Implementing a Loosely-Coupled Integrated Assessment Model in the Pegasus Workflow Management System

Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are commonly used to explore the interactions between different modeled components of socio-environmental systems (SES). Most IAMs are built in a tightly-coupled framework so that the complex interactions between the models can be efficiently implemented within the framework in a straightforward manner. However, tightly-coupled frameworks make it more difficult to change individual models within the IAM because of the high level of integration between the models. Prioritizing flexibility over computational efficiency, the IAM presented here is built using a loosely-coupled framework and implemented in the Pegasus Workflow Management System. The modular nature of loosely-coupled systems allows each component model within the IAM to be easily exchanged for another component model from the same domain assuming each provides the same input / output interface. This flexibility allows researchers to experiment with different models for each SES component and facilitates smoother upgrades between each version of the independently developed component models

Design choices made by target users for a pay-for-performance program in primary care: an action research approach

Contains fulltext : 110832.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)BACKGROUND: International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives to improve quality of health care is growing. Current programs vary in the methods of performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. One may assume that involvement of health care professionals in the goal setting and methods of quality measurement and subsequent payment schemes may enhance their commitment to and motivation for P4P programs and therefore the impact of these programs. We developed a P4P program in which the target users were involved in decisions about the P4P methods. METHODS: For the development of the P4P program a framework was used which distinguished three main components: performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. Based on this framework design choices were discussed in two panels of target users using an adapted Delphi procedure. The target users were 65 general practices and two health insurance companies in the South of the Netherlands. RESULTS: Performance measurement was linked to the Dutch accreditation program based on three domains (clinical care, practice management and patient experience). The general practice was chosen as unit of assessment. Relative standards were set at the 25th percentile of group performance. The incentive for clinical care was set twice as high as the one for practice management and patient experience. Quality scores were to be calculated separately for all three domains, and for both the quality level and the improvement of performance. The incentive for quality level was set thrice as high as the one for the improvement of performance. For reimbursement, quality scores were divided into seven levels. A practice with a quality score in the lowest group was not supposed to receive a bonus. The additional payment grew proportionally for each extra group. The bonus aimed at was on average 5% to 10% of the practice income. CONCLUSIONS: Designing a P4P program for primary care with involvement of the target users gave us an insight into their motives, which can help others who need to discuss similar programs. The resulting program is in line with target users' views and assessments of relevance and applicability. This may enhance their commitment to the program as was indicated by the growing number of voluntary participants after a successfully performed field test during the procedure. The elements of our framework can be very helpful for others who are developing or evaluating a P4P program

Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs

Pay for performance (P4P) is increasingly being used to stimulate healthcare providers to improve their performance. However, evidence on P4P effectiveness remains inconclusive. Flaws in program design may have contributed to this limited success. Based on a synthesis of relevant theoretical and empirical literature, this paper discusses key issues in P4P-program design. The analysis reveals that designing a fair and effective program is a complex undertaking. The following tentative conclusions are made: (1) performance is ideally defined broadly, provided that the set of measures remains comprehensible, (2) concerns that P4P encourages "selection" and "teaching to the test" should not be dismissed, (3) sophisticated risk adjustment is important, especially in outcome and resource use measures, (4) involving providers in program design is vital, (5) on balance, group incentives are preferred over individual incentives, (6) whether to use rewards or penalties is context-dependent, (7) payouts should be frequent and low-powered, (8) absolute targets are generally preferred over relative targets, (9) multiple targets are preferred over single targets, and (10) P4P should be a permanent component of provider compensation and is ideally "decoupled" form base payments. However, the design of P4P programs should be tailored to the specific setting of implementation, and empirical research is needed to confirm the conclusions

Numerical Hermitian Yang-Mills Connections and Vector Bundle Stability in Heterotic Theories

A numerical algorithm is presented for explicitly computing the gauge connection on slope-stable holomorphic vector bundles on Calabi-Yau manifolds. To illustrate this algorithm, we calculate the connections on stable monad bundles defined on the K3 twofold and Quintic threefold. An error measure is introduced to determine how closely our algorithmic connection approximates a solution to the Hermitian Yang-Mills equations. We then extend our results by investigating the behavior of non slope-stable bundles. In a variety of examples, it is shown that the failure of these bundles to satisfy the Hermitian Yang-Mills equations, including field-strength singularities, can be accurately reproduced numerically. These results make it possible to numerically determine whether or not a vector bundle is slope-stable, thus providing an important new tool in the exploration of heterotic vacua.Comment: 52 pages, 15 figures. LaTex formatting of figures corrected in version 2

Numerical Hermitian Yang-Mills Connections and Kahler Cone Substructure

We further develop the numerical algorithm for computing the gauge connection of slope-stable holomorphic vector bundles on Calabi-Yau manifolds. In particular, recent work on the generalized Donaldson algorithm is extended to bundles with Kahler cone substructure on manifolds with h^{1,1}>1. Since the computation depends only on a one-dimensional ray in the Kahler moduli space, it can probe slope-stability regardless of the size of h^{1,1}. Suitably normalized error measures are introduced to quantitatively compare results for different directions in Kahler moduli space. A significantly improved numerical integration procedure based on adaptive refinements is described and implemented. Finally, an efficient numerical check is proposed for determining whether or not a vector bundle is slope-stable without computing its full connection.Comment: 38 pages, 10 figure

