Slow theory : taking time over transnational democratic representation

The possibility for transnational democratic representation is a huge topic. This article is restricted to exploring two unconventional aspects. The first concerns 'the representative claim', extending one critical part of previous analysis of the assessment of such claims, especially by largely unelected transnational actors. The second, which strongly conditions the account of the first, concerns ‘slow theory’ as the way to approach building democratic models and, in particular, to approach transnational democratic representation

Field Recognition and the State Prerogative: Why Democratic Legitimation Recedes in Private Transnational Sustainability Regulation

Like any regulatory effort, private transnational standard-setters need to legitimate themselves to the audiences from which they seek support or obedience. While early scholarship on private transnational governance has emphasized the centrality of democratic legitimation narratives in rendering private governance socially acceptable, evidence from more recent standard-setting schemes suggests a declining relevance of that narrative over time. In my analysis of private sustainability regulation, I identify a combination of two factors that jointly contribute to this diminished role of democratic legitimation. First, private transnational governance has become a pervasive phenomenon. This means that new entrants to the field no longer face the same liability of newness that required first movers to make an extra effort in legitimation. Second, private standard-setting has moved from areas characterized by 'governance gaps' to areas in which meaningful intergovernmental regulation already exists. In these areas, however, the 'state prerogative' in legitimating governance holds. As a result, transnational standard-setters rely not so much on stressing their democratic credentials, but instead emphasize their contribution to achieving internationally agreed goals

Are the good ones doing better?

Private governance schemes deploy a significant share of their resources to advocate their legitimacy. Assuming that their primary concern is to ensure their own success, this suggests that the initiators of private governance schemes presume a strong relation between a scheme’s perception as legitimate on the one hand and its success on the other. Based on this observation, this article explores the general hypothesis that the procedural legitimacy of private governance schemes – defined in terms of inclusiveness, transparency, and deliberativeness – enhances their prospects for success. We particularly focus on how right process may translate into effectiveness. To this end, the article identifies three mechanisms: the development of ownership based on inclusive, fair and representative participation; social learning and persuasion based on deliberative procedures; and social control based on transparency and accountability. The three mechanisms are subjected to a plausibility probe in an illustrative case study of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a private governance scheme in the field of corporate sustainability politics. All in all, the study shows how the GRI’s success can be related to procedural legitimacy. In particular, it suggests that while inclusiveness and deliberation are mostly relevant to gain legitimacy, transparency and accountability are primarily relevant to maintain the legitimacy of private transnational governance schemes.Im Dezember 2006 fand am SFB 700 ein Workshop statt, dessen Teilnehmer/innen die Frage diskutierten, inwiefern die Legitimität und die Effektivität transnationaler Politiknetzwerke und Public Private Partnerships zusammenhängen. Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier war die Grundlage für diese Diskussion. Es geht davon aus, dass Legitimität eine wichtige Voraussetzung für den Erfolg privater Steuerung ist. Offen ist jedoch die Frage, wie dies funktioniert. Im Papier versuchen wir, entsprechende Kausalmechanismenzu entwickeln. Zunächst konzeptionalisieren wir die abhängige Variable „Erfolg“ als die gelungene Steuerung des Verhaltens der beteiligten privaten Akteure im Sinne der vereinbarten Normen (compliance). Im nächsten Abschnitt stellen wir verschiedene Quellen und Formen der Legitimität vor und diskutieren,warum wir prozedurale Legitimität als einem zentralen Erfolgsfaktor für private Governance sehen. Auf dieser Basis entwickeln wir Überlegungen zu den aus unserer Sicht drei zentralen Kausalmechanismen, wie sich prozessuale Legitimität in Regeleinhaltung übersetzt: (1) Aneignung durch inklusive, faire und repräsentative Partizipation; (2) Lernen und Überzeugung über Deliberation und den Bezug auf Argumente; (3) Soziale Kontrolle auf der Basis von Transparenz und Verantwortlichkeit. Unsere Überlegungen zu den Kausalzusammenhängen plausibilisieren wir in einer kurzen empirischen Studie zur Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Dort zeigt sich, dass Inklusivität und Deliberation besonders wichtig sind, um eingangs Legitimität zu erlangen, Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflichten um Legitimität zu erhalten

