Was heißt „Der freie Mensch allein weiß, dass eine Welt außer ihm ist“?

Der Beitrag analysiert ein methodisches Problem der Schellingschen Naturphilosophie: wie das transzendentalphilosophische Prinzip der Freiheit mit der Natur in Verbindung steht. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Neue Naturphilosophie (in Jena 1798-1803) eine Verifikation des Idealismus entfaltet: Der Idealismus hat methodisch Recht, wenn er die Vernunft zum ‚Selbstschöpfer’ (Autopoiesis) von allem macht, denn dies ist in der Natur selbst begründet. Damit kann der Idealismus – modern – eine analytische Dimension für den Bau der Welt entfalten

Der Menschen „Beruf zum freien Denken“. Zum Begriff „Aufklärung“ in der Königsberger Kultur: Prof. Dr. Kurt Röttgerszum achtzigsten Geburtstag

Kant does not understand enlightenment primarily as producing and disseminating knowledge, technology and good morals. Instead, he draws attention to people’s operational powers, which, as subjective abilities, are the reason for the objective improvement of human life and its environment. – The central categories of the Königsberg Enlightenment are “thinking for yourself”, “freedom of thought,” and “criticism of guardianship and immaturity"

O pojęciach i praktyce kłamstwa w epoce nowoczesnej

Lies occupy a surprisingly favorable place within our daily life. As the Polish aphorist Stanisław Jerzy Lec once remarked: if you want to see the lie you need to face the obvious truth. With lies, we do not simply stigmatize the dark part or the „backside” of the humankind. To lie, meaning the ability to deceive, with or without words, even to deceive with the truth (for example in statistics), is one of the intellectual modalities of human existence, as well as an expression of misery. This leads to the paradox: One cannot live with lies or, at the same time, live without them. Lies thus reveal their double nature; they attempt to maintain vivid things, just as they generally tend to destroy them. This double nature of lies makes it impossible to condemn them by means of „ethical conviction”, as Max Weber would put it, or with the words of another famous French philosopher of our present time, Vladimir Jankélévitch, who says that consciousness is already provided with an inner disposition to lie, as a litmus test of its noble and mean sides

Lügenbegriffe und Lügenpraxis in der Moderne

Lies occupy a surprisingly favorable place within our daily life. As the Polish aphorist Stanisław Jerzy Lec once remarked: if you want to see the lie you need to face the obvious truth. With lies, we do not simply stigmatize the dark part or the “backside” of the humankind. To lie, meaning the ability to deceive, with or without words, even to deceive with the truth (for example in statistics), is one of the intellectual modalities of human existence, as well as an expression of misery. This leads to the paradox: One cannot live with lies or, at the same time, live without them. Lies thus reveal their double nature; they attempt to maintain vivid things, just as they generally tend to destroy them. This double nature of lies makes it impossible to condemn them by means of “ethical conviction”, as Max Weber would put it, or with the words of another famous French philosopher of our present time, Vladimir Jankélévitch, who says that consciousness is already provided with an inner disposi-tion to lie, as a litmus test of its noble and mean sides.Lies occupy a surprisingly favorable place within our daily life. As the Polish aphorist Stanisław Jerzy Lec once remarked: if you want to see the lie you need to face the obvious truth. With lies, we do not simply stigmatize the dark part or the “backside” of the humankind. To lie, meaning the ability to deceive, with or without words, even to deceive with the truth (for example in statistics), is one of the intellectual modalities of human existence, as well as an expression of misery. This leads to the paradox: One cannot live with lies or, at the same time, live without them. Lies thus reveal their double nature; they attempt to maintain vivid things, just as they generally tend to destroy them. This double nature of lies makes it impossible to condemn them by means of “ethical conviction”, as Max Weber would put it, or with the words of another famous French philosopher of our present time, Vladimir Jankélévitch, who says that consciousness is already provided with an inner disposi-tion to lie, as a litmus test of its noble and mean sides

Kants kognitive Konstruktivität in der Erkenntnis und als Grenze des Rechts

Kant used Copernicus’ upheaval in thinking on astronomy to illustrate the profoundness of his critique of traditional metaphysics as ‘system of pure reason’. The consequence for philosophy is the following: the perspective of an eternally valid pure reason as a means of gaining knowledge of the world is abandoned – because this approach results not in knowledge, but only in dogmas. Instead, we engage with Kant in a change of perspective. It is grasped how the operative subject manages perception in a changing, agitated world. Instead of understanding perception merely as a mirroring, mimetic achievement, Kant moves to understanding perception as poiesis, as construction, as experimental philosophy. That means: to qualify as perception, something has to be shown to be contrivable, to be construable. This constructiveness of the active subject does not only shape processes of knowledge and perception, but also changes our environment through revolutionary processes in politics and society. Reason in revolutions becomes evident in constituting the legal practice of civil and human rights (Bill of Rights und Code civil).Kant used Copernicus’ upheaval in thinking on astronomy to illustrate the profoundness of his critique of traditional metaphysics as ‘system of pure reason’. The consequence for philosophy is the following: the perspective of an eternally valid pure reason as a means of gaining knowledge of the world is abandoned – because this approach results not in knowledge, but only in dogmas. Instead, we engage with Kant in a change of perspective. It is grasped how the operative subject manages perception in a changing, agitated world. Instead of understanding perception merely as a mirroring, mimetic achievement, Kant moves to understanding perception as poiesis, as construction, as experimental philosophy. That means: to qualify as perception, something has to be shown to be contrivable, to be construable. This constructiveness of the active subject does not only shape processes of knowledge and perception, but also changes our environment through revolutionary processes in politics and society. Reason in revolutions becomes evident in constituting the legal practice of civil and human rights (Bill of Rights und Code civil)

Krystynie Krzemień-Ojak (1932–2016). In memoriam

Krystyna Krzemień-Ojak była osobą niezwykle twórczą, wybitnie utalentowaną tłumaczką i mediatorką w sferze polsko-niemieckich kontaktów kulturowych. Swymi licznymi przekładami na język polski dzieł niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego wniosła wielki wkład w proces przejścia obu kultur od stanu konfrontacji do stanu wzajemnego zrozumienia w obrębie wspólnoty europejskiej

O zdradzie jako służbie publicznej

Steffen Dietzsch’s paper as a short study of betrayal, in which the author sees “self-transcendency towards transgressing all our previous dispositions: both mental and emotional”. The study is based on the analysis of individual “cases” (Benedict Arnold, Ewno Asewa, Roman Malinowski, Ignacjo Silone among others). Dietzsch focuses mainly on betrayal in political-social life, and seeks its definitional source in Christian ethics.Tekst Steffena Dietzscha stanowi krótkie studium zdrady, w której autor dostrzega „samotranscendowanie do przekroczenia wszystkich naszych dotychczasowych dyspozycji, mentalnych i emocjonalnych”. Studium to opiera się na analizie indywidualnych „przypadków” (m.in. Benedict Arnold, Ewno Asewa, Roman Malinowski, Ignacjo Silone). Dietzscha interesuje przede wszystkim funkcjonowanie zdrady w rzeczywistości polityczno-społecznej, zaś jej definicyjnego źródła poszukuje w etyce chrześcijańskiej

Présence d'absence. Wspomnienie Xaviera Tilliette'a SJ

n/