International Conceptions of the Family

This article examines the evolving way the ‘family’ and ‘family life’ have been understood in international and regional human rights instruments, and in the case law of the relevant institutions. It shows how the various structural components which are considered to constitute those concepts operate both between relevant adults and between adults and children. But it also shows that important normative elements, in particular, anti-discrimination norms, operate both to undermine the perception of some structures as constituting ‘family’, and to modify those structures themselves. This raises the question how far human rights norms should be seen as protecting family units in themselves or the individual members that constitute them. Key words Human rights – family – family life – gender discrimination – marriage – same-sex relationships - parental relationships – violence against wome

Reconciling autonomy and beneficence in treatment decision-making for animal patients

This article explores how the concept of consent to medical treatment applies in the veterinary context, and aims to evaluate normative justifications for owner consent to treatment of animal patients. We trace the evolution of the test for valid consent in human health decision-making, against a backdrop of increased recognition of the importance of patient rights and a gradual judicial espousal of a doctrine of informed consent grounded in a particular understanding of autonomy. We argue that, notwithstanding the adoption of a similar discourse of informed consent in professional veterinary codes, notions of autonomy and informed consent are not easily transferrable to the veterinary medicine context, given inter alia the tripartite relationship between veterinary professional, owner and animal patient. We suggest that a more appropriate, albeit inexact, analogy may be drawn with paediatric practice which is premised on a similarly tripartite relationship and where decisions must be reached in the best interests of the child. However, acknowledging the legal status of animals as property and how consent to veterinary treatment is predicated on the animal owner’s willingness and ability to pay, we propose that the appropriate response is for veterinary professionals generally to accept the client’s choice, provided this is informed. Yet such client autonomy must be limited where animal welfare concerns exist, so that beneficence continues to play an important role in the veterinary context. We suggest that this ‘middle road’ should be reflected in professional veterinary guidance

What is „critical" family law

A growing segment of British legal literature, identified by the label Critical Legal Studies UK might be explained as a delayed reflection of the „movement" of that name originating in the United States. The purpose of this article is to attempt an assessment of the value which a „critical" approach might hold for English family law. It is not easy to capture the essential thread of critical legal studies. „Critical" legal writers would reject a view of law which saw legal decisions as formal deductions from established premises, and systems of law as emanations of systems of values which have inherent, objective validity. Instead, the „critical" legal conclusion — scarcely a revelation — is that the law is „inextricably mixed in the totality of social relations and institutions". As far as family law is concerned, „critical" legal writers would claim that „at the root of a critical theory is the, public/private dichotomy". The author questions the usefulness of that dichotomy as a tool of contemporary legal analyses. Then, he tries to prove that one feature of „critical" legal theory not shared by "non-critical (liberal)" theory is that the critical writer inserts an explicit ideological stance into his or her legal analysis. If this is so — claims the author — the "critical" approach reverts to a political programme, and is jurisprudentially irrelevant. If the "critical" writer is less concerned about exploring the doctrinal and empirical problems of achieving coherence within the multitude of legal and institutional mechanisms and is surer of the answers to the value-conflicts than the "non-critical" scholar, i.e. if his/her "currency is commitment rather than truth", one may truly ask whether the movement has appropriated to itself theepithet "critical" under false pretences.Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/201

What is „critical" family law

A growing segment of British legal literature, identified by the label Critical Legal Studies UK might be explained as a delayed reflection of the „movement" of that name originating in the United States. The purpose of this article is to attempt an assessment of the value which a „critical" approach might hold for English family law. It is not easy to capture the essential thread of critical legal studies. „Critical" legal writers would reject a view of law which saw legal decisions as formal deductions from established premises, and systems of law as emanations of systems of values which have inherent, objective validity. Instead, the „critical" legal conclusion — scarcely a revelation — is that the law is „inextricably mixed in the totality of social relations and institutions". As far as family law is concerned, „critical" legal writers would claim that „at the root of a critical theory is the, public/private dichotomy". The author questions the usefulness of that dichotomy as a tool of contemporary legal analyses. Then, he tries to prove that one feature of „critical" legal theory not shared by "non-critical (liberal)" theory is that the critical writer inserts an explicit ideological stance into his or her legal analysis. If this is so — claims the author — the "critical" approach reverts to a political programme, and is jurisprudentially irrelevant. If the "critical" writer is less concerned about exploring the doctrinal and empirical problems of achieving coherence within the multitude of legal and institutional mechanisms and is surer of the answers to the value-conflicts than the "non-critical" scholar, i.e. if his/her "currency is commitment rather than truth", one may truly ask whether the movement has appropriated to itself theepithet "critical" under false pretences.Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/201

Family law and personal life /

Includes bibliographical references (pages 195-214) and index