Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols

Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has produced a range of security mechanisms and protocols tailored for this domain, addressing both security and privacy. Typically, the security analysis of these proposals has largely been informal. However, formal analysis can be used to expose flaws and ultimately provide a higher level of assurance in the protocols. This paper focusses on the formal analysis of a particular element of security mechanisms for V2X found in many proposals: the revocation of malicious or misbehaving vehicles from the V2X system by invalidating their credentials. This revocation needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for vehicle privacy even in the context of vehicles regularly changing their pseudonyms. The REWIRE scheme by Forster et al. and its subschemes BASIC and RTOKEN aim to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and trusted hardware. Formal analysis using the TAMARIN prover identifies two flaws with some of the functional correctness and authentication properties in these schemes. We then propose Obscure Token (OTOKEN), an extension of REWIRE to enable revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach addresses the functional and authentication properties by introducing an additional key-pair, which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of successful revocation of vehicles without resolving the long-term identity. Moreover OTOKEN is the first V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed with a formal model.Comment: 16 pages, 4 figure

Fresh-Register Automata

What is a basic automata-theoretic model of computation with names and fresh-name generation? We introduce Fresh-Register Automata (FRA), a new class of automata which operate on an infinite alphabet of names and use a finite number of registers to store fresh names, and to compare incoming names with previously stored ones. These finite machines extend Kaminski and Francez’s Finite-Memory Automata by being able to recognise globally fresh inputs, that is, names fresh in the whole current run. We exam-ine the expressivity of FRA’s both from the aspect of accepted languages and of bisimulation equivalence. We establish primary properties and connections between automata of this kind, and an-swer key decidability questions. As a demonstrating example, we express the theory of the pi-calculus in FRA’s and characterise bisimulation equivalence by an appropriate, and decidable in the finitary case, notion in these automata

Deduction with XOR Constraints in Security API Modelling

We introduce XOR constraints, and show how they enable a theorem prover to reason effectively about security critical subsystems which employ bitwise XOR. Our primary case study is the API of the IBM 4758 hardware security module. We also show how our technique can be applied to standard security protocols

The role of tolerant genotypes and plant nutrients in the management of iron toxicity in lowland rice

Iron toxicity is a nutrient disorder associated with high concentrations of iron in soil solutions. Deficiencies of other nutrients, such as P, K, Ca, Mg and Zn, have been implicated in its occurrence in rice plants. Field experiments were carried out in 1992 and 1993 in Ivory Coast to evaluate the iron toxicity tolerance of promising rice cultivars available in West Africa, and to provide additional information for selecting breeding materials. Two sites, differing in their potential to cause iron toxicity, were used. Glasshouse and field studies were also conducted to test the role of other nutrients in the occurrence of iron toxicity. The results showed that genetic tolerance to iron toxicity can significantly improve rice production in iron-toxic soils, with some cultivars producing yields in excess of 5 t/ha. The application of N, P, K and Zn in the field decreased the uptake of iron in rice tops, and this can be a significant factor in the iron-toxicity tolerance of the cultivars

End-to-end verifiable elections in the standard model

We present the cryptographic implementation of “DEMOS”, a new e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional “setup” assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a “randomness beacon” or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of end-to-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in the form of two concise attack games. Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

A Proof Theoretic Analysis of Intruder Theories

We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding whether a given message M can be deduced from a set of messages Gamma under the theory of blind signatures and arbitrary convergent equational theories modulo associativity and commutativity (AC) of certain binary operators. The traditional formulations of intruder deduction are usually given in natural-deduction-like systems and proving decidability requires significant effort in showing that the rules are "local" in some sense. By using the well-known translation between natural deduction and sequent calculus, we recast the intruder deduction problem as proof search in sequent calculus, in which locality is immediate. Using standard proof theoretic methods, such as permutability of rules and cut elimination, we show that the intruder deduction problem can be reduced, in polynomial time, to the elementary deduction problem, which amounts to solving certain equations in the underlying individual equational theories. We show that this result extends to combinations of disjoint AC-convergent theories whereby the decidability of intruder deduction under the combined theory reduces to the decidability of elementary deduction in each constituent theory. To further demonstrate the utility of the sequent-based approach, we show that, for Dolev-Yao intruders, our sequent-based techniques can be used to solve the more difficult problem of solving deducibility constraints, where the sequents to be deduced may contain gaps (or variables) representing possible messages the intruder may produce.Comment: Extended version of RTA 2009 pape

Space Environmental Testing of the Electrodynamic Dust Shield Technology

NASA's exploration missions to Mars and the moon may be jeopardized by dust that will adhere to surfaces of (a) Optical systems, viewports and solar panels, (b) Thermal radiators, (c) Instrumentation, and (d) Spacesuits. We have developed an active dust mitigation technology, the Electrodynamic Dust Shield, a multilayer coating that can remove dust and also prevents its accumulation Extensive testing in simulated laboratory environments and on a reduced gravity flight shows that high dust removal performance can be achieved Long duration exposure to the space environment as part of the MISSE-X payload will validate the technology for lunar missions