738 research outputs found
In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative
Sample (2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In sum, philosophers ought to impose on scientists only an epistemic standard that they are willing to impose on themselves
Many worlds and modality in the interpretation of quantum mechanics: an algebraic approach
Many worlds interpretations (MWI) of quantum mechanics avoid the measurement
problem by considering every term in the quantum superposition as actual. A
seemingly opposed solution is proposed by modal interpretations (MI) which
state that quantum mechanics does not provide an account of what `actually is
the case', but rather deals with what `might be the case', i.e. with
possibilities. In this paper we provide an algebraic framework which allows us
to analyze in depth the modal aspects of MWI. Within our general formal scheme
we also provide a formal comparison between MWI and MI, in particular, we
provide a formal understanding of why --even though both interpretations share
the same formal structure-- MI fall pray of Kochen-Specker (KS) type
contradictions while MWI escape them.Comment: submitted to the Journal of Mathematical Physic
Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence
The probabilities a Bayesian agent assigns to a set of events typically
change with time, for instance when the agent updates them in the light of new
data. In this paper we address the question of how an agent's probabilities at
different times are constrained by Dutch-book coherence. We review and attempt
to clarify the argument that, although an agent is not forced by coherence to
use the usual Bayesian conditioning rule to update his probabilities, coherence
does require the agent's probabilities to satisfy van Fraassen's [1984]
reflection principle (which entails a related constraint pointed out by
Goldstein [1983]). We then exhibit the specialized assumption needed to recover
Bayesian conditioning from an analogous reflection-style consideration.
Bringing the argument to the context of quantum measurement theory, we show
that "quantum decoherence" can be understood in purely personalist
terms---quantum decoherence (as supposed in a von Neumann chain) is not a
physical process at all, but an application of the reflection principle. From
this point of view, the decoherence theory of Zeh, Zurek, and others as a story
of quantum measurement has the plot turned exactly backward.Comment: 14 pages, written in memory of Itamar Pitowsk
Correlations, deviations and expectations: the Extended Principle of the Common Cause
The Principle of the Common Cause is usually understood to provide causal explanations for probabilistic correlations obtaining between causally unrelated events. In this study, an extended interpretation of the principle is proposed, according to which common causes should be invoked to explain positive correlations whose values depart from the ones that one would expect to obtain in accordance to her probabilistic expectations. In addition, a probabilistic model for common causes is tailored which satisfies the generalized version of the principle, at the same time including the standard conjunctive-fork model as a special case
Real World Interpretations of Quantum Theory
I propose a new class of interpretations, {\it real world interpretations},
of the quantum theory of closed systems. These interpretations postulate a
preferred factorization of Hilbert space and preferred projective measurements
on one factor. They give a mathematical characterisation of the different
possible worlds arising in an evolving closed quantum system, in which each
possible world corresponds to a (generally mixed) evolving quantum state. In a
realistic model, the states corresponding to different worlds should be
expected to tend towards orthogonality as different possible quasiclassical
structures emerge or as measurement-like interactions produce different
classical outcomes. However, as the worlds have a precise mathematical
definition, real world interpretations need no definition of quasiclassicality,
measurement, or other concepts whose imprecision is problematic in other
interpretational approaches. It is natural to postulate that precisely one
world is chosen randomly, using the natural probability distribution, as the
world realised in Nature, and that this world's mathematical characterisation
is a complete description of reality.Comment: Minor revisions. To appear in Foundations of Physic
A geometric proof of the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem
We give a short geometric proof of the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem for
non-contextual hidden variables models. Note added to this version: I
understand from Jan-Aake Larsson that the construction we give here actually
contains the original Kochen-Specker construction as well as many others (Bell,
Conway and Kochen, Schuette, perhaps also Peres).Comment: This paper appeared some years ago, before the author was aware of
quant-ph. It is relevant to recent developments concerning Kochen-Specker
theorem
On Empirical Equivalence and Duality
I argue that, on a judicious reading of two existing criteria--one syntactic
and the other semantic--dual theories can be taken to be empirically
equivalent. The judicious reading is straightforward, but leads to the
surprising conclusion that very different-looking theories can have equivalent
empirical content. And thus it shows how a widespread scientific practice, of
interpreting duals as empirically equivalent, can be understood by a thus-far
unnoticed feature of existing accounts of empirical equivalence
On Empirical Equivalence and Duality
I argue that, on a judicious reading of two existing criteria--one syntactic and the other semantic--dual theories can be taken to be empirically equivalent. The judicious reading is straightforward, but leads to the surprising conclusion that very different-looking theories can have equivalent empirical content. And thus it shows how a widespread scientific practice, of interpreting duals as empirically equivalent, can be understood by a thus-far unnoticed feature of existing accounts of empirical equivalence
- …