Developing a goal-oriented SDI assessment approach using GIDEON - the Dutch SDI implementation strategy - as a case study

In 2008, the Dutch government approved the GIDEON document as a policy aiming at the implementation of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) in the Netherlands. The execution of GIDEON should take place by pursuing seven implementation strategies which lead to the achievement of the GIDEON goals. GIDEON also expresses the need to monitor the progress of implementing its strategies and realization of its goals. Currently, the work has been started on monitoring the GIDEON implementation strategies. However, there is still a lack of knowledge and methods to monitor GIDEON goals realization. The challenge is to come up with an approach to assess to what extent these goals are achieved. As a response to the challenge of assessing the GIDEON goals, this paper explores the possibility of using the Multi-view SDI assessment framework (Grus et al., 2007). This paper presents and discusses the method that applies the Multi-view SDI assessment framework, its indicators and measurement methods to create a GIDEON assessment approach. The method of creating a GIDEON assessment approach consists of several procedural steps: formulating specific GIDEON objectives, organizing a one-day workshop involving focus group of specific stakeholders responsible for creation and execution of NSDI, asking the workshop participants to select from a long list those indicators that best measure the achievement of each GIDEON goals. The key step of GIDEON approach is a one-day workshop. The workshop participants represented all organizations that cooperated and/or created GIDEON. The workshop consisted of two parts: first part explained the context of a challenge of assessing GIDEON, second part included participants activity to select and come to the consensus on the list of indicators that would best measure GIDEON goals realization. Additionally, the participants were asked to evaluate and express feedback on the usefulness of the method of creating GIDEON assessment approach. The results show that several indicators that relate to specific SDI goals could be selected by a significant number of workshop participants. The indicators that have been selected are not the final ones yet, but provide a guideline and form a base of what has to be measured when assessing GIDEON goals. Involving the representatives of all parties committed to GIDEON into the process of GIDEON assessment approach creation will strengthen its robustness and acceptance. The results of the feedback form filled by each participant show that the presented method is useful or very useful to create GIDEON assessment approach. Additionally, some of the participants provided already their own indicators which are very specific for Dutch SDI monitoring.The method presented in this research, assuming that SDI goals are defined and the organizations that participate in SDI creation are known, can be applied in any other country to develop country-specific and practical SDI assessment approach

Poor People Lose: \u3ci\u3eGideon\u3c/i\u3e and the Critique of Rights

A low income person is more likely to be prosecuted and imprisoned post-Gideon than pre-Gideon. Poor people lose in American criminal justice not because they have ineffective lawyers but because they are selectively targeted by police, prosecutors, and law makers. The critique of rights suggests that rights are indeterminate and regressive. Gideon demonstrates this critique: it has not improved the situation of most poor people, and in some ways has worsened their plight. Gideon provides a degree of legitimacy for the status quo. Even full enforcement of Gideon would not significantly improve the loser status of low-income people in American criminal justice

Implications of Gideon v. Wainwright on American Society

“Your Honor, I request this Court to appoint counsel to represent me in this trial,”1 stated defendant Clearance Earl Gideon before the Judicial Circuit Court of Florida. The court replied, “Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the court can appoint counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request for counsel to defend you in this case.”2 Before 1963 there was no standard in American state courts requiring counsel as an essential fundamental right. Gideon v Wainwright is a landmark case in Supreme Court history because it was a vital step in the fight for the right to legal counsel. The court unanimously ruled that all state courts were required under the Sixth Amendment, of the United States Constitution, to provide counsel in all criminal cases for defendants who were not able to afford counsel.3 Gideon overruled a twenty year old Supreme Court decision in Betts v Brady by establishing that due process as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligated the states to furnish counsel in every case. Gideon v Wainwright has helped to remove vulnerabilities and ambiguities in the criminal justice system. It further protects American society by helping to provide an egalitarian system of administering justice, setting a clear standard for state courts to follow and allowing room for future developments in the right to counsel

