Montre-moi comment tu bouges, je te dirai à quoi tu penses : vers une approche incarnée de la cognition sociale

This thesis assumes a grounded approach to social cognition, which defends that our abilities to understand others’ mental states rely on our immediate experience of sensori-motor informations in social interactions and do not need any inference processes. Some critical theorethical limits have been addressed to this approach to social cognition. Typically, it is considered that this conception can not explain high order mentalization, as, for example, the inference of social intentions, because there are not systematic links between those cognitive constructs and the systems of perception and action. Through the studies of this thesis, we have in a first time showed that the kinematics of voluntary movements are influenced by the type of social intention that is endorsed by participants. Precisely, when an action is produced for a partner, its spatio-temporal characteristics are amplified. Then, we have demonstrated that these kinematic variations are influenced by the physical properties of the partner, and particularly by the eyes’ level. Finally, our results showed that these typical kinematic variations are implicitly processed during social interaction and that they can trigger spontaneous social intention attribution. Interestingly, the ability of participants to access others’ mental states from motor action variations is strongly related to their explicit mentalizing performances. In sum, this thesis provides the first experimental evidences supporting the possibility to spontaneously access to others’ social intentions from perceptive and motor processes.Cette thèse s’inscrit dans une approche incarnée de la cognition sociale, selon laquelle la capacité à comprendre les états mentaux d’autres individus ne nécessite aucune inférence mais repose plutôt sur l’expérience immédiate des informations sensori-motrices perçues lors d’interactions sociales. D’importantes limites ont été formulées à l’encontre de cette approche. Il est notamment considéré qu’elle ne peut rendre compte de phénomènes dits de « hauts niveaux » de mentalisation, comme l’inférence d’intentions sociales, puisqu’il n’existe pas de relations systématiques entre ces dernières et les systèmes de la perception et de l’action. A travers les études de cette thèse, nous avons tout d’abord mis en évidence des altérations systèmatiques de la cinématique de mouvements volontaires selon les intentions sociales poursuivies. Précisément, lorsqu’une action est produite avec l’intention de servir à un partenaire, ses caractéristiques spatio-temporelles sont amplifiées. Ensuite, nous avons démontré que ces déformations cinématiques étaient fonction des propriétés physiques, et particulièrement de la hauteur des yeux du partenaire. Enfin, nos résultats montrent que ces déformations cinématiques sont implicitement traitées lors d’interactions sociales et qu’elles entraînent l’inférence spontanée d’intention sociale. De façon intéressante, la capacité des participants à accéder à ces informations privées à partir de variations cinématiques était fortement liée à leurs capacités explicites de mentalisation. Ainsi, cette thèse fournit les premières évidences expérimentales soutenant la possibilité d’accéder spontanément aux intentions sociales d’autres personnes à partir de processus perceptifs et moteurs

The impact of culture on neuropsychological performance: A global social cognition study across 12 countries

AbstractBackgroundDecades of researches aiming to unveil truths about human neuropsychology may have instead unveil facts appropriate to only a fraction of the world's population: those living in western educated rich democratic nations (Muthukrishna et al., 2020 Psych Sci). So far, most studies were conducted as if education and cultural assumptions on which neuropsychology is based were universals and applied everywhere in the world. The importance given to sociological or cultural factors is thus still relatively ignored. With the growth of international clinical studies on dementia, we believe that documenting the potential inter‐cultural differences at stake in a common neuropsychological assessment is an essential topic. This study thus aimed to explore these potential variations in two classical tasks used in neuropsychology that are composing the mini‐SEA (Bertoux et al., 2012 JNNP), i.e. a reduced version of the well‐known Ekman faces (FER), where one has to recognize facial emotions, and a modified version of the Faux Pas test (mFP), where one has to detect and explain social faux.MethodThe data of 573 control participants were collected through the Social Cognition & FTLD Network, an international consortium investigating social cognitive changes in dementia covering 3 continents (18 research centres in 12 countries). Impact of demographic factors and the effect of countries on performance (mini‐SEA, FER, mFP) were explored through linear mixed‐effects models.ResultAge, education and gender were found to significantly impact the performance of the mini‐SEA subtests. Significant and important variations across the countries were also retrieved, with England having the highest performance for all scores. When controlling for demographical factors, differences within countries explained between 14% (mFP) and 24% (FER) of the variance at the mini‐SEA. These variations were not explained by any economical or sociological metrics.ConclusionImportant variations of performance were observed across the 12 countries of the consortium, showing how cultural differences may critically impact neuropsychological performance in international studies

Does Culture Shape Our Understanding of Others’ Thoughts and Emotions? An Investigation Across 12 Countries

Q2Q2Measures of social cognition have now become central in neuropsychology, being essential for early and differential diagnoses, follow-up, and rehabilitation in a wide range of conditions. With the scientific world becoming increasingly interconnected, international neuropsychological and medical collaborations are burgeoning to tackle the global challenges that are mental health conditions. These initiatives commonly merge data across a diversity of populations and countries, while ignoring their specificity. Objective: In this context, we aimed to estimate the influence of participants’ nationality on social cognition evaluation. This issue is of particular importance as most cognitive tasks are developed in highly specific contexts, not representative of that encountered by the world’s population. Method: Through a large international study across 18 sites, neuropsychologists assessed core aspects of social cognition in 587 participants from 12 countries using traditional and widely used tasks. Results: Age, gender, and education were found to impact measures of mentalizing and emotion recognition. After controlling for these factors, differences between countries accounted for more than 20% of the variance on both measures. Importantly, it was possible to isolate participants’ nationality from potential translation issues, which classically constitute a major limitation. Conclusions: Overall, these findings highlight the need for important methodological shifts to better represent social cognition in both fundamental research and clinical practice, especially within emerging international networks and consortia.https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9422-3579https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6529-7077Revista Internacional - IndexadaA2N

