Ambiguity and Social Interaction

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements

Ambiguity and Social Interaction

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity, Optimism, Pessimism, Strategic Games, Oligopoly, Strategic Delegation, Peace-making, Strategic Complements, Choquet Expected Utility

Ambiguity and Social Interaction

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity; Optimism; Pessimism; Strategic Games; Oligopoly; Strategic Delegation; Peace-making; Strategic Complements; Choquet Expected Utility

Ambiguity and Social Interaction

We examine the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour. We present a relatively non-technical account of ambiguity and show how it may be applied in economics. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. We also examine the effects of ambiguity on peace processes. It is shown that ambiguity can act to select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity, Optimism, Oligopoly, Peace processes, Choquet expected utility

Ambiguity and Social Interaction

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the e?ect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the e?ects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity, Optimism, Oligopoly, Peace-making, Choquet expected utility

Ambiguity and social interaction

Working paper published in SSRN Electronic journal. Final version published in Oxford Economic Papers © Oxford University Press 2008. Available online at http://oep.oupjournals.org/We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements

Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

Author's pre-printIf players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.ESRC senior research fellowship scheme, H5242750259

Comparison of Retention Forces of Different Fabrication Methods of Co-Cr Crowns: Pre-sintered and Milled, Cast and Electroforming Secondary Crowns with Different Taper Angles

To investigate the retention forces of differently fabricated secondary crowns made of Co-Cr alloy and electroforming secondary crowns considering different taper angles. Cobalt-chromium primary crowns with 0°, 1° and 2° taper angles were fabricated. Secondary crowns were made either by i.) a milling and sintering, ii.) casting or iii.) electro-forming process. Pull-off tests were performed and data were analyzed by parametric statistics (p<0.05). With regard to the different taper angles, Co-Cr milled and cast groups, no impact on retention force was observed. Within the electroforming group, primary crowns with a taper angle of 1° showed a higher retention force than crowns with angles of 0° or 2°. With respect to the secondary crowns, primary crowns with a taper angle of 1° showed no impact on the results. Within the taper angles of 0° and 2°, the electroforming group exhibited lower retention forces than cast or milled ones. In the 0° taper angle group, milled secondary crowns displayed higher values than cast ones

Resolving the Ellsberg Paradox by Assuming that People Evaluate Repetitive Sampling

Ellsberg (1961) designed a decision experiment where most people violated the axioms of rational choice. He asked people to bet on the outcome of certain random events with known and with unknown probabilities. They usually preferred to bet on events with known probabilities. It is shown that this behavior is reasonable and in accordance with the axioms of rational decision making if it is assumed that people consider bets on events that are repeatedly sampled instead of just sampled once