Social preferences: from the experimental lab to economic theory

We present a wide collection of experiments which show how human behavior deviates substantially with respect to the predictions derived from standard homo economicus assumptions. Then we review the theoretical literature that this evidence has stimulated. In particular some models are found to be consistent with evidence from a large set of games. As fundamental differences exist among these proposals, new experiments were devised to contrast their effectiveness in predicting behavior. We argue that inequality aversion models are to be preferred to intention based models because the additional predictive power the latter may have comes at a very high cost of complexity. We also find that equality considerations are more relevant than efficiency motives in most economically relevant settings. Results are not conclusive and this gives scope to further research over these issues.Prisoner's dilemma; public good games; social preference models

Regulatory reform, development and distributive concerns

This survey reviews the relationship between regulation and distribution, focusing on regulatory reform in developing countries. The characteristics of these countries impose constraints on appropriate regulatory policies. These constraints condition: i) the terms of the trade-off between firms' rents and efficiency, including the commitment problem in the presence of sunk investments; and ii) the probability of success of removing cross-subsidies. The choices made at reforming infrastructure industries may have a significant impact on perceived distribution and development, and this impact will drive attitudes toward reform. Distributive problems are channeled through politics and institutions, conditioning the potential solutions to the commitment problem. These issues have been extensively explored by the academic literature, which provides guidance on how to address second-generation regulatory reforms.regulation; privatization; infrastructures; development; distribution;

Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good, Experimental Evidence

We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contributions. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant.Experiment, Public Good, Ostracism

Ostracism and the provision of a public good

We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contributions. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant

Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences

First Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”): January 2013.The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind

Feeding the Leviathan

Using a step-level public good game, we analyze the effects on contributions of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that ”educational” effects, in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards ”good” equilibria, are more relevant than motivational ”crowding out” effects, whereby cooperating to avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal only when this decision entails a clear ”trust” message.Peer reviewe

Why feed the Leviathan?

This is a study about the possibility of self-governance. We designed two versions of a step-level public good game, with or without a centralized sanctioning mechanism (CSM). In a baseline treatment participants play 14 rounds of the non-CSM game. In an automatic removal (AR) treatment participants play 7 rounds with CSM plus 7 rounds without CSM. In voted removal (VR) participants play 7 rounds with CSM followed by a voting stage to decide whether to keep CSM. All VR groups removed CSM. Contributions in AR and VR after CSM removal are dramatically higher than in the baseline. Most groups with a CSM history managed to cooperate until the last round. We do not find more cooperation in VR than in AR. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007Public good, Step-level, Sanctioning institution, Cooperation, Education, Trust,

Ostracism and the provision of a public good: experimental evidence

We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels significantly except in first and last periods. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive. This effect is in contrast to most alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.Ostracism Exclusion Public good Teamwork Experiment

Murskaamon työnjohto

Tämän insinöörityön tavoitteena oli laatia selkeä työturvallisuusohje Morenia Oy:n murskaustyömaille, kerätä hyviä toimintatapoja sekä vertailla työntekijöiden erilaisia palkkausmalleja ja löytää työnantajalle edullisin malli murskaamotyöntekijöiden palkkaukseen. Opinnäytetyö aloitettiin vierailemalla kuudella eri murskaustyömaalla sekä Rudus-turvapuistossa. Vierailuilla tutustuttiin yleisesti käytössä oleviin työmenetelmiin ja toimintatapoihin sekä tehtiin kysely työntekijöiden palkkauksesta. Rudus-turvapuistossa tutustuttiin turvallisiin työtapoihin, henkilökohtaisiin turvavarusteisiin sekä koneiden turvalaitteisiin. Työ jatkui tutustumalla alan julkaisuihin sekä kirjallisuuteen, joista tehtiin yhteenvetoa. Työn tuloksena syntyi turvallisuusohje sekä kootut toimintaohjeet murskaustyömaille.The aim of this thesis was to improve work management of a crushing plant. The improving was executed by making explicit work safety instructions for Morenia Ltd. and by collecting information about good working policies at the crushing plants. Comparing different kinds of employees’ salary methods and determining the economic way to hire crushing plant's employees were also one part of the improving. At the beginning of this thesis Morenia Ltd. had many crushing entrepreneurs as subcontractors and working practises varied in work executions, work safety and in environmental issues. To gather the necessary information to fulfil the goals visits to six different crushing plants and to the Rudus Safety Park were made. Some inquiries to support the gained information were made during the visits. These inquiries consisted mainly of normal working procedures and salary meth-ods. The visit to the Rudus Safety Park gave a good outlook about safe working methods, safety accessory of machines and personal safety gear. After acquiring this base information the work proceeded by exploring in crushing industry’s releases. The Excel spreadsheet program was used to make a sheet to compare the ways of hire employees. As a result of this thesis work safety instructions and an assembly about good working procedure for crushing plants were made. An easily usable spreadsheet model about six different salary methods was also created. The spreadsheet model helps in determining the complete salary costs of the crushing plant