In this thesis I attempt to give an account of the experiential
self: the self of inner experience. I put forward the view that the
empirical self is the only self there is, and attribute attempts to
identify a Transcendental Self, a Pure Ego, a Mind, or a Soul, to a misunderstanding of the nature of the empirical, experiential self.
The postulation of a real, or metaphysical, self is put down to the
fact that philosophers have entertained altogether too simple a view
of the nature of the empirical self. Their major assumption has been
that if we have experience of an empirical self, a real self must be
postulated which does the experiencing of the empirical self. On
this basis the real self cannot itself become an object of experience
without this leading to an infinite regress. My contention is, on
the contrary, that the empirical self can itself perform all the
functions allotted to the metaphysical self. On this view, the
notion of a metaphysical self is redundant, and we are saved the
embarrassment of defending the existence of a peculiarly elusive
metaphysical entity.The position I have just outlined could quite easily be
mistaken for one leading up to a theory like Strawson's in which a self is identified with a man; or Shoemaker's in which a self is
described as a non -spiritual substance. In fact it will be seen
to differ radically from these two, essentially coincident,
approaches. Strawson and Shoemaker, together with most recent
philosophers dealing with the problem of self- identity, see the
problem exclusively in terms of the identity of other persons; not
in the identity of a person for himself. Even when the question of
one's own identity arises, this is still taken by them to be a problem
of the identity of other persons. Thus on their view if I have to
establish my own identity, I must use precisely the same criteria as other people would use if they had to establish my identity. The
problem I am concerned with, however, is one about which Strawson is
silent: namely, the problem of explaining in what consists our own
identity for ourselves. Chapter one opens with a discussion of the
significance of the fact that we have first -hand knowledge of what
selves are. The Pure Ego Theory and The Serial Theory are rejected
for failing to take advantage of the unique position this places us in,
to describe what selves are.Since I dispute the widely held Humean view of the empirical
self, and since I wish to take cognizance of the fact that we ourselves are the selves to be identified, I undertake an analysis of
consciousness itself. Most of chapter one is devoted to that task.
The reality of consciousness is defended against arguments denying
its existence, and an exclusively empirical analysis of consciousness
is offered. This is to protect my programme from the objection
that a metaphysical interpretation of the self is only avoided at the
cost of introducing a metaphysical interpretation of consciousness.
To this end I defend the proposition that consciousness is nothing
over and above its several manifestations, and I deny in particular
that consciousness consists of acts of awareness. Then again
adherence to the notion of consciousness is defended against the
reductionist argument that reference to it should be dispensed with,
in favour of piecemeal references to its manifestations. It is
maintained that it is erroneous to conceive of consciousness as an
aggregate of its manifestations.As a preliminary to investigating the constitution of
consciousness two opposing points of view are considered in the form
put forward by four Nineteenth Century philosophers. The views of
Hamilton and Ferrier who contend that consciousness exhibits a duality
between subject and object are contrasted with those of Hodgson and
James who deny that consciousness has any such "inner duplicity."
This short survey leads to the conclusion that an independent analysis
of consciousness is needed, in view of the fact that opposing positions
are defended by appeals to self -evidence that cancel each other out.
What is required, and what I undertake, is to give an analysis of
consciousness that is based on empirical facts and eschews any appeal
to intuition or self -evidence.Attention is made the subject of study in chapter two, because
it supplies immediate evidence of the existence of the bifurcation of
elements within consciousness. This effect of attention is
investigated in the surmise that it might turn out to be the empirical
basis to the alleged duality between subject and object. I attempt
to show that attention is operative in all normal forms of consciousness:
even when we believe ourselves to be totally inattentive. It transpires that attention reveals the structure of consciousness. It
polarizes consciousness into that part of it that is receiving
attention and a remaining part that is not. The part receiving
attention I refer to as the object of attention, and the part from
which attention is withdrawn I refer to as residual consciousness.
These two aspects of consciousness are dealt with in chapters two and
three, respectively. Evidence from the psychologists William James,
and his French contemporary, T.H. Ribot, is adduced to support the
analysis of the relation between consciousness and attention.A central distinction to my enterprise is the distinction I draw between what I call "interrogative attention" on the one hand,
and "non- interrogative attention' on the other. I argue that these
two forms of attention amount to the different ways in which consciousness may be structured. In the case of interrogative attention, in
which attention is bestowed without a problem - solving intelligence
being brought to bear on the object of attention, the two poles of
consciousness -- residual consciousness and object of attention - -are merely severed from each other. In the case of interrogative
attention, in which attention is given for the sake of finding something out, the two poles of consciousness are in a systematic
relationship with each other. The investigation suggests that the different forms of attention are just the different ways in which
consciousness may be structured. There is therefore no suggestion
that attention may assume the role of an occult cause. Although the
structure of consciousness will vary according to the form of
attention, its bi- polarity is a formal feature common to all such
structures. No matter what the content, the form of consciousness
remains unchanged. There is nothing static about the content of
residual consciousness on one side, nor about the object of attention
on the other. Both, it is maintained, change ceaselessly through the
continuous interchange of elements from one pole of consciousness to the
other. An important observation is made to the effect that the
changing content of the two poles is not noticed equally at both poles.
