Local Chromatin Features Including PU.1 and IKAROS Binding and H3K4 Methylation Shape the Repertoire of Immunoglobulin Kappa Genes Chosen for V(D)J Recombination.

V(D)J recombination is essential for the generation of diverse antigen receptor (AgR) repertoires. In B cells, immunoglobulin kappa (Igκ) light chain recombination follows immunoglobulin heavy chain (Igh) recombination. We recently developed the DNA-based VDJ-seq assay for the unbiased quantitation of Igh VH and DH repertoires. Integration of VDJ-seq data with genome-wide datasets revealed that two chromatin states at the recombination signal sequence (RSS) of VH genes are highly predictive of recombination in mouse pro-B cells. It is unknown whether local chromatin states contribute to Vκ gene choice during Igκ recombination. Here we adapt VDJ-seq to profile the Igκ VκJκ repertoire and present a comprehensive readout in mouse pre-B cells, revealing highly variable Vκ gene usage. Integration with genome-wide datasets for histone modifications, DNase hypersensitivity, transcription factor binding and germline transcription identified PU.1 binding at the RSS, which was unimportant for Igh, as highly predictive of whether a Vκ gene will recombine or not, suggesting that it plays a binary, all-or-nothing role, priming genes for recombination. Thereafter, the frequency with which these genes recombine was shaped both by the presence and level of enrichment of several other chromatin features, including H3K4 methylation and IKAROS binding. Moreover, in contrast to the Igh locus, the chromatin landscape of the promoter, as well as of the RSS, contributes to Vκ gene recombination. Thus, multiple facets of local chromatin features explain much of the variation in Vκ gene usage. Together, these findings reveal shared and divergent roles for epigenetic features and transcription factors in AgR V(D)J recombination and provide avenues for further investigation of chromatin signatures that may underpin V(D)J-mediated chromosomal translocations

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Digitalisat der Ausgabe von 1938, erschienen 202

Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules

We analyze how shareholders screen management proposals at annual general meetings. First, we use a simple model of strategic voting to develop a theoretical benchmark of effective information aggregation through voting. Then, we derive testable implications and provide structural estimates of the model parameters. The main conclusions are that shareholders vote strategically and that proposal screening increases value. Shareholders largely neutralize the lock-in effect of supermajority rules, thereby preventing the incorrect rejection of proposals. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.