Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies

We explore an equilibrium model of games where players’ choice behavior is given by logit response functions, but their payoff responsiveness is heterogeneous. We extend the definition of quantal response equilibrium to this setting, calling it heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium (HQRE), and prove existence under weak conditions. We generalize HQRE to allow for limited insight, in which players can only imagine others with low responsiveness. We identify a formal connection between this new equilibrium concept, called truncated quantal response equilibrium (TQRE), and the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model. We show that CH can be approximated arbitrarily closely by TQRE. We report a series of experiments comparing the performance of QRE, HQRE, TQRE and CH. A surprise is that the fi of the models are quite close across a variety of matrix and dominance-solvable asymmetric information betting games. The key link is that in the QRE approaches, strategies with higher expected payoffs are chosen more often than strategies with lower expected payoff. In CH this property is not built into the model, but generally holds true in the experimental data

The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

It is well documented that people are reluctant to switch from a default option. We experimentally test the robustness of this behavioral inertia in a collective decision-making setting by varying the default option type and the decision-making environment. We examine the impacts of automatic-participation and no-participation default options on subjects’ participation in a public goods provision and their contributions. Two variants of public goods game are employed: the linear and the threshold public goods games. The study shows the evidence of partial stickiness rather than complete stickiness of default options as indicated in empirical studies. Our experimental results square with the evidence of behavioral inertia only when the automatic-participation default is used. This default boosts contributions in the linear public goods game but not in the threshold public goods game. The evidence of partial stickiness is robust to the variation of the game employed, but the effect on contribution is sensitive to it

Children’s rights online: challenges, dilemmas and emerging directions

In debates over internet governance, the interests of children figure unevenly, and only partial progress has been made in supporting children’s rights online globally. This chapter examines how the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is helpful in mapping children’s rights to provision, protection and participation as they apply online as well as offline. However, challenges remain. First, opportunities and risks are positively linked, policy approaches are needed to resolve the potential conflict between protection on the one hand, and provision and participation on the other. Second, while parents may be relied on to some degree to balance their child’s rights and needs, the evidence suggests that a minority of parents are ill-equipped to manage this. Third, resolution is needed regarding the responsibility for implementing digital rights, since many governments prefer self-regulation in relation to internet governance. The chapter concludes by calling for a global governance body charged with ensuring the delivery of children’s rights

Strong, bold, and kind : Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

Financial support from the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet), from Formas through the program Human Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources (COMMONS), and the Ideenfonds of the University of Munich is gratefully acknowledged.We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.PostprintPeer reviewe