Curious Negotiator

n negotiation the exchange of information is as important as the exchange of offers. The curious negotiator is a multiagent system with three types of agents. Two negotiation agents, each representing an individual, develop consecutive offers, supported by information, whilst requesting information from its opponent. A mediator agent, with experience of prior negotiations, suggests how the negotiation may develop. A failed negotiation is a missed opportunity. An observer agent analyses failures looking for new opportunities. The integration of negotiation theory and data mining enables the curious negotiator to discover and exploit negotiation opportunities. Trials will be conducted in electronic business

OWL-POLAR : semantic policies for agent reasoning

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comPostprin

AGI and the Knight-Darwin Law: why idealized AGI reproduction requires collaboration

Can an AGI create a more intelligent AGI? Under idealized assumptions, for a certain theoretical type of intelligence, our answer is: “Not without outside help”. This is a paper on the mathematical structure of AGI populations when parent AGIs create child AGIs. We argue that such populations satisfy a certain biological law. Motivated by observations of sexual reproduction in seemingly-asexual species, the Knight-Darwin Law states that it is impossible for one organism to asexually produce another, which asexually produces another, and so on forever: that any sequence of organisms (each one a child of the previous) must contain occasional multi-parent organisms, or must terminate. By proving that a certain measure (arguably an intelligence measure) decreases when an idealized parent AGI single-handedly creates a child AGI, we argue that a similar Law holds for AGIs

Normative Multi-Agent Programs and Their Logics

Multi-agent systems are viewed as consisting of individual agents whose behaviors are regulated by an organization artefact. This paper presents a simplified version of a programming language that is designed to implement norm-based artefacts. Such artefacts are specified in terms of norms being enforced by monitoring, regimenting and sanctioning mechanisms. The syntax and operational semantics of the programming language are introduced and discussed. A logic is presented that can be used to specify and verify properties of programs developed in this language

Normative Autonomy and Normative Co-ordination: Declarative Power, Representation, and Mandate

In this paper we provide a formal analysis of the idea of normative co-ordination. We argue that this idea is based on the assumption that agents can achieve flexible co-ordination by conferring normative positions to other agents. These positions include duties, permissions, and powers. In particular, we explain the idea of declarative power, which consists in the capacity of the power-holder of creating normative positions, involving other agents, simply by "proclaiming" such positions. In addition, we account also for the concepts of representation, namely the representative's capacity of acting in the name of his principal, and of mandate, which is the mandatee's duty to act as the mandator has requested. Finally, we show how the framework can be applied to represent the contract-net protocol. Some brief remarks on future research and applications conclude this contribution

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

"Exhibitionists" and "voyeurs" do it better: A shared environment for flexible coordination with tacit messages

Coordination between multiple autonomous agents is a major issue for open multi-agent systems. This paper proposes the notion of Behavioural Implicit Communication (BIC) originally devised in human and animal societies as a new and critical coordination mechanism also for artificial agents. BIC is a parasitical form of communication that exploits both some environmental properties and the agents? capacity to interpret their actions. In this paper we abstract from the agents? architecture to focus on the interaction mediated by the environment. Observability of the environment ? and in particular of agents? actions ? is crucial for implementing BIC-based form of coordination in artificial societies. Accordingly in this paper we introduce an abstract model of environment providing services to enhance observation power of agents, enabling BIC and other form of observation-based coordination. Also, we describe a typology of environments and examples of observation based coordination with and without implicit communication

Words as social tools: flexibility, situatedness, language and sociality in abstract concepts. Reply to comments on “Words as social tools: language, sociality and inner grounding in abstract concepts”

The article is a reply to comments by other authors on the topic of abstract concepts