Undercut-proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Pricing Game

Two firms selling a homogenous product to two types of buyers are involved in a sequential pricing game with zero costs. The pricing strategy available involves a fixed price and a royalty. It is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with positive profits to both firms if and only if buyers differ significantly in their willingness to pay. In particular, the incumbent sets a positive royalty and sells to the low demand buyer while the entrant only charges a fixed price and sells to the high demand buyer, resulting in an undercut-proof subgame perfect equilibrium.Sequential Pricing; Fixed Price; Royalty; Undercut-proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Situation

A Location Game On Disjoint Circles

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N > K>= 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face a resource mobility constraint such that not all N locations can be placed in the rst round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that for K = 1, the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper we show that with K > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium configurations of locations in both versions of the game.

Performance of mixed oligopoly model in the context of Indian telecom industry

The logic for state monopoly of public utilities arises from increasing returns to scale and the concern that private business in these areas results in monopolistic exploitation of consumers. The state monopoly however is fraught with the danger of production inefficiency. In this backdrop, the market form of mixed oligopoly is contemplated in markets like health, education, electricity, gas, telecommunications, etc, where public and private sector coexists. The private firms maximize profit but the public firm maximizes social welfare. Despite this theoretical exposition, it is often observed that public firms fail to make contributions according to their potentiality. As a result the issue of social welfare gets a short shrift. While assessing the behaviour and performance of the firm in this setup we must know the objective functions and the constraints. The asymmetry of objectives between private and public firms and the asymmetry of constraints may explain the below par performance of public firms. This needs focus on the existing theoretical construct on mixed oligopoly and empirical consideration of the performance of some specific public firm. In this paper we study the state owned Indian telecom company Bharat Shanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) to get an understanding of performance of mixed oligopoly

Performance of mixed oligopoly model in the context of Indian telecom industry

The logic for state monopoly of public utilities arises from increasing returns to scale and the concern that private business in these areas results in monopolistic exploitation of consumers. The state monopoly however is fraught with the danger of production inefficiency. In this backdrop, the market form of mixed oligopoly is contemplated in markets like health, education, electricity, gas, telecommunications, etc, where public and private sector coexists. The private firms maximize profit but the public firm maximizes social welfare. Despite this theoretical exposition, it is often observed that public firms fail to make contributions according to their potentiality. As a result the issue of social welfare gets a short shrift. While assessing the behaviour and performance of the firm in this setup we must know the objective functions and the constraints. The asymmetry of objectives between private and public firms and the asymmetry of constraints may explain the below par performance of public firms. This needs focus on the existing theoretical construct on mixed oligopoly and empirical consideration of the performance of some specific public firm. In this paper we study the state owned Indian telecom company Bharat Shanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) to get an understanding of performance of mixed oligopoly

Auction versus posted price mechanisms in online sales: The roles of impatience and dissuasion

If all potential buyers participate in a first-price auction, then (theoretically) the auction price weakly exceeds the price placed by the seller under a posted price mechanism. However, it is documented that in online sales sellers prefer posted price mechanism to auction. We aim to explain this empirical contradiction in terms of partial participation of the buyers in auction, prompted by impatience and dissuasion. Auction on Internet often requires waiting, and hence, many impatient participants may not join the auction process. Furthermore, a previous experience of failure in auction may also prompt buyers’ non-participation. We show, theoretically, that in the case of partial participation, the price in auction may be lower; posted price turns out to be payoff dominant for both the buyers and the sellers. We then run a laboratory experiment and verify the presence of impatience (through waiting cost) and dissuasion factor (through previous failure) among the subjects

Comparison of bioactive glass coated and hydroxyapatite coated titanium dental implants in the human jaw bone

Background: Current trends in clinical dental implant therapy include modification of titanium surfaces for the purpose of improving osseointegration by different additive (bioactive coatings) and subtractive processes (acid etching, grit-blasting). The aim of this study was to evaluate and compare the behaviour of hydroxyapatite and the newly developed bioactive glass coated implants (62 implants) in osseous tissue following implantation in 31 patients. Methods: Bioactive glass and hydroxyapatite was suitably coated on titanium alloy. Hydroxyapatite coating was applied on the implant surface by air microplasma spray technique and bioactive glass coating was applied by vitreous enamelling technique. The outcome was assessed up to 12 months after prosthetic loading using different clinical and radiological parameters. Results: Hydroxyapatite and bioactive glass coating materials were non-toxic and biocompatible. Overall results showed that bioactive glass coated implants were as equally successful as hydroxyapatite in achieving osseointegration and supporting final restorations. Conclusions: The newly developed bioactive glass is a good alternative coating material for dental implants

Developing Tailor-Made Microbial Consortium for Effluent Remediation

The work describes a biofilm-based soluble sulphate reduction system, which can treat up to 1600 ppm of soluble sulphate within 3.5 hours of incubation to discharge level under ambient condition using a well-characterized sulphate-reducing bacterial (SRB) consortium. This system ensures the treatment of 1509 litres of sulphate solution in 24 hours using a 220-litre bioreactor. Performance of the system during series operation was compromised, indicating the presence of inhibitor in solution at a toxic level. A single unit bioreactor would be the ideal configuration for this consortium. Modified designs of bioreactors were tested for optimization of the process using response surface methodology (RSM), where the system could function optimally at an initial sulphate concentration of 1250 ppm with a flow rate of 1.8 litre/hour. The time course of sulphate reduction yielded a parabolic profile (with coefficient of determination r 2 = 0.99 and p value < 0.05). The rate of sulphate reduction was found to be independent of seasonal variation as well as the specific design characteristic

Effect of fuel characteristics on synthesis of calcium hydroxyapatite by solution combustion route

The effect of fuel characteristics on the processing of nano sized calcium hydroxyapatite (HA) fine powders by the solution combustion technique is reported. Urea, glycine and glucose were used as fuels in this study. By using different combinations of urea and glycine fuels and occasional addition of small amounts of highly water-soluble glucose, the flame temperature (T (f)) of the process as well as product characteristics could be controlled easily. The powders obtained by this modified solution combustion technique were characterized by XRD, FTIR spectroscopy, SEM, FESEM-EDX, particle size analyser (PSD) and specific surface area (SSA) measurements. The particle size of phase pure HA powder was found to be 1) urea and glycine precursor batches were investigated separately

Operational issues and network effects in vaccine markets

One of the most important concerns for managing public health is the prevention of infectious diseases. Although vaccines provide the most effective means for preventing infectious diseases, there are two main reasons why it is often difficult to reach a socially optimal level of vaccine coverage: (i) the emergence of operational issues (such as yield uncertainty) on the supply side, and (ii) the existence of negative network effects on the consumption side. In particular, uncertainties about production yield and vaccine imperfections often make manufacturing some vaccines a risky process and may lead the manufacturer to produce below the socially optimal level. At the same time, negative network effects provide incentives to potential consumers to free ride off the immunity of the vaccinated population. In this research, we consider how a central policy-maker can induce a socially optimal vaccine coverage through the use of incentives to both consumers and the vaccine manufacturer. We consider a monopoly market for an imperfect vaccine; we show that a fixed two-part subsidy is unable to coordinate the market, but derive a two-part menu of subsidies that leads to a socially efficient level of coverage