Coarse Brownian Dynamics for Nematic Liquid Crystals: Bifurcation Diagrams via Stochastic Simulation

We demonstrate how time-integration of stochastic differential equations (i.e. Brownian dynamics simulations) can be combined with continuum numerical bifurcation analysis techniques to analyze the dynamics of liquid crystalline polymers (LCPs). Sidestepping the necessity of obtaining explicit closures, the approach analyzes the (unavailable in closed form) coarse macroscopic equations, estimating the necessary quantities through appropriately initialized, short bursts of Brownian dynamics simulation. Through this approach, both stable and unstable branches of the equilibrium bifurcation diagram are obtained for the Doi model of LCPs and their coarse stability is estimated. Additional macroscopic computational tasks enabled through this approach, such as coarse projective integration and coarse stabilizing controller design, are also demonstrated

Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of Coordination Mechanisms. We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if $\ell_e(x)$ is the latency function of an edge $e$, we replace it by $\hat{\ell}_e(x)$ with $\ell_e(x) \le \hat{\ell}_e(x)$ for all $x$. Then an adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Price of Anarchy of the mechanism is defined as the worst-case ratio of the Nash social cost in the modified network over the optimal social cost in the original network. Formally, if \CM(r) denotes the cost of the worst Nash flow in the modified network for rate $r$ and \Copt(r) denotes the cost of the optimal flow in the original network for the same rate then [\ePoA = \max_{r \ge 0} \frac{\CM(r)}{\Copt(r)}.] We first exhibit a simple coordination mechanism that achieves for any network of parallel links an engineered Price of Anarchy strictly less than 4/3. For the case of two parallel links our basic mechanism gives 5/4 = 1.25. Then, for the case of two parallel links, we describe an optimal mechanism; its engineered Price of Anarchy lies between 1.191 and 1.192.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, preliminary version appeared at ESA 201

Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games

We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. Our goal is to design scheduling policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium and guarantee a small price of anarchy for the l_k-norm social cost --- the objective balances overall quality of service and fairness. We consider policies with different amount of knowledge about jobs: non-clairvoyant, strongly-local and local. The analysis relies on the smooth argument together with adequate inequalities, called smooth inequalities. With this unified framework, we are able to prove the following results. First, we study the inefficiency in l_k-norm social costs of a strongly-local policy SPT and a non-clairvoyant policy EQUI. We show that the price of anarchy of policy SPT is O(k). We also prove a lower bound of Omega(k/log k) for all deterministic, non-preemptive, strongly-local and non-waiting policies (non-waiting policies produce schedules without idle times). These results ensure that SPT is close to optimal with respect to the class of l_k-norm social costs. Moreover, we prove that the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI has price of anarchy O(2^k). Second, we consider the makespan (l_infty-norm) social cost by making connection within the l_k-norm functions. We revisit some local policies and provide simpler, unified proofs from the framework's point of view. With the highlight of the approach, we derive a local policy Balance. This policy guarantees a price of anarchy of O(log m), which makes it the currently best known policy among the anonymous local policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium.Comment: 25 pages, 1 figur

Olanzapine-associated neuroleptic malignant syndrome: Is there an overlap with the serotonin syndrome?

BACKGROUND: The neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a rare but serious condition mainly associated with antipsychotic medication. There are controversies as to whether "classical" forms of neuroleptic malignant syndrome can occur in patients given atypical antipsychotics. The serotonin syndrome is caused by drug-induced excess of intrasynaptic 5-hydroxytryptamine. The possible relationship between neuroleptic malignant syndrome and serotonin syndrome is at present in the focus of scientific interest. METHODS: This retrospective phenomenological study aims to examine the seventeen reported olanzapine – induced neuroleptic malignant syndrome cases under the light of possible overlap between neuroleptic malignant syndrome and serotonin syndrome clinical features. RESULTS: The serotonin syndrome clinical features most often reported in cases initially diagnosed as neuroleptic malignant syndrome are: fever (82%), mental status changes (82%) and diaphoresis (47%). Three out of the ten classical serotonin syndrome clinical features were concurrently observed in eleven (65%) patients and four clinical features were observed in seven (41%) patients. CONCLUSION: The results of this study show that the clinical symptoms of olanzapine-induced neuroleptic malignant syndrome and serotonin syndrome are overlapping suggesting similarities in underlying pathophysiological mechanisms

Towards More Practical Linear Programming-based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Design

