The effects of custodial vs. non-custodial sentences on re-offending: A systematic review of the state of knowledge

As part of a broad initiative of systematic reviews of experimental or quasiexperimental evaluations of interventions in the field of crime prevention and the treatment of offenders, our work consisted in searching through all available databases for evidence concerning the effects of custodial and non-custodial sanctions on reoffending. For this purpose, we examined more than 3,000 abstracts, and finally 23 studies that met the minimal conditions of the Campbell Review, with only 5 studies based on a controlled or a natural experimental design. These studies allowed, all in all, 27 comparisons. Relatively few studies compare recidivism rates for offenders sentenced to jail or prison with those of offenders given some alternative to incarceration (typically probation). According to the findings, the rate of re-offending after a non-custodial sanction is lower than after a custodial sanction in 11 out of 13 significant comparisons. However, in 14 out of 27 comparisons, no significant difference on re-offending between both sanctions is noted. Two out of 27 comparisons are in favour of custodial sanctions. Finally, experimental evaluations and natural experiments yield results that are less favourable to non-custodial sanctions, than are quasi-experimental studies using softer designs. This is confirmed by the meta-analysis including four controlled and one natural experiment. According to the results, non-custodial sanctions are not beneficial in terms of lower rates of re-offending beyond random effects. Contradictory results reported in the literature are likely due to insufficient control of pre-intervention differences between prisoners and those serving “alternative” sanctions

MARKET AND GOVERNMENT FAILURES RELATED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF TAX INCENTIVES REGIME

Abstract: The paper deals with problem of effectiveness of tax incentive regimes. The main purpose of this paper is to define causes, factors and measures aimed to prevent and neutralize failures of introduction of tax incentives. In order to examine the behavior of economic agents we used game theory tools, notably the “principal-agent” model, similar to the Allingham-Sandmo model. To solve a problem of inefficient interaction, when investors unreasonably pretend on tax incentives and government ignore that by granting them incentives, we proposed to use Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies. Finally we defined factors of improvement of efficiency of tax incentive regimes, particularly mechanisms of their implementation and termination

A Study of Outcomes Determination Strategy in Non-profit Health and Welfare Programs Evaluation

This article considers the findings of a survey of evaluators practising in Australian health and welfare organisations to learn about strategy in outcomes evaluation design. Outcomes evaluation is identified as an opportunity for health and welfare programs to learn if and how different practice interventions are contributing to the achievement of desired outcomes, for the purpose of building an evidence base for advancing the wellbeing of people. Results indicate that current strategy to determine client outcomes in these sectors is typified by reliance on program logic models and funding specifications, with limited translation of best practice evidence or client wellbeing preferences. We suggest that clarity of purpose is an important consideration for non-profit programs embarking on evaluation design, bringing attention to the need for skill development and better resourcing of non-profit organisations to support the production of evaluations capable of contributing to best practice evidence