Prenegotiation and Mediation: the Anglo-Argentine diplomacy after the Falklands/Malvinas War(1983-1989)

This paper studies the process of prenegotiation and the role of mediators during the negotiations between the Argentine and British governments about the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from immediately after the war of 1982 to 1990. In this period, the relationship between both governments evolved from rupture and no-relations to the agreement on the conditions to negotiate the renewal of full diplomatic relations concluded in early 1990. In a preliminary process of prenegotiation, the governments of Switzerland, initially, and the United States played a role in helping to reach an agreement. The former failed when the talks ended abruptly in July 1984. The latter succeeded in getting both parties to the table and keeping them there, thus avoiding a potential rupture until the two parties reached an agreement in principle. During the prenegotiation stage, the principal parties were able to reduce the risks of escalation; they defined and narrowed the boundaries of the dispute, clearly identified the trade-offs, and structured the agenda of formal negotiations. Consequently, the likelihood of successful negotiation improved significantly when the parties reach an agreement during prenegotiation on what will be discussed later. This case also illustrate that sometimes, when negotiations reach a point of stalemate, a mediator can help to find a "zone of agreement". When this situation occurs, the degree of involvement and the resources of the mediator are particularly important. Finally, this case confirms the assertions that effective mediation is more a matter of leverage and influence than a matter of impartiality.international negotiation, prenegotiation, mediation, Falklands, Malvinas

Reassessing the Fighting Performance of Conscript Soldiers during the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982)

While the idea is controversial, it is quite possible that, at least under certain circumstances, the fighting effectiveness of a conscript army can equal that of a professional army. For any army, fighting effectiveness is not only influenced by the degree of psychological cohesion among soldiers and officers, but also by the organizational culture of each particular service unit towards the preparation for war and the waging of the conflict itself. The Malvinas (Falklands) War of 1982 demonstrates this very well. In this war, two different types of armies confronted one another: the British army, a professional and all volunteer force, and the Argentine army constituted principally of conscripted soldiers. In this regard, some analysts assert that the British concept was vindicated when a force of British professional soldiers defeated an opposing Argentine force of draftees twice as numerous. Analysts in general have rated the capabilities of the Argentine land forces as poor, although there were exceptions and some units performed very well. These cases deserve to be studied. Notably, the most effective Argentine effort came from some small Army units and one Navy unit, the 5th Marine Battalion. For these units, two primary reasons account for the differences in fighting performance. First, small Army groups fought well because there was cohesion among their components, conscripts, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers, especially by the attitude of the latter. Secondly, in the case of the Marine battalion, its performance was the product not only of good training, but also of the different institutional approach to waging war that the Argentine Navy employed. These, in turn, improved cohesion. By focusing upon these units and their effectiveness, a rather new picture of the Malvinas War comes to light that differs quite substantially from those drawn in the immediate aftermath of the war itself. It should also make us rethink the "lessons" of the war, including those that surround the professionals versus conscripts controversy.

Factores organizacionales y desempeño en Combate: la experiencia de la IMARA en Malvinas

Cuando los soldados entran en combate lo hacen en el marco de una organización que los envía y los apoya. De este modo su calidad es puesta a prueba y, por ese motivo, el combate es el momento crítico de toda organización militar. En esa situación su desempeño dependerá no sólo de los planes estratégicos, su cantidad y el material disponible, sino también de la preparación y del espíritu que le fue inculcado a sus miembros a lo largo de su paso por la organización militar. No cabe duda que para la Fuerzas Armadas argentinas la Guerra de las Malvinas fue un momento crítico. El siguiente trabajo explora las razones del comportamiento de las unidades de Infantería de Marina de la Armada Argentina (IMARA) a partir del análisis de dos factores organizacionales. El primer factor, más comúnmente señalado, es lo que en éste análisis se denomina estructural; el segundo se centra en algunos aspectos sociológicos, más precisamente la cultura organizacional. Para explicar los atributos estructurales y culturales del cuerpo de Infantería de Marina argentina se entrevistaron a oficiales de la Armada en servicio activo o en situación de retiro que participaron o que fueron testigos privilegiados de los acontecimientos descriptos y a documentos y artículos oficiales y otros testimonios impresos.

Reducing the environmental impact of surgery on a global scale: systematic review and co-prioritization with healthcare workers in 132 countries

Abstract Background Healthcare cannot achieve net-zero carbon without addressing operating theatres. The aim of this study was to prioritize feasible interventions to reduce the environmental impact of operating theatres. Methods This study adopted a four-phase Delphi consensus co-prioritization methodology. In phase 1, a systematic review of published interventions and global consultation of perioperative healthcare professionals were used to longlist interventions. In phase 2, iterative thematic analysis consolidated comparable interventions into a shortlist. In phase 3, the shortlist was co-prioritized based on patient and clinician views on acceptability, feasibility, and safety. In phase 4, ranked lists of interventions were presented by their relevance to high-income countries and low–middle-income countries. Results In phase 1, 43 interventions were identified, which had low uptake in practice according to 3042 professionals globally. In phase 2, a shortlist of 15 intervention domains was generated. In phase 3, interventions were deemed acceptable for more than 90 per cent of patients except for reducing general anaesthesia (84 per cent) and re-sterilization of ‘single-use’ consumables (86 per cent). In phase 4, the top three shortlisted interventions for high-income countries were: introducing recycling; reducing use of anaesthetic gases; and appropriate clinical waste processing. In phase 4, the top three shortlisted interventions for low–middle-income countries were: introducing reusable surgical devices; reducing use of consumables; and reducing the use of general anaesthesia. Conclusion This is a step toward environmentally sustainable operating environments with actionable interventions applicable to both high– and low–middle–income countries

Reformas constitucionales y modelos de decisión en la democracia argentina, 1984-1994

Fil: Corbacho, Alejandro L. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina

A Service of zbw Prenegotiation and Mediation: the Anglo-Argentine diplomacy after the Falklands/Malvinas War (1983-1989) (*)

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper studies the process of prenegotiation and the role of mediators during the negotiations between the Argentine and British governments about the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from immediately after the war of 1982 to 1990. In this period, the relationship between both governments evolved from rupture and no-relations to the agreement on the conditions to negotiate the renewal of full diplomatic relations concluded in early 1990. In a preliminary process of prenegotiation, the governments of Switzerland, initially, and the United States played a role in helping to reach an agreement. The former failed when the talks ended abruptly in July 1984. The latter succeeded in getting both parties to the table and keeping them there, thus avoiding a potential rupture until the two parties reached an agreement in principle. During the prenegotiation stage, the principal parties were able to reduce the risks of escalation; they defined and narrowed the boundaries of the dispute, clearly identified the trade-offs, and structured the agenda of formal negotiations. Consequently, the likelihood of successful negotiation improved significantly when the parties reach an agreement during prenegotiation on what will be discussed later. This case also illustrate that sometimes, when negotiations reach a point of stalemate, a mediator can help to find a "zone of agreement." When this situation occurs, the degree of involvement and the resources of the mediator are particularly important. Finally, this case confirms the assertions that effective mediation is more a matter of leverage and influence than a matter of impartiality. In general the literature on international negotiation stresses how the parties negotiate, but another important albeit less studied problem is that of persuading the parties to negotiate. parties remained far apart. In effect, after winning the war, the British wanted only to restore formal diplomatic relations without discussing the issue of sovereignty. For its part, the Argentine government proposed formal diplomatic relations only if sovereignty were part of the package to be discussed at the table. During this period, initiatives to negotiate bilaterally failed. In July 1984, the Swiss government sponsored talks in the city of Berne that failed. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may The situation finally began to change after a crisis in 1986. This crisis was sparked by differences between Argentina and Great Britain over the control of fishing in the disputed waters. First, the Argentine implemented a policy of more aggressive naval patrolling in the waters around the islands and it signed fishing agreements with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. The British thereupon imposed unilaterally a fishing conservation zone in the area. The implementation of these policies appeared to escalate the dispute into a potentially new conflict in the South Atlantic. At that moment, the United States, worried about the tension between two of its allies, intervened as a mediator. After two years of secret prenegotiations among the three parties, the Argentine government agreed to negotiate formally the reinstatement of diplomatic relations without discussing for the moment the issue of sovereignty over the islands as were the British wishes. During this period, the trilateral negotiations had changed the Argentine position from negotiating only if discussing sovereignty to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations without discussing sovereignty. Why did the Argentine government take such decision? What factors influenced the decision to adopt a conciliatory approach? This paper contends that between 1986 and 1989, parties established a "zone of agreement" where they had failed previously, primarily because of the presence of a mediating party like the United States. 6 Among the factors that explain prenegotiation outcomes, some authors concentrate on the importance of the mediation role by an effective third-party

Erdafitinib in patients with advanced solid tumours with FGFR alterations (RAGNAR): an international, single-arm, phase 2 study

Background: FGFR alterations are reported across various malignancies and might act as oncogenic drivers in multiple histologies. Erdafitinib is an oral, selective pan-FGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor with activity in FGFR-altered advanced urothelial carcinoma. We aimed to evaluate the safety and activity of erdafitinib in previously treated patients with FGFR-altered advanced solid tumours. Methods: The single-arm, phase 2 RAGNAR study was conducted at 156 investigative centres (hospitals or oncology practices that are qualified oncology study centres) across 15 countries. The study consisted of four cohorts based on tumour histology and patient age; the results reported in this Article are for the primary cohort of the study, defined as the Broad Panel Cohort, which was histology-agnostic. We recruited patients aged 12 years or older with advanced or metastatic tumours of any histology (except urothelial cancer) with predefined FGFR1-4 alterations (mutations or fusions according to local or central testing). Eligible patients had disease progression on at least one previous line of systemic therapy and no alternative standard therapy available to them, and an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group performance status of 0-1 (or equivalent for adolescents aged 12-17 years). Patients received once-daily oral erdafitinib (8 mg/day with provision for pharmacodynamically guided up-titration to 9 mg/day) on a continuous 21-day cycle until disease progression or intolerable toxicity. The primary endpoint was objective response rate by independent review committee according to Response Evaluation Criteria In Solid Tumors (RECIST), version 1.1, or Response Assessment In Neuro-Oncology (RANO). The primary analysis was conducted on the treated population of the Broad Panel Cohort. This ongoing study is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT04083976. Findings: Patients were recruited between Dec 5, 2019, and Feb 15, 2022. Of 217 patients treated with erdafitinib, 97 (45%) patients were female and 120 (55%) were male. The data cutoff was Aug 15, 2022. At a median follow-up of 17·9 months (IQR 13·6-23·9), an objective response was observed in 64 (30% [95% CI 24-36]) of 217 patients across 16 distinct tumour types. The most common grade 3 or higher treatment-emergent adverse events related to erdafitinib were stomatitis (25 [12%]), palmar-plantar erythrodysaesthesia syndrome (12 [6%]), and hyperphosphataemia (11 [5%]). The most commonly occurring serious treatment-related adverse events (grade 3 or higher) were stomatitis in four (2%) patients and diarrhoea in two (1%). There were no treatment-related deaths. Interpretation: RAGNAR results show clinical benefit for erdafitinib in the tumour-agnostic setting in patients with advanced solid tumours with susceptible FGFR alterations who have exhausted other treatment options. These results support the continued development of FGFR inhibitors in patients with advanced solid tumours