The nature of the structure of consciousness is revealed to be one in
which the changes occurring to the object of attention attract notice,
while the changes taking place in the content of residual consciousness
pass largely unnoticed. This is shown to be necessarily the case,
and the feature of consciousness in question I describe as the
directionality of consciousness.Chapter four is the crucial chapter in the work. The two
preceding chapters are designed to prepare the ground for the
denouement which it presents, and much of the significance of the
earlier discussion can only be fully appreciated in its light. In
it the view is advanced that the bi -polar structure of consciousness
accounts for the duality between subject and object which Hamilton had
asserted to be a self- evident feature of consciousness. The essence
of the theory is that residual consciousness (which may be said to be,
metaphorically speaking, the negative pole of consciousness), is the
empirical self for which we have been searching. It is shown to
have all the "marks" philosophers have taken to be characteristics of the self. The empirical self is, on this theory, located within
consciousness, and for this reason its knowability is guaranteed.
At the same time the empirical self is not identified with the
content of consciousness, and in this way the difficulty that the
self is continuously passing away, which besets the Serial Theory of
the Self, is overcome. From this perspective it can be appreciated
that the Humean identification of the self with a series of
perceptions is the very reverse of the truth. It is tantamount to
the identification of the self with what is essentially not -self:
viz. the objects of attention (i.e., the wrong pole of consciousness:
the positive instead of the negative pole, so to speak).I contrast this theory with its closest rival --the theory that
identifies the self with the mass of somatic feeling - -and demonstrate
its manifest superiority to the latter theory. Objections to the
plausibility of the proposed identification of the self with residual
consciousness are considered and answered. It is shown to share the
merit, which is particularly claimed by the somatic feeling theory, of
enabling us to maintain that even an isolated perception can be said
to be the perception of a self, quite independently of its relation to
other perceptions. In this way it overcomes a major stumbling block
to theories of the empirical self which in general permit of no such
claim. At the same tine this feature of the theory destroys the
basis of one of the strongest arguments in favour of a Pure Ego Theory:
namely the supposai that only on a Pure Ego Theory could it be maintained that one isolated perception could be the perception of a self.
Finally the implications of the theory on the question of self - consciousness are drawn out, and the limits to complete self - objectification are explained.Perhaps the single greatest difficulty for a theory that
locates the self within experience, is to account for self- identity
through time: in other words, the problem of the continuity of the
self. A theory identifying the self with residual consciousness
must seem particularly vulnerable in this respect, because of the
fact that residual consciousness has an ever - changing content. This
problem is taken up in chapter five. The Serial Theory is subjected
to close examination, because it is offered as a solution to this
problem. It is shown to be unsatisfactory, because of its dependence
on the Humean view of consciousness, which, as I have already indicated,
I dispute. I try to show that my analysis of consciousness escapes
the atomistic implications of the Serial Theory, and demands instead
that consciousness be seen as a continuum.The argument put forward to establish the fact that consciousness is continuous, is dependent on a subsidiary thesis that runs
parallel to the main one throughout the work. It is the contention
that states of consciousness come into being in conjunction with the
bodily activities involving the use of our sense- organs. In the
present context this thesis is brought in to explain the continuity of
consciousness, in the following manner. I show that states of
consciousness are sustained by bodily activities, and reason that
since bodily activities are continuous while they last, the states of
consciousness they sustain must themselves be continuous for as long
as the bodily activity continues. The inference is then drawn that
since residual consciousness is a part of consciousness, the
continuousness of consciousness must be reflected in residual
consciousness as well. Thus, on the basis of the identification of
the self with residual consciousness, the continuity of the self is
assured. Memory is then brought in to explain our awareness of our
self- continuity.The thesis concludes with a sketch of some of the wider
implications of my findings. It is argued that the relation between
bodily activity and consciousness demands that the self be conceived
of as embodied. And finally it is suggested that the theory offers
the prospect of a reconciliation between Realism and Idealism; if not
in the main, at least in respect of the issue of the active versus the
passive self in perceptual experience
