De la intención en el respeto al derecho (Respuesta al profesor Kervégan)

(I) From a firm distinction between ethics and right, the Kantian Rechtslehre holds that the demand to adopt the maxim to act according to the right is an ethical demand. Also J.F. Kervégan defends that individuals should recognize the ethical obligation to respect juridical rules, but this does not mean that right depends on ethics, because, in strict right, internal disposition or intention could not be considered as motive for the rightful action. Law regulates and judges the external actions and also the motive has to be external as it is external the coercion that right –but not ethics- can impose on society so that each member of it, for his own interest, does not damage in his external agency any other member’s freedom. Because of this only one motive, Kant declares that right and coercion’s capacity signify the same thing. (II) His formalist position stops him to go into the complex network of rights and duties, of advantages and burdens, which makes distributive justice the true subject of juridical art. Moreover, because of the strict externals of the law Kant is unaware of the juridical controversy, reduces the jurist to the observance of texts, ejects the equity as not right’s own, and risks to transform the right in the gendarme of morals (M. Villey). (III) With regard to intention, one thing is that in strict law the internal disposition can not be deemed as the motive, and other thing is that if law and coercion’s capacity signify the same thing, there is no difference between obeing the law to avoide the punishment, or avoiding the punishment in breaking the law; then, the last option would be profitable for too many people, since (1) the coercion power is not able to survey in every moment each individual, and (2) the watchmen themselves need to be watched over and so on. After a short mention of the well known Plato, Hobbes and Montesquieu’s arguments about the voluntary obedience as the other motive of the strict right, not less necessary than coercion, we remember that J. F. Kervégan also defended in another context that any juridical order has two irreducible le système des normes générales qui définissent ce qui doit être, et la décision qui conforme l’être au devoir-être. (IV) Finally, in the interstates right, Kant can not maintain that right and capacity of coercion mean the same thing, because there is not any force over the sovereignty of the States, and therefore the contract will last till one of them breaks it by its free and sovereign decision.(I) Desde la separación estricta de ética y derecho, la Rechtslehre kantiana sostiene que es la ética la que exige al sujeto que haga suya la máxima de actuar conforme al derecho. En la misma línea defiende J. F. Kervégan que los sujetos habríamos de reconocer como un deber ético el respeto a las normas jurídicas, sin que esto quiera decir que el derecho dependa de la ética, pues en estricto derecho no podría tenerse a la intención de conciencia como móvil de la acción justa. Lo que el derecho regula y juzga son las acciones exteriores, y también el móvil tiene que es el poder coercitivo, que el derecho, a diferencia de la ética, tiene la facultad de imponer a la sociedad a fin de que cada miembro de ella en su acción externa evite por su propio interés perjudicar la libertad de cualquier otro. Por esta unicidad del móvil sostiene Kant que derecho y facultad de coaccionar significan una y la misma cosa. (II) El formalismo de su planteamiento impide a Kant entrar en la complejidad del entramado de derechos y deberes, de bienes y cargas, que hace de la justicia distributiva el verdadero objeto del arte jurídico. Y por su externalización estricta del derecho reduce al jurista a la observancia de los textos, ignora el procedimiento de la controversia judicial, excluye la equidad como ajena al derecho, y convierte al derecho en el gendarme de la moral (Michel Villey). (III) En cuanto a la intención interior, una cosa es que las leyes no puedan motivar el albedrío por la conciencia de la obligación, y otra que si derecho y coacción significaran lo mismo no habría diferencia entre cumplir la ley para evitar el castigo o eludir el castigo burlando la ley –opción ésta que a muchos resultaría más provechosa, dado que el poder del Estado es incapaz de vigilar en cada momento a cada sujeto, y que los vigilantes mismos necesitan ser vigilados, ad infinitum. Tras una breve alusión a los conocidos argumentos de Platón, Hobbes y Montesquieu sobre la obediencia voluntaria como el otro móvil del derecho, no menos necesario que la coerción, se recuerda que también el profesor Kervégan ha defendido en otro contexto que un orden jurídico cualquiera tiene dos componentes irreductibles entre sí: el sistema de normas que define lo que debe ser y la decisión que conforma el ser al deber-ser. (IV) Finalmente, en el derecho interestatal no puede Kant invocar la facultad de coaccionar, que deja de significar lo mismo que “derecho” porque, al no haber ninguna fuerza superior a la soberanía de los Estados, el pacto durará hasta que alguno de ellos lo incumpla por su libre y soberana decisión

Las pérdidas del gusto y del sentimiento en la Crítica del Juicio.

