This thesis examines the contract decisions of Sir Owen Dixon during his tenure on the High Court of Australia to see whether they are in line with his self-proclaimed strict and complete legalism. The thesis shows that Dixon’s understanding of the judicial role did not encompass a naïve mechanical jurisprudence or a simple-minded declaratory theory of law. Instead, Dixon saw the act of judging as a practice, based on mastery of the authorities, principles and style of reasoning associated with the common law. Dixon accepted that judging was a creative enterprise but he understood it as a bounded activity and not akin to political activity. The thesis also argues that Dixon’s conception of judging is a testable hypothesis capable of showing if a judge has decided a case in conformity with it. For practical reasons not all the cases examined could be described in this thesis but a representative sample of the analysis of major and minor cases, covering a variety of contract law issues and ranging over the entire period of Dixon’s time on the High Court (1929-1964), have been presented. In addition, all of Dixon’s contract law judgments that raise any question about his fidelity to strict and complete legalism have also been described in the thesis. The thesis shows that, with two relatively minor exceptions, Dixon did decide his contract decisions in conformity with his self-proclaimed strict and complete legalism. The thesis concludes by discussing the limits on what can be drawn from this finding and what implications flow from it.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Law School, 201