Gideon\u27s Muted Trumpet

Once the darling of the legal academy, criminal procedure has fallen into disrepute. Thirty-five years ago, when Gideon was decided, criminal procedure was the flagship of constitutional law, criminal defense attorneys were heroes, and courts and lawyers were perceived as themselves agents of social justice. Today, there are still heroes. But the conventional wisdom, within the academy and the country at large, no longer associates criminal law or procedure with heroism. Indeed, in some quarters, criminal procedure has become the enemy. Increasingly, scholars urge revisionism, popular pundits brand procedural innovations as a loss of common sense, and philosophers warn that the procedural republic has helped us to lose our way. Striking is this scholarly skepticism when compared to the disturbing fate of those who spawned this conference: they are vulnerable, poor, friendless; they have never seen a lawyer and they have talked to a judge speaking from a remote televised location. They sit in jail for ten or twenty or thirty days, losing their jobs and their families, only to have the charges ultimately dismissed. Douglas Colbert\u27s cases raise important questions about a failed legal revolution. For when the charges have been dismissed, what will Colbert\u27s defendants understand about criminal procedure ? The majesty of Gideon? The wisdom of the Warren Court? No doubt, the jailed and abandoned defendant would agree with critics of criminal procedure. How else could he see the process except as his punishment

What Gideon Did

Many accounts of Gideon v Wainwright s legacy focus on what Gideon did not do--its doctrinal and practical limits. For constitutional theorists, Gideon imposed a preexisting national consensus upon a few outlier states, and therefore did not represent a dramatic doctrinal shift. For criminal procedure scholars, advocates, and journalists, Gideon has failed, in practice, to guarantee meaningful legal help for poor people charged with crimes. Drawing on original historical research, this Article instead chronicles what Gideon did-the doctrinal and institutional changes it inspired between 1963 and the early 1970s. Gideon shifted the legal profession\u27s policy consensus on indigent defense away from a charity model toward a public model. By 1973, this new consensus had transformed criminal practice nationwide through the establishment of hundreds of public defender offices and the expansion of lawyers\u27 presence in low-level criminal proceedings. This Article describes these changes primarily through the example of Massachusetts, while contextualizing that example with national comparisons. The broad outlines of these post-Gideon changes are familiar to legal scholars. But situating these changes in a longer historical context and tracing them in detailfrom the perspective of lawyers on the ground in the 1960s yields two insights that help to explain the seemingly permanent post-Gideon crisis in indigent defense. First, the post- Gideon transformation was indeed limited in its practical effects, but its limits derived not only from politics but also from history-and from the legal profession itself Lawyers themselves, long before Gideon, framed indigent defense as low-status, low-pay, less-than-fullyprofessional legal work. That framing survived even as private charities became post-Gideon public defenders. Second, the post- Gideon transformation was also limited-or, perhaps, destined to be perceived as limited-by tensions inherent in the attempt to provide large-scale legal assistance through government bureaucracies. Characteristics now identified as symptoms of crisis-such as politically determined funding, ever-expanding caseloads, and triage advocacyfirst appeared as innovations that lawyers perceived Gideon to require. As public defenders proliferated, so too did complaints that they were underfunded and overworked, and that they encouraged guilty pleas over trials. The origins of the indigent defense crisis lie not only in Gideon\u27s neglect but also, paradoxically, in Gideon \u27 transformative influence. This history lends some support to recent scholarly expressions of skepticism about Gideon, but it also provides some reasons for optimism: If the indigent defense crisis derives not only from intransigent political indifference but also from contingent choices made by lawyers, then lawyers may retain more power than they realize to mitigate the crisis

