Understanding the Nature of Nanoscale Wetting Through All-Atom Simulations

The spreading behavior of spherical and cylindrical water droplets between 30Å and 100Å in radius on a sapphire surface is investigated using all-atom molecular dynamics simulations for durations on the order of tens of nanoseconds. A monolayer film develops rapidly and wets the surface, while the bulk of the droplet spreads on top of the monolayer, maintaining the shape of a spherical cap. Unlike previous simulations in the literature, the bulk radius is found to increase to a maximum value and receed as the monolayer continues to expand. Simple time and droplet size dependence is observed for monolayer radius and contact angle, and a mathematical model for the spreading dynamics is developed to predict droplet height and bulk radius over time. The model predictions match the simulation data reasonably well, although more work remains in understanding the distinct temporal regimes in the wetting process which this work does not consider

A New Moral Imperative

Oliver M. Evans, 69, a founder and former president of The Humane Society of the United States, died on December 16. Mr. Evans, a native of Montclair, N.J., was a director or officer of HSUS throughout its 21-year history. He was serving as treasurer at the time of his death. In recognition of his outstanding leadership to the humane movement and his personal dedication to animal welfare, The HSUS headquarters building was dedicated to his memory on October 10

Self consciousness, self identity, and self knowledge

In this thesis I attempt to give an account of the experiential self: the self of inner experience. I put forward the view that the empirical self is the only self there is, and attribute attempts to identify a Transcendental Self, a Pure Ego, a Mind, or a Soul, to a misunderstanding of the nature of the empirical, experiential self. The postulation of a real, or metaphysical, self is put down to the fact that philosophers have entertained altogether too simple a view of the nature of the empirical self. Their major assumption has been that if we have experience of an empirical self, a real self must be postulated which does the experiencing of the empirical self. On this basis the real self cannot itself become an object of experience without this leading to an infinite regress. My contention is, on the contrary, that the empirical self can itself perform all the functions allotted to the metaphysical self. On this view, the notion of a metaphysical self is redundant, and we are saved the embarrassment of defending the existence of a peculiarly elusive metaphysical entity.The position I have just outlined could quite easily be mistaken for one leading up to a theory like Strawson's in which a self is identified with a man; or Shoemaker's in which a self is described as a non -spiritual substance. In fact it will be seen to differ radically from these two, essentially coincident, approaches. Strawson and Shoemaker, together with most recent philosophers dealing with the problem of self- identity, see the problem exclusively in terms of the identity of other persons; not in the identity of a person for himself. Even when the question of one's own identity arises, this is still taken by them to be a problem of the identity of other persons. Thus on their view if I have to establish my own identity, I must use precisely the same criteria as other people would use if they had to establish my identity. The problem I am concerned with, however, is one about which Strawson is silent: namely, the problem of explaining in what consists our own identity for ourselves. Chapter one opens with a discussion of the significance of the fact that we have first -hand knowledge of what selves are. The Pure Ego Theory and The Serial Theory are rejected for failing to take advantage of the unique position this places us in, to describe what selves are.Since I dispute the widely held Humean view of the empirical self, and since I wish to take cognizance of the fact that we ourselves are the selves to be identified, I undertake an analysis of consciousness itself. Most of chapter one is devoted to that task. The reality of consciousness is defended against arguments denying its existence, and an exclusively empirical analysis of consciousness is offered. This is to protect my programme from the objection that a metaphysical interpretation of the self is only avoided at the cost of introducing a metaphysical interpretation of consciousness. To this end I defend the proposition that consciousness is nothing over and above its several manifestations, and I deny in particular that consciousness consists of acts of awareness. Then again adherence to the notion of consciousness is defended against the reductionist argument that reference to it should be dispensed with, in favour of piecemeal references to its manifestations. It is maintained that it is erroneous to conceive of consciousness as an aggregate of its manifestations.As a preliminary to investigating the constitution of consciousness two opposing points of view are considered in the form put forward by four Nineteenth Century philosophers. The views of Hamilton and Ferrier who contend that consciousness exhibits a duality between subject and object are contrasted with those of Hodgson and James who deny that consciousness has any such "inner duplicity." This short survey leads to the conclusion that an independent analysis of consciousness is needed, in view of the fact that opposing positions are defended by appeals to self -evidence that cancel each other out. What is required, and what I undertake, is to give an analysis of consciousness that is based on empirical facts and eschews any appeal to intuition or self -evidence.Attention is made the subject of study in chapter two, because it supplies immediate evidence of the existence of the bifurcation of elements within consciousness. This effect of attention is investigated in the surmise that it might turn out to be the empirical basis to the alleged duality between subject and object. I attempt to show that attention is operative in all normal forms of consciousness: even when we believe ourselves to be totally inattentive. It transpires that attention reveals the structure of consciousness. It polarizes consciousness into that part of it that is receiving attention and a remaining part that is not. The part receiving attention I refer to as the object of attention, and the part from which attention is withdrawn I refer to as residual consciousness. These two aspects of consciousness are dealt with in chapters two and three, respectively. Evidence from the psychologists William James, and his French contemporary, T.H. Ribot, is adduced to support the analysis of the relation between consciousness and attention.A central distinction