Elementos y esencias

La autora compara los modos en que Aristóteles, los filósofos materialistas antiguos y la ciencia natural moderna explican el término “elemento”. El interés filosófico de este análisis depende del dictum wittgensteiniano: “La esencia es expresada por la gramática”. En la discusión sobre Aristóteles se examinan las nociones de materia prima, forma y sustancia. Se concluye que el uso de los términos técnicos por ciertos grupos humanos —como el de los científicos naturales— produce una “especie-de-esencias” no eternas ni inmutables.The author compares the ways in which the term “element” has been explicated by Aristotle, ancient materialists, and modern natural science. The philosophical interest of this analysis stems from Wittgenstein’s dictum: “essence is expressed by grammar.” In the context of Aristotle’s thought, the ideas of first matter, form, and substance are examined. The conclusion is that the use of technical terms by certain communities—such as natural scientists— produces a “species-of-essences” neither eternal nor immutable

Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action

What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons for action only insofar as they are dispositions to have affective experiences. On this account, affective experience has a central role to play in explaining how desires provide reasons for action

A non-uniform semantic analysis of the Italian temporal connectives Prima and Dopo

In this paper, I argue that the temporal connective prima ('before') is a comparative adverb. The argument is based on a number of grammatical facts from Italian, showing that there is an asymmetry between prima and dopo ('after'). On the ground of their divergent behaviour, I suggest that dopo has a different grammatical status from prima. I propose a semantic treatment for prima that is based on an independently motivated analysis of comparatives which can be traced back to Seuren (1973). Dopo is analyzed instead as an atomic two-place predicate which contributes a binary relation over events to the sentence meaning. The different semantic treatments of the two connectives provide an explanation for the grammatical asymmetries considered at the outset; interestingly, it also sheds some light on other asymmetries between prima and dopo which are known to hold for the English temporal connectives before and after as well: these asymmetries are related to the veridicality properties, the distribution of NPIs, and the logical properties of these connectives first described in Anscombe (1964)

Aristotle for the modern Ethicist

Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley discussed Aristotle’s ethics as an alternative to modern moral philosophy. This idea is best known from Anscombe’s 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The mainstream response has been to design a normative theory of ‘virtue ethics’ to rival deontology and consequentialism. This essay argues that that response is inadequate; it misses Anscombe’s point and obscures various aspects of Aristotle’s ethics, in particular his emphasis on friendship and human interconnectedness. This element of Aristotelianism was favoured by Midgley. By returning to Midgley, with the support of Aristotle, it is possible to find an alternative modern Aristotelianism in ethics

Really Trying or Merely Trying

We enjoy first-person authority with respect to a certain class of actions: for these actions, we know what we are doing just because we are doing it. This paper first formulates an epistemological principle that captures this authority in terms of trying to act in a way that one has the capacity to act. It then considers a case of effortful action – running a middle distance race – that threatens this principle. And proposes the solution of changing the metaphysics of action: one can keep hold of the idea that we have first-person authority over what we are doing by adopting a disjunctive account of action

What future, which technology? On the problem of describing relevant futures.

Doing research on future and emerging technologies raises a number of significant ontological and epistemological challenges. The fundamental uncertainty of the future, combined with problems of appropriate descriptions of technology in general, render it difficult to come to an appropriate account of the likely shape and use of future technologies. This paper discusses several streams of research that address this issue, including the question of relevant description and context, interpretive flexibility, affordances of technology, and multi-stability of technological trajectories. The paper proposes that some of these problems may be addressed by using a democratic and participative approach to technology research and development. Participative technology assessment is then discussed as an example of an established way of democratically engaging with technology stakeholders during research and development. The paper concludes by discussing the promises and limitations of such a participative approach with regard to the question of understanding and researching future technologies

Gramática, estructura y esencia

Este trabajo, hasta hoy inédito. fue leído en inglés durante el Coloquio Wittgenstein realizado en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú en julio de 1989 con la participación de la autora. Cora Diamond, Juan Bautista Ferro, Peter Geach, Mario Montalbetti y Jorge Secada. La versión original que se publica ahora acompañada de mi traducción al castellano incorpora algunos agregados y correcciones que la profesoraAnscombe hizo en el manuscrito durante y después de la lectura del trabajo. Los únicos cambios que he introducido yo en el texto inglés son unas mínimas alteraciones y correcciones gráficas y una corrección ortográfica evidente.Las menciones a términos del original inglés que he incluido en el texto en castellanovan entre corchetes angulares. Salvo las notas, éstas son las únicasinterpolaciones que he hecho en el cuerpo del artículo

Gramrnar, Structure, and Essence

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