Inspectors General and the Law of Oversight Independence

President Trump’s defiance of basic norms threatened the oversight institutions of American democracy. His brazen assault on the prosecutorial and investigative independence of federal law enforcement was well documented. Yet few have thoroughly scrutinized his violations of the oversight independence of internal institutions that monitor the government to promote integrity, transparency, and accountability. This Article examines the independence of Inspectors General (IGs), the internal watchdogs of the Executive Branch, and the President’s attacks on the institution. President Trump breached long-standing independence norms when he fired or replaced IGs in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of oversight duties. Then, in some cases, he named political appointees as acting IGs, despite clear conflicts of interest. This Article analyzes the constitutionality and policy implications of recent congressional proposals that seek to reinforce IG independence and prevent future abuses of power by codifying norms into law: specifically, proposals to limit the President’s appointment and removal authority, including statutory removal for cause protection and restrictions on acting appointments. Recently, in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court narrowed the grounds for congressional removal protection. However, this Article argues that a constitutional basis exists in the Court’s reframed doctrine for Congress to enact IG removal protection because the President and agency heads are ultimately accountable for acting upon IGs’ investigative findings and recommendations. The Article also considers structural changes to the IG institution—a multimember commission, court-appointed officers, or agency appointees—as alternative forms of protection and applies removal protection to particular cases to evaluate whether it supplies the proper balance between IG independence and accountability. The Article then explains the validity of proposed restrictions on acting IG appointments and offers additional policy recommendations to enhance statutory qualifications for permanent IG appointments. The law of oversight independence reveals the interplay between internal constraints on executive power, the external separation of powers, and the dynamics of presidential accountability in the design of reforms to protect oversight institutions

Extrinsic primary afferent signalling in the gut

Visceral sensory neurons activate reflex pathways that control gut function and also give rise to important sensations, such as fullness, bloating, nausea, discomfort, urgency and pain. Sensory neurons are organised into three distinct anatomical pathways to the central nervous system (vagal, thoracolumbar and lumbosacral). Although remarkable progress has been made in characterizing the roles of many ion channels, receptors and second messengers in visceral sensory neurons, the basic aim of understanding how many classes there are, and how they differ, has proven difficult to achieve. We suggest that just five structurally distinct types of sensory endings are present in the gut wall that account for essentially all of the primary afferent neurons in the three pathways. Each of these five major structural types of endings seems to show distinctive combinations of physiological responses. These types are: 'intraganglionic laminar' endings in myenteric ganglia; 'mucosal' endings located in the subepithelial layer; 'muscular–mucosal' afferents, with mechanosensitive endings close to the muscularis mucosae; 'intramuscular' endings, with endings within the smooth muscle layers; and 'vascular' afferents, with sensitive endings primarily on blood vessels. 'Silent' afferents might be a subset of inexcitable 'vascular' afferents, which can be switched on by inflammatory mediators. Extrinsic sensory neurons comprise an attractive focus for targeted therapeutic intervention in a range of gastrointestinal disorders.Australian National Health and Medical Research Counci

Too Big to Fail — U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an “At Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the Multi-Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market