to my enterprise is the distinction I draw between what I call "interrogative attention" on the one hand, and "non- interrogative attention' on the other. I argue that these two forms of attention amount to the different ways in which consciousness may be structured. In the case of interrogative attention, in which attention is bestowed without a problem - solving intelligence being brought to bear on the object of attention, the two poles of consciousness -- residual consciousness and object of attention - -are merely severed from each other. In the case of interrogative attention, in which attention is given for the sake of finding something out, the two poles of consciousness are in a systematic relationship with each other. The investigation suggests that the different forms of attention are just the different ways in which consciousness may be structured. There is therefore no suggestion that attention may assume the role of an occult cause. Although the structure of consciousness will vary according to the form of attention, its bi- polarity is a formal feature common to all such structures. No matter what the content, the form of consciousness remains unchanged. There is nothing static about the content of residual consciousness on one side, nor about the object of attention on the other. Both, it is maintained, change ceaselessly through the continuous interchange of elements from one pole of consciousness to the other. An important observation is made to the effect that the changing content of the two poles is not noticed equally at both poles. The nature of the structure of consciousness is revealed to be one in which the changes occurring to the object of attention attract notice, while the changes taking place in the content of residual consciousness pass largely unnoticed. This is shown to be necessarily the case, and the feature of consciousness in question I describe as the directionality of consciousness.Chapter four is the crucial chapter in the work. The two preceding chapters are designed to prepare the ground for the denouement which it presents, and much of the significance of the earlier discussion can only be fully appreciated in its light. In it the view is advanced that the bi -polar structure of consciousness accounts for the duality between subject and object which Hamilton had asserted to be a self- evident feature of consciousness. The essence of the theory is that residual consciousness (which may be said to be, metaphorically speaking, the negative pole of consciousness), is the empirical self for which we have been searching. It is shown to have all the "marks" philosophers have taken to be characteristics of the self. The empirical self is, on this theory, located within consciousness, and for this reason its knowability is guaranteed. At the same time the empirical self is not identified with the content of consciousness, and in this way the difficulty that the self is continuously passing away, which besets the Serial Theory of the Self, is overcome. From this perspective it can be appreciated that the Humean identification of the self with a series of perceptions is the very reverse of the truth. It is tantamount to the identification of the self with what is essentially not -self: viz. the objects of attention (i.e., the wrong pole of consciousness: the positive instead of the negative pole, so to speak).I contrast this theory with its closest rival --the theory that identifies the self with the mass of somatic feeling - -and demonstrate its manifest superiority to the latter theory. Objections to the plausibility of the proposed identification of the self with residual consciousness are considered and answered. It is shown to share the merit, which is particularly claimed by the somatic feeling theory, of enabling us to maintain that even an isolated perception can be said to be the perception of a self, quite independently of its relation to other perceptions. In this way it overcomes a major stumbling block to theories of the empirical self which in general permit of no such claim. At the same tine this feature of the theory destroys the basis of one of the strongest arguments in favour of a Pure Ego Theory: namely the supposai that only on a Pure Ego Theory could it be maintained that one isolated perception could be the perception of a self. Finally the implications of the theory on the question of self - consciousness are drawn out, and the limits to complete self - objectification are explained.Perhaps the single greatest difficulty for a theory that locates the self within experience, is to account for self- identity through time: in other words, the problem of the continuity of the self. A theory identifying the self with residual consciousness must seem particularly vulnerable in this respect, because of the fact that residual consciousness has an ever - changing content. This problem is taken up in chapter five. The Serial Theory is subjected to close examination, because it is offered as a solution to this problem. It is shown to be unsatisfactory, because of its dependence on the Humean view of consciousness, which, as I have already indicated, I dispute. I try to show that my analysis of consciousness escapes the atomistic implications of the Serial Theory, and demands instead that consciousness be seen as a continuum.The argument put forward to establish the fact that consciousness is continuous, is dependent on a subsidiary thesis that runs parallel to the main one throughout the work. It is the contention that states of consciousness come into being in conjunction with the bodily activities involving the use of our sense- organs. In the present context this thesis is brought in to explain the continuity of consciousness, in the following manner. I show that states of consciousness are sustained by bodily activities, and reason that since bodily activities are continuous while they last, the states of consciousness they sustain must themselves be continuous for as long as the bodily activity continues. The inference is then drawn that since residual consciousness is a part of consciousness, the continuousness of consciousness must be reflected in residual consciousness as well. Thus, on the basis of the identification of the self with residual consciousness, the continuity of the self is assured. Memory is then brought in to explain our awareness of our self- continuity.The thesis concludes with a sketch of some of the wider implications of my findings. It is argued that the relation between bodily activity and consciousness demands that the self be conceived of as embodied. And finally it is suggested that the theory offers the prospect of a reconciliation between Realism and Idealism; if not in the main, at least in respect of the issue of the active versus the passive self in perceptual experience