R. Lavy and C. Swamy (FOCS 2005, J. ACM 2011) introduced a general method for obtaining truthful-in-expectation mechanisms from linear programming based approximation algorithms. Due to the use of the Ellipsoid method, a direct implementation of the method is unlikely to be efficient in practice. We propose to use the much simpler and usually faster multiplicative weights update method instead. The simplification comes at the cost of slightly weaker approximation and truthfulness guarantees

Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games

We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria, have low cost, i.e. the Bayesian Price of Anarchy (PoA) is minimized. Although budget balance is a very natural requirement, it puts considerable restrictions on the design space, resulting in high PoA. We propose an alternative, relaxed requirement called budget balance in the equilibrium (BBiE).We show an interesting connection between algorithms for Oblivious Stochastic optimization problems and cost-sharing design with low PoA. We exploit this connection for both problems and we enforce approximate solutions of the stochastic problem, as Bayesian Nash equilibria, with the same guarantees on the PoA. More interestingly, we show how to obtain the same bounds on the PoA, by using anonymous posted prices which are desirable because they are easy to implement and, as we show, induce dominant strategies for the players

Simulations of the Poynting--Robertson Cosmic Battery in Resistive Accretion Disks

We describe the results of numerical "2.5--dimensional" MHD simulations of an initially unmagnetized disk model orbiting a central point--mass and responding to the continual generation of poloidal magnetic field due to a secular source that emulates the Poynting--Robertson (PR) drag on electrons in the vicinity of a luminous stellar or compact accreting object. The fluid in the disk and in the surrounding hotter atmosphere has finite electrical conductivity and allows for the magnetic field to diffuse freely out of the areas where it is generated, while at the same time, the differential rotation of the disk twists the poloidal field and quickly induces a substantial toroidal--field component. The secular PR term has dual purpose in these simulations as the source of the magnetic field and the trigger of a magnetorotational instability (MRI) in the disk. The MRI is especially mild and does not destroy the disk because a small amount of resistivity dampens the instability efficiently. In simulations with moderate resistivities (diffusion timescales up to $\sim$16 local dynamical times) and after $\sim$100 orbits, the MRI has managed to transfer outward substantial amounts of angular momentum and the inner edge of the disk, along with azimuthal magnetic flux, has flowed toward the central point--mass where a new, magnetized, nuclear disk has formed. The toroidal field in this nuclear disk is amplified by differential rotation and it cannot be contained; when it approaches equipartition, it unwinds vertically and produces episodic jet--like outflows. The poloidal field in the inner region cannot diffuse back out if the characteristic diffusion time is of the order of or larger than the dynamical time; it continues to grow linearly in time undisturbed and without saturation, as the outer sections of many poloidal loops are being drawn radially outward.Comment: 27 pages, 55 figure

Local Guarantees in Graph Cuts and Clustering

Correlation Clustering is an elegant model that captures fundamental graph cut problems such as Min $s-t$ Cut, Multiway Cut, and Multicut, extensively studied in combinatorial optimization. Here, we are given a graph with edges labeled $+$ or $-$ and the goal is to produce a clustering that agrees with the labels as much as possible: $+$ edges within clusters and $-$ edges across clusters. The classical approach towards Correlation Clustering (and other graph cut problems) is to optimize a global objective. We depart from this and study local objectives: minimizing the maximum number of disagreements for edges incident on a single node, and the analogous max min agreements objective. This naturally gives rise to a family of basic min-max graph cut problems. A prototypical representative is Min Max $s-t$ Cut: find an $s-t$ cut minimizing the largest number of cut edges incident on any node. We present the following results: $(1)$ an $O(\sqrt{n})$-approximation for the problem of minimizing the maximum total weight of disagreement edges incident on any node (thus providing the first known approximation for the above family of min-max graph cut problems), $(2)$ a remarkably simple $7$-approximation for minimizing local disagreements in complete graphs (improving upon the previous best known approximation of $48$), and $(3)$ a $1/(2+\varepsilon)$-approximation for maximizing the minimum total weight of agreement edges incident on any node, hence improving upon the $1/(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation that follows from the study of approximate pure Nash equilibria in cut and party affiliation games

Einstein--Maxwell--Dilaton metrics from three--dimensional Einstein--Weyl structures

A class of time dependent solutions to $(3+1)$ Einstein--Maxwell-dilaton theory with attractive electric force is found from Einstein--Weyl structures in (2+1) dimensions corresponding to dispersionless Kadomtsev--Petviashvili and $SU(\infty)$ Toda equations. These solutions are obtained from time--like Kaluza--Klein reductions of $(3+2)$ solitons.Comment: 12 pages, to be published in Class.Quantum Gra