What \u3ci\u3eGideon\u3c/i\u3e Did

Many accounts of Gideon v. Wainwright’s legacy focus on what Gideon did not do—its doctrinal and practical limits. For constitutional theorists, Gideon imposed a preexisting national consensus upon a few “outlier” states, and therefore did not represent a dramatic doctrinal shift. For criminal procedure scholars, advocates, and journalists, Gideon has failed, in practice, to guarantee meaningful legal help for poor people charged with crimes. Drawing on original historical research, this Article instead chronicles what Gideon did—the doctrinal and institutional changes it inspired between 1963 and the early 1970s. Gideon shifted the legal profession’s policy consensus on indigent defense away from a charity model toward a public model. By 1973, this new consensus had transformed criminal practice nationwide through the establishment of hundreds of public defender offices and the expansion of lawyers’ presence in low-level criminal proceedings. This Article describes these changes primarily through the example of Massachusetts, while contextualizing that example with national comparisons. The broad outlines of these post-Gideon changes are familiar to legal scholars. But situating these changes in a longer historical context and tracing them in detail from the perspective of lawyers on the ground in the 1960s yields two insights that help to explain the seemingly permanent post-Gideon crisis in indigent defense. First, the post-Gideon transformation was indeed limited in its practical effects, but its limits derived not only from politics but also from history—and from the legal profession itself. Lawyers themselves, long before Gideon, framed indigent defense as low-status, low-pay, less-than-fully-professional legal work. That framing survived even as private charities became post-Gideon public defenders. Second, the post-Gideon transformation was also limited—or, perhaps, destined to be perceived as limited—by tensions inherent in the attempt to provide large-scale legal assistance through government bureaucracies. Characteristics now identified as symptoms of crisis—such as politically determined funding, ever-expanding caseloads, and triage advocacy—first appeared as innovations that lawyers perceived Gideon to require. As public defenders proliferated, so too did complaints that they were underfunded and overworked, and that they encouraged guilty pleas over trials. The origins of the indigent defense crisis lie not only in Gideon’s neglect but also, paradoxically, in Gideon’s transformative influence. This history lends some support to recent scholarly expressions of skepticism about Gideon, but it also provides some reasons for optimism: If the indigent defense crisis derives not only from intransigent political indifference but also from contingent choices made by lawyers, then lawyers may retain more power than they realize to mitigate the crisis

Gideon v. Wainwright--From a 1963 Perspective

Gideon v. Wainwright is more than a “landmark” Supreme Court ruling in the field of constitutional criminal procedure. As evidenced by the range of celebrators of Gideon’s Fiftieth Anniversary (extending far beyond the legal academy) and Gideon’s inclusion in the basic coverage of high school government courses, Gideon today is an icon of the American justice system. I have no quarrel with that iconic status, but I certainly did not see any such potential in Gideon when I analyzed the Court’s ruling shortly after it was announced in March of 1963. I had previously agreed to write an article for the Supreme Court Review’s coverage of the Court’s 1962–63 term. Phillip Kurland, the Review’s editor, made Gideon my assignment, noting that the Court during that term had decided numerous constitutional criminal procedure cases and Gideon clearly was the most prominent of those rulings. As my research progressed, I came to the conclusion that Gideon was more significant as a case study in the crafting of an opinion that overruled a previous decision (Gideon had overruled Betts v. Brady) than as a contribution to the field of constitutional criminal procedure. Indeed, as I noted in the introduction to my article on Gideon and the “art of overruling,” Gideon appeared to have less doctrinal and practical significance than two other criminal procedure rulings decided on the same day—Douglas v. California and Fay v. Noia. This Essay recounts the analysis that led me to view Gideon in 1963 as an important, but limited, decision—certainly not one destined to be an all-time landmark ruling

Mayo (Gideon) Papers, 1827-1920

The collection is arranged in three series: papers of Gideon Mayo, papers of Charles W. Mayo, Gideon Mayo\u27s son, and papers of George H. Hamlin. The Gideon Mayo series is arranged in five sub-series: correspondence, legal records, financial records, company records, and personal and miscellaneous material.https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/findingaids/1133/thumbnail.jp

0009: David Michael Gideon Papers, 1878-1959

A major portion of the collection consists of correspondence between Mr. Gideon and his political and business associates between 1929 and 1945. Included is correspondence regarding the administration of the estate of Mr. Gideon\u27s brother-in-law, Mike Broh. Another large group of papers is made up of ledgers, journals, day books, daily cash sheets, check ledgers, account ledgers, and other records from the Huntington Herald Company and the several land and holding companies with which Mr. Gideon was associated. Correspondence and business records of the Sam and Dave Gideon clothing store from 1914 until 1926 comprise most of the remaining papers. These include correspondence regarding merchandise, credit memoranda, invoices, charge account ledgers, and other books and papers. Also included is correspondence with the W. T. Grant Company from 1919 until 1933, regarding the lease of their building, owned by Mr. Gideon. There are also personal papers and Mr. Gideon\u27s ledgers of personal expenses from 1922 until 1949. To view materials from this collection that are digitized and available online, search the David Michael Gideon Papers, 1878-1959 here