A New Moral Imperative

Oliver M. Evans, 69, a founder and former president of The Humane Society of the United States, died on December 16. Mr. Evans, a native of Montclair, N.J., was a director or officer of HSUS throughout its 21-year history. He was serving as treasurer at the time of his death. In recognition of his outstanding leadership to the humane movement and his personal dedication to animal welfare, The HSUS headquarters building was dedicated to his memory on October 10

“What can’t be coded can be decorded” Reading Writing Performing Finnegans Wake

This thesis examines the ways in which performances of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939) navigate the boundary between reading and writing. I consider the extent to which performances enact alternative readings of Finnegans Wake, challenging notions of competence and understanding; and by viewing performance as a form of writing I ask whether Joyce’s composition process can be remembered by its recomposition into new performances. These perspectives raise questions about authority and archivisation, and I argue that performances of Finnegans Wake challenge hierarchical and institutional forms of interpretation. By appropriating Joyce’s text through different methodologies of reading and writing I argue that these performances come into contact with a community of ghosts and traces which haunt its composition. In chapter one I argue that performance played an important role in the composition and early critical reception of Finnegans Wake and conduct an overview of various performances which challenge the notion of a ‘Joycean competence’ or encounter the text through radical recompositions of its material. In chapter two I discuss Mary Manning’s The Voice of Shem (1955) and find that its theatrical reassembling of the text served as a competent reading of the Wake’s form as an alternative to contemporary studies of the book, and that its specific ‘redistribution’ of the text accessed affective and genetic elements that were yet to be explored in Joyce scholarship. In chapter three I consider several decompositions of the Wake by John Cage (1975-1983) and find that by paying attention to the materiality of the book rather than its ‘plot’ or ‘meaning’ his performances reencountered the work concealed in Finnegans Wake’s composition. In chapter four, I document and analyse my own performance, About That Original Hen (2014), a ‘research-as-performance’ lecture which re-enacts a visit to the James Joyce Archive. By reconfiguring Finnegans Wake in relation to a marginal figure from its composition process and a contemporary act of protest within the university, this performance explores how a diachronic re-animation of archival materials can engage with the ghosts which haunt its composition and enact a political reading of the text’s production and subsequent archivisation. I conclude the thesis by arguing that these performances repeat the contingencies, misreadings and appropriations and collective acts of reading and writing that were integral to the composition of Finnegans Wake