Change and continuity in global governance

Why, despite well-established and well-publicized intergovernmental processes that date back to the early 1970s, have we been unable to put in place effective mechanisms to combat climate change? Why, despite the existence of extensive global human rights machinery, do we live in a world where mass kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder continue to blight the lives of so many? Why, despite a great deal of effort on the part of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nonstate actors, have we been unable to make much of a difference to the lives of the ultra-poor and attenuate the very worst aspects of growing global inequalities? Most fundamentally, why have the current international system and the outcomes that it has produced remained so inadequate in the postwar period

Democracy Is Democracy Is Democracy? Changes in Evaluations of International Institutions in Academic Textbooks, 1970-2010

This article examines what democracy means when it is used in academic textbook evaluations of international institutions and how the meaning of the term "democracy” in such evaluations has changed over time. An analysis of 71 textbooks on international institutions in the policy areas of international security, environmental, and human rights politics leads us to several answers. We observe slight changes in relation to three aspects. First, the range of democracy-relevant actors expands over time, most notably in relation to nonstate actors as important participants in (or even subjects of) international policymaking. Second, representational concerns become more relevant in justifying demands for greater participation in international institutions. Third, international organizations are increasingly discussed not only as subjects that enhance the transparency and accountability of the policies of their member states, but also as the objects of democratic demands for transparency and accountability themselve

Explaining variation in the effectiveness of transnational energy partnerships

This article analyzes the effectiveness of transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development-also known as "Type II outcomes" of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development-in the sustainable energy sector. We combine quantitative and qualitative research. Quantitatively, we use a database of 340 partnerships, including 46 partnerships that focus on energy. Our qualitative analysis includes case studies of five partnerships that appear as the most effective and five that are operational but only with modest degrees of effectiveness. We study two competing hypotheses. The first, rooted in institutionalism, assumes that variation in effectiveness is related to organizational structures and procedures. The competing hypothesis emphasizes the power of actors and expects partnerships that involve key business actors and powerful Northern states to perform better. We conclude that the level of institutionalization is most important in explaining effectiveness, while powerful partners and the type of internal organization may further enhance effectiveness

Energy security in a developing world

Energy security, a fuzzy concept, has traditionally been used to justify state control over energy and a reluctance to deal with energy issues at global level. However, over time, the concept is acquiring different meanings that are applicable at different levels of governance. Many of the elements of the new definitions also imply a number of inherent contradictions. Against this background, this article explores the dimensions of energy security with a special focus on the developing world. It argues that (1) within developing countries (DCs), energy security implies both access to modern energy services by the poorest as well as access by the rapidly developing industrial, services, and urban sectors. Lack of adequate resources has implied trade-offs in terms of who gets access and in terms of taking into account the social and ecological consequences of specific energy sources. Furthermore, (2) the growing DCs' need for energy is impacted by industrialized country perceptions of the various dimensions of energy security-recognizing the need for access to the poorest; industrialized countries are increasingly implicitly questioning the right of DCs to use fossil fuels because of its implications for climate change; or to build large dams because of ecological and social security concerns or expand nuclear energy because of its potential security implications. The development of reliable, continuous, affordable, and environmentally sound provision of energy services combined with a focus on energy efficiency and conservation is the only way of alleviating the various multi-level dimensions of energy security. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Input and output legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives

In a globalizing world, governments are not always able or willing to regulate the social and environmental externalities of global business activities. Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI), defined as global institutions involving mainly corporations and civil society organizations, are one type of regulatory mechanism that tries to fill this gap by issuing soft law regulation. This conceptual paper examines the conditions of a legitimate transfer of regulatory power from traditional democratic nation-state processes to private regulatory schemes, such as MSIs. Democratic legitimacy is typically concerned with input legitimacy (rule credibility, or the extent to which the regulations are perceived as justified) and output legitimacy (rule effectiveness, or the extent to which the rules effectively solve the issues). In this study, we identify MSI input legitimacy criteria (inclusion, procedural fairness, consensual orientation, and transparency) and those of MSI output legitimacy (rule coverage, efficacy, and enforcement), and discuss their implications for MSI democratic legitimacy