The Effect of Performance-Based Financial Incentives on Improving Patient Care Experiences: A Statewide Evaluation

Patient experience measures are central to many pay-for-performance (P4P) programs nationally, but the effect of performance-based financial incentives on improving patient care experiences has not been assessed. The study uses Clinician & Group CAHPS data from commercially insured adult patients (n = 124,021) who had visits with 1,444 primary care physicians from 25 California medical groups between 2003 and 2006. Medical directors were interviewed to assess the magnitude and nature of financial incentives directed at individual physicians and the patient experience improvement activities adopted by groups. Multilevel regression models were used to assess the relationship between performance change on patient care experience measures and medical group characteristics, financial incentives, and performance improvement activities. Over the course of the study period, physicians improved performance on the physician-patient communication (0.62 point annual increase, p < 0.001), care coordination (0.48 point annual increase, p < 0.001), and office staff interaction (0.22 point annual increase, p = 0.02) measures. Physicians with lower baseline performance on patient experience measures experienced larger improvements (p < 0.001). Greater emphasis on clinical quality and patient experience criteria in individual physician incentive formulas was associated with larger improvements on the care coordination (p < 0.01) and office staff interaction (p < 0.01) measures. By contrast, greater emphasis on productivity and efficiency criteria was associated with declines in performance on the physician communication (p < 0.01) and office staff interaction (p < 0.001) composites. In the context of statewide measurement, reporting, and performance-based financial incentives, patient care experiences significantly improved. In order to promote patient-centered care in pay for performance and public reporting programs, the mechanisms by which program features influence performance improvement should be clarified

Performance Scores in General Practice: A Comparison between the Clinical versus Medication-Based Approach to Identify Target Populations

CONTEXT: From one country to another, the pay-for-performance mechanisms differ on one significant point: the identification of target populations, that is, populations which serve as a basis for calculating the indicators. The aim of this study was to compare clinical versus medication-based identification of populations of patients with diabetes and hypertension over the age of 50 (for men) or 60 (for women), and any consequences this may have on the calculation of P4P indicators. METHODS: A comparative, retrospective, observational study was carried out with clinical and prescription data from a panel of general practitioners (GPs), the Observatory of General Medicine (OMG) for the year 2007. Two indicators regarding the prescription for statins and aspirin in these populations were calculated. RESULTS: We analyzed data from 21.690 patients collected by 61 GPs via electronic medical files. Following the clinical-based approach, 2.278 patients were diabetic, 8,271 had hypertension and 1.539 had both against respectively 1.730, 8.511 and 1.304 following the medication-based approach (% agreement = 96%, kappa = 0.69). The main reasons for these differences were: forgetting to code the morbidities in the clinical approach, not taking into account the population of patients who were given life style and diet rules only or taking into account patients for whom morbidities other than hypertension could justify the use of antihypertensive drugs in the medication-based approach. The mean (confidence interval) per doctor was 33.7% (31.5-35.9) for statin indicator and 38.4% (35.4-41.4) for aspirin indicator when the target populations were identified on the basis of clinical criteria whereas they were 37.9% (36.3-39.4) and 43.8% (41.4-46.3) on the basis of treatment criteria. CONCLUSION: The two approaches yield very "similar" scores but these scores cover different realities and offer food for thought on the possible usage of these indicators in the framework of P4P programmes

The equity dimension in evaluations of the quality and outcomes framework: A systematic review

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Pay-for-performance systems raise concerns regarding inequity in health care because providers might select patients for whom targets can easily be reached. This paper aims to describe the evolution of pre-existing (in)equity in health care in the period after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in the UK and to describe (in)equities in exception reporting. In this evaluation, a theory-based framework conceptualising equity in terms of equal access, equal treatment and equal treatment outcomes for people in equal need is used to guide the work.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>A systematic MEDLINE and Econlit search identified 317 studies. Of these, 290 were excluded because they were not related to the evaluation of QOF, they lacked an equity dimension in the evaluation, their qualitative research focused on experiences or on the nature of the consultation, or unsuitable methodology was used to pronounce upon equity after the introduction of QOF.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>None of the publications (n = 27) assessed equity in access to health care. Concerning equity in treatment and (intermediate) treatment outcomes, overall quality scores generally improved. For the majority of the observed indicators, all citizens benefit from this improvement, yet the extent to which different patient groups benefit tends to vary and to be highly dependent on the type and complexity of the indicator(s) under study, the observed patient group(s) and the characteristics of the study. In general, the introduction of QOF was favourable for the aged and for males. Total QOF scores did not seem to vary according to ethnicity. For deprivation, small but significant residual differences were observed after the introduction of QOF favouring less deprived groups. These differences are mainly due to differences at the practice level. The variance in exception reporting according to gender and socio-economic position is low.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Although QOF seems not to be socially selective at first glance, this does not mean QOF does not contribute to the inverse care law. Introducing different targets for specific patient groups and including appropriate, non-disease specific and patient-centred indicators that grasp the complexity of primary care might refine the equity dimension of the evaluation of QOF. Also, information on the actual uptake of care, information at the patient level and monitoring of individuals' health care utilisation tracks could make large contributions to an in-depth evaluation. Finally, evaluating pay-for-quality initiatives in a broader health systems impact assessment strategy with equity as a full assessment criterion is of utmost importance.</p