Voting Technology: Vote-by-Mail, and Residual Votes in California, 1990-2010

To test the supposition that the lost votes recovered by California through the modernization of voting technologies may be being undone by the trend toward more voting by mail, Table A1 attempts to quantify changes in the residual vote rate in each county from the presidential elections of 1992 to 2008 due to changes in voting technologies, and due to the growth in voting by mail. The table starts by reporting turnout in the 1992 and 2008 presidential elections; the percentage of ballots cast by mail in 1992 and 2008, along with the change across the two years; the type of voting equipment used in 1992 and 2008; and the estimated change in the residual vote rate from 1992 and 2008 based on changes in voting technology, using the coefficients from Table 4 in the text. It then calculates the estimated number of votes represented by this coefficient by multiplying it by turnout for 2008. Negative values indicate an estimated reduction in the residual vote in 2008 due to technology changes since 1992. For instance, for Alameda County, we estimate that the change from punch cards in 1992 to precinct-count optical scanning in 2008 resulted in a reduction in the number of residual votes in 2008 by 5,343 (≈ -0.85% × 628,545)

Voting Technology, Vote-by-Mail, and Residual Votes in California, 1990-2010

This paper examines how the growth in vote-by-mail and changes in voting technologies led to changes in the residual vote rate in California from 1990 to 2010. We find that in California’s presidential elections, counties that abandoned punch cards in favor of optical scanning enjoyed a significant improvement in the residual vote rate. However, these findings do not always translate to other races. For instance, find that the InkaVote system in Los Angeles has been a mixed success, performing very well in presidential and gubernatorial races, fairly well for ballot propositions, and poorly in Senate races. We also conduct the first analysis of the effects of the rise of vote-by-mail on residual votes. Regardless of the race, increased use of the mails to cast ballots is robustly associated with a rise in the residual vote rate. The effect is so strong that the rise of voting by mail in California has mostly wiped out all the reductions in residual votes that were due to improved voting technologies since the early 1990s

An invasive podosome-like structure promotes fusion pore formation during myoblast fusion

An F-actin–enriched protrusion resembling an invasive podosome promotes fusion pore formation between muscle founder cells and fusion-competent myoblasts

Priorities for synthesis research in ecology and environmental science

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the National Science Foundation grant #1940692 for financial support for this workshop, and the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) and its staff for logistical support.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Priorities for synthesis research in ecology and environmental science

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the National Science Foundation grant #1940692 for financial support for this workshop, and the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) and its staff for logistical support.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

An Economic Approach to Consumer Product Ratings

In three essays we examine user-generated product ratings with aggregation. While recommendation systems have been studied extensively, this simple type of recommendation system has been neglected, despite its prevalence in the field. We develop a novel theoretical model of user-generated ratings. This model improves upon previous work in three ways: it considers rational agents and allows them to abstain from rating when rating is costly; it incorporates rating aggregation (such as averaging ratings); and it considers the effect on rating strategies of multiple simultaneous raters. In the first essay we provide a partial characterization of equilibrium behavior. In the second essay we test this theoretical model in laboratory, and in the third we apply established behavioral models to the data generated in the lab. This study provides clues to the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings in field implementations. We show theoretically that in equilibrium, ratings distributions do not represent the value distributions of sincere ratings. Indeed, we show that if rating strategies follow a set of regularity conditions, then in equilibrium the rate at which players participate is increasing in the extremity of agents' valuations of the product. This theoretical prediction is realized in the lab. We also find that human subjects show a disproportionate predilection for sincere rating, and that when they do send insincere ratings, they are almost always in the direction of exaggeration. Both sincere and exaggerated ratings occur with great frequency despite the fact that such rating strategies are not in subjects' best interest. We therefore apply the behavioral concepts of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and cursed equilibrium (CE) to the experimental data. Together, these theories explain the data significantly better than does a theory of rational, Bayesian behavior -- accurately predicting key comparative statics. However, the theories fail to predict the high rates of sincerity, and it is clear that a better theory is needed

All in the Family: Why Non-Democratic Leaders Have More Children

Economists have come to learn that politics matters. But survival matters the most to those involved in politics. We provide a theory whereby non-benevolent, non-democratic leaders increase their expected family size to raise the likelihood that a child will be a match at continuing the regime’s survival. As a consequence, having a larger family size raises the non-democratic leader’s expected rents that they can exploit from the citizenry. In contrast, democratic leaders have a lower desire to appropriate rents from the citizenry, and therefore have a diminished desire to have additional children for these purposes. We construct a data set of the number of children of country leaders as of August 31, 2005. We find that in a sample of 221 country leaders, fully non-democratic leaders have approximately 1.5–2.5 more actual children as compared to if they are fully democratic. This empirical relationship is established controlling for a full array of country specific as well as individual specific variables. Our finding also continues to hold when using alternative measures of family size