No Amendment? No Problem: Judges, “Informal Amendment,” and the Evolution of Constitutional Meaning in the Federal Democracies of Australia, Canada, India, and the United States

This article considers the way in which judges play a significant role in developing the meaning of a constitution through the exercise of interpretive choices that have the effect of “informally amending” the text. We demonstrate this by examining four written federal democratic constitutions: those of the United States, the first written federal democratic constitution; India, the federal constitution of the largest democracy on earth; and the constitutions of Canada and Australia, both federal and democratic, but emerging from the English unwritten tradition. We divide our consideration of these constitutions into two ideal types, identified by Bruce Ackerman: the “revolutionary” constitutions of the United States and India, and the “adaptive establishmentarian” constitutions of Canada and Australia. In this way, we show that judicial informal amendment changes constitutional meaning in both revolutionary and adaptive settings. We conclude that whatever the origins of a federal democratic constitution, be it revolutionary or adaptive establishmentarian, and whatever the background of the judges and the text with which they work, in the absence of formal amendment, judges use an image of the constitution to give and to change the meaning of a written text over time. This allows a constitution to adapt to changing social, economic, and political conditions where formal amendment, for whatever reason, proves difficult. But, in some cases, it might also leave a federal democracy with a constitution which the Framers did not intend. Whatever the outcome, though, the judges play a central role in the evolution of constitutional meaning over time, for good or for ill

No Amendment? No Problem: Judges, Informal Amendment, and the Evolution of Constitutional Meaning in the Federal Democracies of Australia, Canada, India, and the United States

This article considers the way in which judges play a significant role in developing the meaning of a constitution through the exercise of interpretive choices that have the effect of “informally amending” the text. We demonstrate this by examining four written federal democratic constitutions: those of the United States, the first written federal democratic constitution; India, the federal constitution of the largest democracy on earth; and the constitutions of Canada and Australia, both federal and democratic, but emerging from the English unwritten tradition. We divide our consideration of these constitutions into two ideal types, identified by Bruce Ackerman: the “revolutionary” constitutions of the United States and India, and the “adaptive establishmentarian” constitutions of Canada and Australia. In this way, we show that judicial informal amendment changes constitutional meaning in both revolutionary and adaptive settings. We conclude that whatever the origins of a federal democratic constitution, be it revolutionary or adaptive establishmentarian, and whatever the background of the judges and the text with which they work, in the absence of formal amendment, judges use an image of the constitution to give and to change the meaning of a written text over time. This allows a constitution to adapt to changing social, economic, and political conditions where formal amendment, for whatever reason, proves difficult. But, in some cases, it might also leave a federal democracy with a constitution which the Framers did not intend. Whatever the outcome, though, the judges play a central role in the evolution of constitutional meaning over time, for good or for ill

Copper-Catalyzed Dehydrogenative Amidation of Light Alkanes

The functionalization of C-H bonds in light alkanes, particularly to form C-N bonds, remains a challenge. We report the dehydrogenative coupling of amides with C1–C4 hydrocarbons to form N-alkyl amide products with tBuOOtBu as oxidant, and a copper complex of a phenanthroline-type ligand as catalyst. The reactions occurred in good yields in benzene or supercritical carbon dioxide as solvents. This strategy allowed for the determination of the relative reactivity of these alkane C-H bonds toward this amination process and showed, in contrast to prior work with larger alkanes, that the reactivity correlated with bond dissociation energies.Support for this work was provided by the MINECO (CTQ2017-82893-C2-1-R), Junta de Andalucía (P18-RT-1536) and PO FEDER 2014–2020 (UHU-1260216). Work at UCB was supported by the Director, Office of Science, of the US Department of Energy under contract no. DE-AC02- 05CH11231. M.A.F. thanks MINECO for a Juan de la Cierva Incorporación fellowship. Funding for open access charges is given by Universidad de Huelva/ CBUA

Restoration of Cardiac Function After Myocardial Infarction by Long-Term Activation of the CNS Leptin-Melanocortin System

Heart failure has a high mortality rate, and current therapies offer limited benefits. The authors demonstrate that activation of the central nervous system leptin-melanocortin pathway confers remarkable protection against progressive heart failure following severe myocardial infarction. The beneficial cardiac-protective actions of leptin require activation of brain melanocortin-4 receptors and elicit improvements in cardiac substrate oxidation, cardiomyocyte contractility, C

Judges, commerce and contract law

John Gava, Reader at Adelaide Law School, considers the question how should judges decide commercial cases, in particular, contract cases? He looks at the circumstances and impact of the use of contract law, with attention on common law contract and market needs. Published in Amicus Curiae – Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. The Journal is produced by SALS at the IALS (Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London)

Sir Owen Dixon: a strict and complete legalist? His contract decisions examined.

This thesis examines the contract decisions of Sir Owen Dixon during his tenure on the High Court of Australia to see whether they are in line with his self-proclaimed strict and complete legalism. The thesis shows that Dixon’s understanding of the judicial role did not encompass a naïve mechanical jurisprudence or a simple-minded declaratory theory of law. Instead, Dixon saw the act of judging as a practice, based on mastery of the authorities, principles and style of reasoning associated with the common law. Dixon accepted that judging was a creative enterprise but he understood it as a bounded activity and not akin to political activity. The thesis also argues that Dixon’s conception of judging is a testable hypothesis capable of showing if a judge has decided a case in conformity with it. For practical reasons not all the cases examined could be described in this thesis but a representative sample of the analysis of major and minor cases, covering a variety of contract law issues and ranging over the entire period of Dixon’s time on the High Court (1929-1964), have been presented. In addition, all of Dixon’s contract law judgments that raise any question about his fidelity to strict and complete legalism have also been described in the thesis. The thesis shows that, with two relatively minor exceptions, Dixon did decide his contract decisions in conformity with his self-proclaimed strict and complete legalism. The thesis concludes by discussing the limits on what can be drawn from this finding and what implications flow from it.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Law School, 201