Show me how you move, I'll tell you what you're thinking : towards an embodied approach to social cognition

Cette thèse s’inscrit dans une approche incarnée de la cognition sociale, selon laquelle la capacité à comprendre les états mentaux d’autres individus ne nécessite aucune inférence mais repose plutôt sur l’expérience immédiate des informations sensori-motrices perçues lors d’interactions sociales. D’importantes limites ont été formulées à l’encontre de cette approche. Il est notamment considéré qu’elle ne peut rendre compte de phénomènes dits de « hauts niveaux » de mentalisation, comme l’inférence d’intentions sociales, puisqu’il n’existe pas de relations systématiques entre ces dernières et les systèmes de la perception et de l’action. A travers les études de cette thèse, nous avons tout d’abord mis en évidence des altérations systèmatiques de la cinématique de mouvements volontaires selon les intentions sociales poursuivies. Précisément, lorsqu’une action est produite avec l’intention de servir à un partenaire, ses caractéristiques spatio-temporelles sont amplifiées. Ensuite, nous avons démontré que ces déformations cinématiques étaient fonction des propriétés physiques, et particulièrement de la hauteur des yeux du partenaire. Enfin, nos résultats montrent que ces déformations cinématiques sont implicitement traitées lors d’interactions sociales et qu’elles entraînent l’inférence spontanée d’intention sociale. De façon intéressante, la capacité des participants à accéder à ces informations privées à partir de variations cinématiques était fortement liée à leurs capacités explicites de mentalisation. Ainsi, cette thèse fournit les premières évidences expérimentales soutenant la possibilité d’accéder spontanément aux intentions sociales d’autres personnes à partir de processus perceptifs et moteurs.This thesis assumes a grounded approach to social cognition, which defends that our abilities to understand others’ mental states rely on our immediate experience of sensori-motor informations in social interactions and do not need any inference processes. Some critical theorethical limits have been addressed to this approach to social cognition. Typically, it is considered that this conception can not explain high order mentalization, as, for example, the inference of social intentions, because there are not systematic links between those cognitive constructs and the systems of perception and action. Through the studies of this thesis, we have in a first time showed that the kinematics of voluntary movements are influenced by the type of social intention that is endorsed by participants. Precisely, when an action is produced for a partner, its spatio-temporal characteristics are amplified. Then, we have demonstrated that these kinematic variations are influenced by the physical properties of the partner, and particularly by the eyes’ level. Finally, our results showed that these typical kinematic variations are implicitly processed during social interaction and that they can trigger spontaneous social intention attribution. Interestingly, the ability of participants to access others’ mental states from motor action variations is strongly related to their explicit mentalizing performances. In sum, this thesis provides the first experimental evidences supporting the possibility to spontaneously access to others’ social intentions from perceptive and motor processes

The role of the temporoparietal junction in self-other distinction

Being able to discriminate between what originates from ourselves and what originates from others is critical for efficient interactions with our social environment. However, it remains an open question whether self-other distinction is a domain-general mechanism that is involved in various social-cognitive functions or whether specific ‘self-other distinction mechanisms’ exist for each of these functions. On the neural level, there is evidence that self-other distinction is related to a specific brain region at the border of the superior temporal and inferior parietal cortex, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Demonstrating that the TPJ plays a role in social processes that require self-other distinction would support the idea of a domain-general mechanism of self-other distinction. In the present paper, we review evidence coming from clinical observations, neuroimaging experiments and a meta-analysis indicating the involvement of the TPJ in various cognitive operations requiring self-other distinction. At the perceptual level, we discuss the human ability to identify one’s own body and to distinguish it from others. At the action level, we review research on the human ability to experience agency and the control of imitative response tendencies. Finally, at the mental-state level, we discuss the ability to attribute mental states to others. Based on this integrative review, we suggest that the TPJ, and in particular its dorsal part, supports a domain general ability to enhance task-relevant representations when self-related and other-related representations are in conflict. Finally, this conception allows us to propose a unifying architecture for the emergence of numerous socio-cognitive abilities

What Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Actually Measure? Theory and Practice

International audienceIn recent decades, the ability to represent others' mental states (i.e., theory of mind) has gained particular attention in various disciplines ranging from ethology to cognitive neuroscience. Despite the exponentially growing interest, the functional architecture of social cognition is still unclear. In the present review, we argue that not only the vocabulary but also most of the classic measures for theory of mind lack specificity. We examined classic tests used to assess theory of mind and noted that the majority of them do not require the participant to represent another's mental state or, sometimes, any mental state at all. Our review reveals that numerous classic tests measure lower-level processes that do not directly test for theory of mind. We propose that more attention should be paid to methods used in this field of social cognition to improve the understanding of underlying concepts