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Política y ontología. Cara y cruz de Ortega

Desde el propósito de contribuir a un balance crítico del legado de Ortega, las siguientes páginas seleccionan dos dimensiones de su pensamiento: (I) las posiciones políticas sobre España, válidas en lo esencial, y (II) sus tentativas metafísicas de superar la contraposición de idealismo y materialismo, que no alcanzan más que a yuxtaponer ambas tesis incompatibles, en ausencia de reflexión sobre la naturaleza de la autoafección sensorial.In order to contribute to an evaluation of Ortega’s legacy, the following pages select two dimensions of his work: (I) the political proposals concerning Spain, valid in the essential, and (II) his metaphysical attempts to overcome the opposition idealism-materialism, that leaves side by side both incompatible thesis, on account of the absence of reflexion about sensorial selfintuition

Building initial models of rotating white dwarfs with SPH

A general procedure to build self-gravitational, rotating equilibrium structures with the Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamics (SPH) technique does not exist. In particular, obtaining stable rotating configurations for white dwarf (WD) stars is currently a major drawback of many astrophysical simulations. Rotating WDs with low internal temperatures are connected with both, explosive and implosive scenarios such as type Ia supernova explosions or neutron stars formation. Simulations of these events with SPH codes demand stable enough particle configurations as initial models. In this work we have developed and tested a relaxation method to obtain equilibrium configurations of rotating WDs. This method is straightforward and takes advantage of the excellent mass and angular momentum conservation properties of the SPH technique. Although we focus on rigid rotation and its potential applications to several Type Ia supernova scenarios, we also show that our proposal is also able to provide good initial models in differential rotation, which has the potential to benefit many other types of simulations where rotation plays a capital role, like disk evolution and stellar formation.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Privacy-Preserving Group Discounts

How can a buyer legitimately benefit from group discounts while preserving his privacy? We show how this can be achieved when buyers can use their own computing device (e.g. smartphone or computer) to perform a purchase. Specifically, we present a protocol for privacy-preserving group discounts. The protocol allows a group of buyers to prove how many they are without disclosing their identities. Coupled with an anonymous payment system, this allows group discounts to be compatible with buyer privacy.This work was partly funded by Google through a Faculty Research Award to the first author, who is also partially supported by the Government of Catalonia through an ICREA Acadèmia Prize. The following partial supports are also gratefully acknowledged: the Spanish Government under projects TIN2011-27076-C03-01 “CO-PRIVACY” and CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2007-00004 “ARES”, and the European Commission under FP7 projects “DwB” and “Inter-Trust”

Las pérdidas del gusto y del sentimiento en la Crítica del Juicio.

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Plan de ordenación de los recursos naturales y desarrollo sostenible del Alto Tajo.

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A Multi-Temporal Object-Based Image Analysis to Detect Long-Lived Shrub Cover Changes in Drylands

Climate change and human actions condition the spatial distribution and structure of vegetation, especially in drylands. In this context, object-based image analysis (OBIA) has been used to monitor changes in vegetation, but only a few studies have related them to anthropic pressure. In this study, we assessed changes in cover, number, and shape of Ziziphus lotus shrub individuals in a coastal groundwater-dependent ecosystem in SE Spain over a period of 60 years and related them to human actions in the area. In particular, we evaluated how sand mining, groundwater extraction, and the protection of the area affect shrubs. To do this, we developed an object-based methodology that allowed us to create accurate maps (overall accuracy up to 98%) of the vegetation patches and compare the cover changes in the individuals identified in them. These changes in shrub size and shape were related to soil loss, seawater intrusion, and legal protection of the area measured by average minimum distance (AMD) and average random distance (ARD) analysis. It was found that both sand mining and seawater intrusion had a negative effect on individuals; on the contrary, the protection of the area had a positive effect on the size of the individuals’ coverage. Our findings support the use of OBIA as a successful methodology for monitoring scattered vegetation patches in drylands, key to any monitoring program aimed at vegetation preservation