Truth Commissions after Economic Crises: Political Learning or Blame Game?

This article addresses an important but understudied aspect of the recent Great Recession in Europe: the institutional strategies political elites deployed to learn from past policy failures and address accountability, more specifically, truth commissions. We raise two overlapping puzzles. The first concerns the timing of the decision to adopt an economic truth commission: while Iceland established a truth commission at an early stage of the crisis, Greece and Ireland did so much later. What accounts for ‘early’ versus ‘delayed’ truth seekers? The second concerns variations in learning outcomes. Iceland’s commission paved the way for learning institutional lessons, but truth commissions in Greece and Ireland became overtly politicised. What accounts for these divergences? This article compares truth commissions in Iceland, Greece and Ireland and identifies two types of political learning – institutional and instrumental – related to the establishment of a truth commission. It argues that political elites in countries with higher pre-crisis levels of trust in institutions and public transparency are more likely to establish economic truth commissions quickly; this is the ‘institutional logic’ of learning. The ‘instrumental logic’ of learning, in contrast, leads governments interested in apportioning blame to their predecessors to establish commissions at a later date, usually proximal to critical elections

Really responsive risk-based regulation

Regulators in a number of countries are increasingly developing "risk-based" strategies to manage their resources, and their reputations as "risk-based regulators" have become much lauded by regulatory reformers. This widespread endorsement of risk-based regulation, together with the experience of regulatory failure, prompts us to consider how risk-based regulators can attune the logics of risk analyses to the complex problems and the dynamics of regulation in practice. We argue, first, that regulators have to regulate in a way that is responsive to five elements: (1) regulated firms' behavior, attitude, and culture; (2) regulation's institutional environments; (3) interactions of regulatory controls; (4) regulatory performance; and (5) change. Secondly, we argue that the challenges of regulation to which regulators have to respond vary across the different regulatory tasks of detection, response development, enforcement, assessment, and modification. Using the "really responsive" framework, we highlight some of the strengths and limitations of using risk-based regulation to manage risk and uncertainty within the constraints that flow from practical circumstances and, indeed, from the framework of risk-based regulation itself. The need for a revised, more nuanced conception of risk-based regulation is stressed

The strategic role of reinsurance in the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-life insurance market

We demonstrate that by increasing the level of reinsurance, primary insurers increase their product-market share at the expense of rivals with lower reinsurance coverage in five main lines of insurance in the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-life insurance market. We use panel data drawn from statutory filings made by non-life insurers to the then UK regulator (FSA) over 1985 to 2010 period. We find that the influence of reinsurance and other financial variables on insurers’ growth in product-market share varies across lines of insurance business. Since reinsurance impacts on product-market outcomes in competitive non-life insurance industry, we conclude that reinsurance performs an important strategic function in insurance markets

Architecture, symbolic capital and elite mobilizations: The case of the Royal Bank of Scotland corporate campus

In this article, we apply the conceptual framework of Pierre Bourdieu, in particular forms of capital, social fields, field of power and modes of domination, to demonstrate how the study of a symbolically powerful building can provide insights into what are often opaque elite interactions. In order to do this, we focus on the corporate campus headquarters of a powerful financial institution, the Royal Bank of Scotland in the context of Scotland in the period 2000–2009. We pose the following questions: What is the relationship between corporate space and the field of power? What role does a corporate building play in circuits of capital conversion? What does this case tell us about the role of architecture in elite mobilisations? In addressing these questions, we contribute to critical organisation studies by identifying and theorising the role of corporate space in inter-elite dynamics and circuits of capital conversion. This approach, we argue, provides a methodological lever which could be applied to other symbolically important buildings in order to understand the nature and role of inter-field interactions in the conception and realisation of such buildings

Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services

Financial regulators in many states recently have obtained statuory mandates to enhance consumer financial literacy. This paper investicages the development of policy pursuant to such mandates in the UK and Canada to identify how national regulators in both countries represent financial market place. It finds that regulators in both countries represent financial education as empowerment and responsible consumer behaviour. The paper rekates the tension between empowerment and responsibilization aspects of literacy enhancement to policy goals of expectations of protection. It raises questions about regulators' use of consumer education to responsiblize consumption of financial products and calls for further research on the international growth of financial literacy education as a regulatory project