Robustness assessment of the ‘cooperation under resource pressure’ (CURP) model: Insights on resource availability and sharing practices among hunter-gatherers

A well-known challenge in archaeological research is the exploration of the social mechanisms that hunter-gatherers may have implemented throughout history to deal with changes in resource availability. The agent-based model (ABM) ‘cooperation under resource pressure’ (CURP) was conceived to explore food stress episodes in societies lacking a food preservation technology. It was particularly aimed at understanding how cooperative behaviours in the form of food sharing practices emerge, increase and may become the prevailing strategy in relation to changes in resource availability and expectancy of reciprocity. CURP’s main outcome is the identification of three regimes of behaviour depending on the stress level. In this work, the model’s robustness to the original selection mechanism (random tournament) is assessed, as different dynamics can lead to different persistent regimes. For that purpose, three other selection mechanisms are implemented and evaluated, to identify the prevailing states of the system. Results show that the three regimes are robust irrespective of the analysed dynamics. We consequently examine in more detail the long-term archaeological implications that these results may have.Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (former Ministry of Science and Innovation): SimulPast Project (CSD2010- 00034 CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010), HAR2009-06996 and CULM Project (HAR2016- 77672-P); from the Argentine National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET): Project PIP-0706; from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research: Project GR7846; from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725 and from the European Social Fund as one of the authors is the recipient of a predoctoral grant from the Department of Education of Junta de Castilla y León (Spain)

Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems

Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction

Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas

Mitigating climate change effects involves strategic decisions by individuals that may choose to limit their emissions at a cost. Everyone shares the ensuing benefits and thereby individuals can free ride on the effort of others, which may lead to the tragedy of the commons. For this reason, climate action can be conveniently formulated in terms of Public Goods Dilemmas often assuming that a minimum collective effort is required to ensure any benefit, and that decision-making may be contingent on the risk associated with future losses. Here we investigate the impact of reward and punishment in this type of collective endeavors - coined as collective-risk dilemmas - by means of a dynamic, evolutionary approach. We show that rewards (positive incentives) are essential to initiate cooperation, mostly when the perception of risk is low. On the other hand, we find that sanctions (negative incentives) are instrumental to maintain cooperation. Altogether, our results are gratifying, given the a-priori limitations of effectively implementing sanctions in international agreements. Finally, we show that whenever collective action is most challenging to succeed, the best results are obtained when both rewards and sanctions are synergistically combined into a single policy.This research was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants PTDC/EEISII/5081/2014 and PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014 and by multiannual funding of INESC-ID and CBMA (under the projects UID/CEC/50021/2019 and UID/BIA/04050/2013). F.P.S. acknowledges support from the James S. McDonnell Foundation 21st Century Science Initiative in Understanding Dynamic and Multi-scale Systems Postdoctoral Fellowship Award. All authors declare no competing financial or non-financial interests in relation to the work described

Measuring local depletion of terrestrial game vertebrates by central-place hunters in rural Amazonia

The degree to which terrestrial vertebrate populations are depleted in tropical forests occupied by human communities has been the subject of an intense polarising debate that has important conservation implications. Conservation ecologists and practitioners are divided over the extent to which community-based subsistence offtake is compatible with ecologically functional populations of tropical forest game species. To quantify depletion envelopes of forest vertebrates around human communities, we deployed a total of 383 camera trap stations and 78 quantitative interviews to survey the peri-community areas controlled by 60 semi-subsistence communities over a combined area of over 3.2 million hectares in the Médio Juruá and Uatumã regions of Central-Western Brazilian Amazonia. Our results largely conform with prior evidence that hunting large-bodied vertebrates reduces wildlife populations near settlements, such that they are only found at a distance to settlements where they are hunted less frequently. Camera trap data suggest that a select few harvest-sensitive species, including lowland tapir, are either repelled or depleted by human communities. Nocturnal and cathemeral species were detected relatively more frequently in disturbed areas close to communities, but individual species did not necessarily shift their activity patterns. Group biomass of all species was depressed in the wider neighbourhood of urban areas rather than communities. Interview data suggest that species traits, especially group size and body mass, mediate these relationships. Large-bodied, large-group-living species are detected farther from communities as reported by experienced informants. Long-established communities in our study regions have not “emptied” the surrounding forest. Low human population density and low hunting offtake due to abundant sources of alternative aquatic protein, suggest that these communities represent a best-case scenario for sustainable hunting of wildlife for food, thereby providing a conservative assessment of game depletion. Given this ‘best-case’ camera trap and interview-based evidence for hunting depletion, regions with higher human population densities, external trade in wildlife and limited access to alternative protein will likely exhibit more severe depletion

The life history of human foraging: Cross-cultural and individual variation

Human adaptation depends on the integration of slow life history, complex production skills, and extensive sociality. Refining and testing models of the evolution of human life history and cultural learning benefit from increasingly accurate measurement of knowledge, skills, and rates of production with age. We pursue this goal by inferring hunters' increases and declines of skill from approximately 23,000 hunting records generated by more than 1800 individuals at 40 locations. The data reveal an average age of peak productivity between 30 and 35 years of age, although high skill is maintained throughout much of adulthood. In addition, there is substantial variation both among individuals and sites. Within study sites, variation among individuals depends more on heterogeneity in rates of decline than in rates of increase. This analysis sharpens questions about the coevolution of human life history and cultural adaptation