The importance of including habitat-specific behaviour in models of butterfly movement

Dispersal is a key process affecting population persistence and major factors affecting dispersal rates are the amounts, connectedness and properties of habitats in landscapes. We present new data on the butterfly Maniola jurtina in flower-rich and flower-poor habitats that demonstrates how movement and behaviour differ between sexes and habitat types, and how this effects consequent dispersal rates. Females had higher flight speeds than males but their total time in flight was four times less. The effect of habitat type was strong for both sexes, flight speeds were ~2.5x and ~1.7x faster on resource-poor habitats for males and females respectively, and flights were approximately 50% longer. With few exceptions females oviposited in the mown grass habitat, likely because growing grass offers better food for emerging caterpillars, but they foraged in the resource-rich habitat. It seems that females faced a trade-off between ovipositing without foraging in the mown grass or foraging without ovipositing where flowers were abundant. We show that taking account of habitat-dependent differences in activity, here categorised as flight or non-flight, is crucial to obtaining good fits of an individual-based model to observed movement. An important implication of this finding is that incorporating habitat-specific activity budgets is likely necessary for predicting longer-term dispersal in heterogeneous habitats as habitat-specific behaviour substantially influences the mean (>30% difference) and kurtosis (1.4x difference) of dispersal kernels. The presented IBMs provide a simple method to explicitly incorporate known activity and movement rates when predicting dispersal in changing and heterogeneous landscapes

Using photonic cooling systems to improve the efficiency of photovoltaic cells and their means of electricity production

Photovoltaic (PV) systems generate electricity from the abundance of solar energy provided by the sun, making them a significant technology in utilising clean, renewable energy. It is in our best interest to achieve the maximum possible electrical output from these systems. Solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are a effective technology to resource clean energy, it is in our best interest to achieve the maximum possible electrical output from these cells. Through this meta-study we discuss how the efficiency of photovoltaic systems can be optimised using photonic cooling systems (PCS). The use of laser and doppler cooling upon photovoltaic (solar) cells combat the thermodynamic property of semiconductors where increases in temperature result in a decrease in electroconductive efficiency. PCS’ ability to bring materials to the mK range theoretically improves PV systems efficiency by more than double the current practical results. However, we show the inability for semiconductors to function at such low temperatures resulting in such cells acting as insulators in the mK range. Through this meta-study we have researched efficiency of PV cells and PCS through multiple paper analysis. Using databases such as Scopus and Nature where we recognise highly cited journals/papers while focusing upon PV and PCS as search parameters. Linking between their temperature, efficiency and success during practical testing

Probing molecular free energy landscapes by periodic loading

Single molecule pulling experiments provide information about interactions in biomolecules that cannot be obtained by any other method. However, the reconstruction of the molecule's free energy profile from the experimental data is still a challenge, in particular for the unstable barrier regions. We propose a new method for obtaining the full profile by introducing a periodic ramp and using Jarzynski's identity for obtaining equilibrium quantities from non-equilibrium data. Our simulated experiments show that this method delivers significant more accurate data than previous methods, under the constraint of equal experimental effort.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure