Compensation dispersion between and within hierarchical levels

This paper studies the dispersion around the expected compensation of workers before and after controlling for hierarchical positions in cross-section data samples. From data for Spanish managers, we find that this dispersion decreases with education and work experience before entering the current job and increases with job tenure. This finding contrasts with previous research that finds a positive association between compensation dispersion and education and work experience. We explain the new finding through a model of learning that separates compensation dispersion between jobs and within jobs (hierarchical positions). The model takes advantage of the information revealed when workers are promoted to their current hierarchical positions and allows for more robust tests of learning theories

Monopoly capitalism, profits, income distribution and unionism

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:D172630 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Econometric Modelling of UK Executive Compensation

Looks briefly at theories underlying the correlation between company performance and executive compensation, develops a mathematical model and applies it to results which show a significant positive link between the highest paid director’s compensation and total shareholder returns, but not with earnings per share. Considers consistency with other research, notes the influence of company size on executive pay and calls for further research on this important issue of corporate governance

The impact of mergers and aquisitions on profitability and employee remuneration in UK manufacturing industry

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:3597.93385(no 99/24) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Executive Incentive Schemes in Initial Public Offerings: The Effects of Multiple-Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance

Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this article examines factors affecting the implementation of equity-based incentive schemes in initial public offerings (IPOs). With a unique sample of U.K. IPO companies between the years 1998 and 2002, it shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the retained ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the toughness of executive compensation. The article’s interesting findings suggest a number of avenues for a future analysis of the governance development process in threshold firms

Is pay related to performance in The Netherlands? An analysis of Duth executive compensation, 2002-2006

This paper analyzes the characteristics of Dutch pay arrangements. We show that (1) studying executive compensation outside the Anglo-American countries adds insights to the pay for performance literature, (2) pay for performance relations are different for various types of executives and for various compensation components, (3) attention to the methodological treatment of conditional stock (option) grants is important, and (4) researchers should go beyond stock market performance indicators to detect the performance relatedness of pay. All in all, a myriad of pay-performance relationships has been found for the Dutch case, when the above is accounted for