70 research outputs found
Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
In this account of the history of voting-power measurement, we confine ourselves to the concept of a priori voting power. We show how the concept was re-invented several times and how the circumstances in which it was reinvented led to conceptual confusion as to the true meaning of what is being measured. In particular, power-as-influence was conflated with value in the sense of transferable utility cooperative game theory (power as share in constant total payoff). Influence was treated, improperly, as though it were transferable utility, and hence an additive and distributive quantity. We provide examples of the resulting misunderstanding and mis-directed criticism
An ordinal multi-criteria decision-making procedure in the context of uniform qualitative scales
ProducciĂłn CientĂficaIn this contribution, we propose a multi-criteria decision-making procedure that has been devised in a purely ordinal way. Agents evaluate the alternatives regarding several criteria by assigning one or two consecutive terms of a uniform ordered qualitative scale to each alternative in each criterion. Weights assigned to criteria are managed through replications of the corresponding ratings, and alternatives are ranked according to the medians of their ratings after the replications
An equivalent formulation for the Shapley value
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_1.An equivalent explicit formula for the Shapley value is provided, its equivalence with the classical one is proven by double induction. The importance of this new formula, in contrast to the classical one, is its capability of being extended to more general classes of games, in particular to j-cooperative games or multichoice games, in which players choose among different levels of participation in the game.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version
Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council
We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a
voting body containing all members delegates decision-making to a (time-varying) subset
of its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical
framework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region
levels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the
framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to
reform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between
21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective,
while from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region
with more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily underrepresented.
Our equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto
rights, however
Forecasting European Union politics: Real-time forecasts in political time series analysis
Correlation and Inequality in Weighted Majority Voting Games
In a weighted majority voting game, the weights of the players are determined based on some socio-economic parameter. A number of measures have been proposed to measure the voting powers of the different players. A basic question in this area is to what extent does the variation in the voting powers reflect the variation in the weights? The voting powers depend on the winning threshold. So, a second question is what is the appropriate value of the winning threshold? In this work, we propose two simple ideas to address these and related questions in a quantifiable manner. The first idea is to use Pearson's Correlation Coefficient between the weight vector and the power profile to measure the similarity between weight and power. The second idea is to use standard inequality measures to quantify the inequality in the weight vector as well as in the power profile. These two ideas answer the first question. Both the weight-power similarity and inequality scores of voting power profiles depend on the value of the winning threshold. For situations of practical interest, it turns out that it is possible to choose a value of the winning threshold which maximises the similarity score and also minimises the difference in the inequality scores of the weight vector and the power profile. This provides an answer to the second question. Using the above formalisation, we are able to quantitatively argue that it is sufficient to consider only the vector of swings for the players as the power measure. We apply our methodology to the voting games arising in the decision making processes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). In the case of IMF, we provide quantitative evidence that the actual winning threshold that is currently used is sub-optimal and instead propose a winning threshold which has a firm analytical backing. On the other hand, in the case of EU, we provide quantitative evidence that the presently used threshold is very close to the optimal
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