate the potential of this approach, the paper outlines current research, teaching and organizing activity being undertaken by geographers at Queen Mary University of London. The paper suggests that pragmatism provides a theoretical and methodological foundation for research and teaching which can facilitate the creation of new publics, and can help to build power and democratic capacity with the aim of remaking the world.The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Liam Harney would like to acknowledge the support of Queen Mary University Centre for Public Engagement for funding a publication on the housing crisis in Tower Hamlets, the Antipode Foundation for awarding a Scholar-Activist award for a research project on pragmatism, and the ESRC for a 1+3 PhD studentship. Jenny McCurry and James Scott would both like to acknowledge the support of the ESRC for +3 PhD studentships. Jane Wills would like to acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust for funding a research project on localism in the UK that includes the work of Citizens UK

Quantum estimation of a damping constant

We discuss an interferometric approach to the estimation of quantum mechanical damping. We study specific classes of entangled and separable probe states consisting of superpositions of coherent states. Based on the assumption of limited quantum resources we show that entanglement improves the estimation of an unknown damping constant.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figure

Chaotic Scattering in the Regime of Weakly Overlapping Resonances

We measure the transmission and reflection amplitudes of microwaves in a resonator coupled to two antennas at room temperature in the regime of weakly overlapping resonances and in a frequency range of 3 to 16 GHz. Below 10.1 GHz the resonator simulates a chaotic quantum system. The distribution of the elements of the scattering matrix S is not Gaussian. The Fourier coefficients of S are used for a best fit of the autocorrelation function if S to a theoretical expression based on random--matrix theory. We find very good agreement below but not above 10.1 GHz

Quantum Chaotic Scattering in Microwave Resonators

In a frequency range where a microwave resonator simulates a chaotic quantum billiard, we have measured moduli and phases of reflection and transmission amplitudes in the regimes of both isolated and of weakly overlapping resonances and for resonators with and without time-reversal invariance. Statistical measures for S-matrix fluctuations were determined from the data and compared with extant and/or newly derived theoretical results obtained from the random-matrix approach to quantum chaotic scattering. The latter contained a small number of fit parameters. The large data sets taken made it possible to test the theoretical expressions with unprecedented accuracy. The theory is confirmed by both, a goodness-of-fit-test and the agreement of predicted values for those statistical measures that were not used for the fits, with the data

Hero Baby

With fiction and theory, the following pages give context to my most recent body of work called Hero Baby. The work in Hero Baby embodies an aesthetic of cuteness, as highlights the relationship between: aggression and protection, power and submission, war and commodity, nationalism and desire for love

Reflections on an Experiment in Pragmatic Social Research and Knowledge Production

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Manchester University Press via the link in this recordThis chapter reflects upon the lessons learned through an experiment in pragmatic social research conducted in east London in the United Kingdom in 2015. The project drew upon the pragmatism of the Chicago School of Sociologists and the work of Ernest Burgess, Robert Park and George Herbert Mead as well as the earlier work of William James and John Dewey. The ‘E14 Expedition’ tried to test whether, and if so, how, university researchers could work with a range of citizens to address public problems in a genuinely open way, listening to the full range of opinion and ideas. The project exposed the extent to which academic social scientists are often deaf to political opinions that are believed to be misguided, confused and/or incorrect. It also exposed the role played by the social infrastructure of pre-existing relationships, trust, shared interests and identity in underpinning and enabling effective collective action. The chapter advocates paying greater academic and political attention to the things that make public action and problem-solving possible, including being open to different ideas and beliefs, and nurturing the social relationships that enable democratic behaviour and practice