Are Bankers “Crying Wolf”? Type I, Type II Errors and Deterrence in Anti-Money Laundering: The Italian Case

Excessive and useless reporting, called the "crying wolf effect," is a crucial shortcoming that any anti-money laundering (AML) design aims to address. For this reason, in recent years, AML policies in both the US and Europe have switched from a rule-based to a risk-based approach. This study theoretically and empirically investigates whether the risk-based approach delivers the expected results. The theoretical model shows that a trade-off can emerge between accuracy (fewer type-I and type-II errors) and deterrence. The empirical analysis, conducted after the risk-based approach was introduced in Italy, confirms this trade-off. More specifically, deterrence seems a priority, whereas accuracy is sacrificed. In this respect, the data suggest that Italian bankers are likely to "cry wolf.

Money management and entrepreneurial training in microfinance: impact on beneficiaries and institutions

This study uses a randomized control trial to evaluate the outcome of integrating money management and entrepreneurial training into a microcredit program in India. We find positive and significant effects on clients\u2019 financial management skills and entrepreneurship abilities, particularly for clients with higher human capital, or more diligent, or having an entrepreneurial idea, and an increase in initiative and self-confidence. Effects appear stronger for clients obliged to attend the training course or more interested in attending it. By considering missed or delayed repayments reduction we assess the benefits of the training provided and of extending it for the institution

Litigating federalism:An empirical analysis of decisions of the Belgian Constitutional Court

Belgian Constitutional Court - Conflicts between regions, communities and the central government - Allocation of competences - Decisions with high political content - Degree of political alignment between the parties in litigation and judicial behaviour at the Court - Empirical testing - All decisions of the Belgian Constitutional Court, 1985-2012 - Alignment between the alleged political preferences of the judges and the political affiliation of the Petitioner increases the rate of success of the latter

Fostering savings by commitment: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment at The Small Enterprise Foundation in South Africa

We studied the effects of a pilot project that strengthened savings incentive mechanisms. The project was established by The Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF), a leading microfinance institution based in South Africa. The program introduced a savings stimulus in the form of a Goal Card: clients subscribing to this (non-coercive) tool were required to identify a savings goal and to commit to regular payments to reach it. The experiment had a quasi-natural approach as it was implemented by SEF in non-randomly selected locations. Difference-in-differences estimates show improved savings habits among those of the foundation's customers who were involved in the program, compared to the counterfactual that are identified using propensity score matching. The effect of the program manifested in its second semester, suggesting a persistent change of habits but a slow accumulation of savings. We conclude that asking microcredit customers to identify a savings goal and commit to a regular savings amount to achieve it is a promising savings incentive mechanism

Judicial disagreement need not be political: dissent on the Estonian Supreme Court

I investigate the non-unanimous decisions of judges on the Estonian Supreme Court. I argue that since judges on the court enjoy high de jure independence, dissent frequently, and are integrated in the normal judicial hierarchy, the Estonian Supreme Court is a crucial case for the presumption that judicial disagreement reveals policy preferences. I analyse dissenting opinions using an ideal point response model. Examining the characteristics of cases which discriminated with respect to the recovered dimension, I show that this dimension cannot be interpreted as a meaningful policy dimension, but instead reflects disagreement about the proper scope of constitutional redress

Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities?

This work applies various probit/logit models to a database constructed by the authors, consisting of rulings by the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional, TC) resolving positive conflicts of competence between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities from 1981 to 2014. Our goal is to contrast empirically whether the decisions of the Court respond strictly to legal criteria (the legalist or formalist viewpoint) or if they are determined by political motivations, so that we can state that the TC constitutes an extension, in the jurisdictional milieu, of the central executive power (the realist viewpoint). According to the results of our estimations, we can state that the approach which appears to predominate in the behaviour of the TC is the legalistic one

“Nuova” Microfinanza? Credito di Gruppo e Credito Informale in Mercati Competitivi

In un dato territorio, cosa accade se un operatore economico è messo nelle condizioni di scegliere se partecipare ad un credito di gruppo, ovvero rivolgersi ad un "prestasoldi" informale? In questo lavoro si presenta il primo modello che studia tale situazione dal punto di vista del debitore, ponendo il credito di gruppo ed il credito informale in un contesto di mercati competitivi. I risultati indicano che il credito di gruppo sarà tanto più preferito quanto più la "Non Governmental Organization" (NGO) che propone tale contratto sarà in grado di offrire efficaci servizi non finanziari e di essere efficiente nella organizzazione della propria struttura. Inoltre, quanto più la NGO è efficiente, tanto più si osserva una relazione diretta tra entità della somma presa a prestito e preferenza per il credito di gruppo. Successivamente si studia il ruolo della garanzia e della reputazione nel determinare la preferenza del debitore per l'uno o l'altro tipo di credito. Infine, il modello suggerisce che i prenditori caratterizzati da progetti più produttivi tendono a scegliere il credito individuale

Informal Credit and Group Lending: Modelling the Choice

This paper presents a theoretical model that examines group lending and microfinance in a competitive environmen