The multi-trillion-dollar market for, what was at that time wholly unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives (“swaps”) is widely viewed as a principal cause of the 2008 worldwide financial meltdown. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on July 21, 2010, was expressly considered by Congress to be a remedy for this troublesome deregulatory problem. The legislation required the swaps market to comply with a host of business conduct and anti-competitive protections, including that the swaps market be fully transparent to U.S. financial regulators, collateralized, and capitalized. The statute also expressly provides that it would cover foreign subsidiaries of big U.S. financial institutions if their swaps trading could adversely impact the U.S. economy or represent the use of extraterritorial trades as an attempt to “evade” Dodd-Frank. In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated an 80-page, triple-columned, and single-spaced “guidance” implementing Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial reach, i.e., that manner in which Dodd-Frank would apply to swaps transactions executed outside the United States. The key point of that guidance was that swaps trading within the “guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were subject to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations wherever in the world those subsidiaries’ swaps were executed. At that time, the standardized industry swaps agreement contemplated that, inter alia, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers’ foreign subsidiaries would be “guaranteed” by their corporate parent, as was true since 1992. In August 2013, without notifying the CFTC, the principal U.S. bank holding company swaps dealer trade association privately circulated to its members standard contractual language that would, for the first time, “deguarantee” their foreign subsidiaries. By relying only on the obscure footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance’s 662 footnotes, the trade association assured its swaps dealer members that the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries could (if they so chose) no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank. As a result, it has been reported (and it also has been understood by many experts within the swaps industry) that a substantial portion of the U.S. swaps market has shifted from the large U.S. bank holding companies swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed “foreign” subsidiaries, with the attendant claim by these huge big U.S. bank swaps dealers that Dodd-Frank swaps regulation would not apply to these transactions. The CFTC also soon discovered that these huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were “arranging, negotiating, and executing” (“ANE”) these swaps in the United States with U.S. bank personnel and, only after execution in the U.S., were these swaps formally “assigned” to the U.S. banks’ newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries with the accompanying claim that these swaps, even though executed in the U.S., were not covered by Dodd-Frank. In October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule that would have closed the “deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes completely. However, because it usually takes at least a year to finalize a “proposed” rule, this proposed rule closing the loopholes in question was not finalized prior to the inauguration of President Trump. All indications are that it will never be finalized during a Trump Administration. Thus, in the shadow of the recent tenth anniversary of the Lehman failure, there is an understanding among many market regulators and swaps trading experts that large portions of the swaps market have moved from U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed foreign affiliates where Dodd- Frank swaps regulation is not being followed. However, what has not moved abroad is the very real obligation of the lender of last resort to rescue these U.S. swaps dealer bank holding companies if they fail because of poorly regulated swaps in their deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries, i.e., the U.S. taxpayer. While relief is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Trump Administration or the Republican-controlled Senate, some other means will have to be found to avert another multi-trillion-dollar bank bailout and/or a financial calamity caused by poorly regulated swaps on the books of big U.S. banks. This paper notes that the relevant statutory framework affords state attorneys general and state financial regulators the right to bring so-called “parens patriae” actions in federal district court to enforce, inter alia, Dodd- Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens. That kind of litigation to enforce the statute’s extraterritorial provisions is now badly needed

The first view of δ Scuti and γ Doradus stars with the TESS mission

Abstract We present the first asteroseismic results for δ Scuti and γ Doradus stars observed in Sectors 1 and 2 of the TESS mission. We utilise the 2-min cadence TESS data for a sample of 117 stars to classify their behaviour regarding variability and place them in the Hertzsprung-Russell diagram using Gaia DR2 data. Included within our sample are the eponymous members of two pulsator classes, γ Doradus and SX Phoenicis. Our sample of pulsating intermediate-mass stars observed by TESS also allows us to confront theoretical models of pulsation driving in the classical instability strip for the first time and show that mixing processes in the outer envelope play an important role. We derive an empirical estimate of 74% for the relative amplitude suppression factor as a result of the redder TESS passband compared to the Kepler mission using a pulsating eclipsing binary system. Furthermore, our sample contains many high-frequency pulsators, allowing us to probe the frequency variability of hot young δ Scuti stars, which were lacking in the Kepler mission data set, and identify promising targets for future asteroseismic modelling. The TESS data also allow us to refine the stellar parameters of SX Phoenicis, which is believed to be a blue straggler

Landslide initiation and runout susceptibility modeling in the context of hill cutting and rapid urbanization: a combined approach of weights of evidence and spatial multi-criteria

Rainfall induced landslides are a common threat to the communities living on dangerous hill-slopes in Chittagong Metropolitan Area, Bangladesh. Extreme population pressure, indiscriminate hill cutting, increased precipitation events due to global warming and associated unplanned urbanization in the hills are exaggerating landslide events. The aim of this article is to prepare a scientifically accurate landslide susceptibility map by combining landslide initiation and runout maps. Land cover, slope, soil permeability, surface geology, precipitation, aspect, and distance to hill cut, road cut, drainage and stream network factor maps were selected by conditional independence test. The locations of 56 landslides were collected by field surveying. A weight of evidence (WoE) method was applied to calculate the positive (presence of landslides) and negative (absence of landslides) factor weights. A combination of analytical hierarchical process (AHP) and fuzzy membership standardization (weighs from 0 to 1) was applied for performing a spatial multi-criteria evaluation. Expert opinion guided the decision rule for AHP. The Flow-R tool that allows modeling landslide runout from the initiation sources was applied. The flow direction was calculated using the modified Holmgren’s algorithm. The AHP landslide initiation and runout susceptibility maps were used to prepare a combined landslide susceptibility map. The relative operating characteristic curve was used for model validation purpose. The accuracy of WoE, AHP, and combined susceptibility map was calculated 96%, 97%, and 98%, respectively