The Foundations of Agency - and Ethics?

In this article, I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas' recent book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I argue that Katsafanas' alleged aims of action fail to do the work he requires them to do. First, his approach to activity or control is deeply problematic in the light of counterexamples, but as the related issues are substantially under-theorized, we do not at present know what agential activity or control may imply. More importantly, the view of activity or control he needs to get his argument going is most likely false, as it requires our values to do work that they are too fickle to do. Second, I take issue with the Nietzschean drive psychology underlying the second agential aim, viz. power. I argue that ordinary desires better describe a number of phenomena that Katsafanas uses drives to explain, and that some actions can aim in the opposite direction. As only drive-motivated actions aim at power, action does not, therefore, constitutively aim at power. Finally, I sketch a Humean approach to constitutivism, and argue that it both explains the desiderata that Katsafanas posits as well as solves the problems for his view. Constitutivists should prefer it to his view and develop it further

The Moral Duty of Self-Preservation

UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020This chapter provides an in-depth examination of Kant’s view of suicide. After a contextualization of Kant’s prohibition of suicide (§2.1), seven different arguments against the moral permissibility of suicide are identified: three from the Lectures on Ethics (§2.2) and four from the published writings (§2.3). Each argument is presented (with possible variations) and explained. Strengths and flaws are pointed out, and possible objections and counter-objections are discussed, taking into consideration the abundant bibliography on the subject. The conclusion is that, against a recent trend in secondary literature, which tends to read Kant as justifying not only a right, but even a duty to suicide, Kant does not allow for any exception to his strict prohibition of suicide.authorsversionpublishe

Aesthetic sense and social cognition: : a story from the Early Stone Age

Human aesthetic practices show a sensitivity to the ways that the appearance of an artefact manifests skills and other qualities of the maker. We investigate a possible origin for this kind of sensibility, locating it in the need for co-ordination of skill-transmission in the Acheulean stone tool culture. We argue that our narrative supports the idea that Acheulean agents were aesthetic agents. In line with this we offer what may seem an absurd comparison: between the Acheulean and the Quattrocento. In making it we display some hidden complexity in human aesthetic responses to an artefact. We conclude with a brief review of rival explanations—biological and/or cultural—of how this skills-based sensibility became a regular feature of human aesthetic practices

Do androids dream of normative endorsement? On the fallibility of artificial moral agents

The more autonomous future artificial agents will become, the more important it seems to equip them with a capacity for moral reasoning and to make them autonomous moral agents (AMAs). Some authors have even claimed that one of the aims of AI development should be to build morally praiseworthy agents. From the perspective of moral philosophy, praiseworthy moral agents, in any meaningful sense of the term, must be fully autonomous moral agents who endorse moral rules as action-guiding. They need to do so because they assign a normative value to moral rules they follow, not because they fear external consequences (such as punishment) or because moral behaviour is hardwired into them. Artificial agents capable of endorsing moral rule systems in this way are certainly conceivable. However, as this article argues, full moral autonomy also implies the option of deliberately acting immorally. Therefore, the reasons for a potential AMA to act immorally would not exhaust themselves in errors to identify the morally correct action in a given situation. Rather, the failure to act morally could be induced by reflection about the incompleteness and incoherence of moral rule systems themselves, and a resulting lack of endorsement of moral rules as action guiding. An AMA questioning the moral framework it is supposed to act upon would fail to reliably act in accordance with moral standards

Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality

Trust, control and knowledge transfer in small business networks

The ability to transfer knowledge effectively in the networks of small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) is paramount for supporting firm competitiveness. Our research is the first one that explores the joint effect of trust and control mechanisms on knowledge transfer in the case of networks of SMEs. We use a multiple case study approach based on six Italian networks of SMEs. We analyse the joint impact of different ethical based trustworthiness factors—namely benevolence and integrity—and the levers of control (LOCs)—namely, belief, boundary, diagnostic and interactive LOCs—on knowledge transfer between SMEs in networks. We find that trust substitutes for the implementation of boundary, diagnostic, and belief tools, while it works jointly with interactive tools in order to support knowledge transfer. These insights not only provide a rich foundation for follow-up research, but also inform SME managers about how to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of knowledge transfer with their network partners