Success in the University Admission Process in Germany: Regional Provenance Matters

School education in Germany is under the responsibility of the federal states and as a consequence average grades differ widely across regions. Since school leavers apply nationwide for admission to university, regional provenance may thus matter a lot for the success probability in the admission process. Using a comprehensive dataset of the German central clearing house for university admissions in 2006/2007, we show that success rates indeed differ dramatically between federal states, provided that grades are not made comparable across state boundaries. Most of the variation in success can be explained by state-level differences in grading. By defining quotas for federal states and restricting competition among applicants to the state-level, the link between state-level grading and success rates in the university admission process can be broken.Admission to university, central clearing house, federalism, federal education system

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school (“Abiturbestenverfahren”, “Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen”) and on waiting time (“Wartezeitverfahren”). While these procedures differ in the criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences. Thus, strategic behaviour is expected. Using the full data set of applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to organize the market are briefly discussed.Matching, university admissions, strategic behaviour

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school ("Abiturbestenverfahren", "Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen") and on waiting time ("Wartezeitverfahren"). While these procedures differ in the criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences. Thus, strategic behaviour is expected. Using the full data set of applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to organize the market are briefly discussed.Matching, university admissions, strategic behaviour

Gescheiterte Allgemeine Volksinitiative: Sind die Volksrechte reformträge?

Die Umsetzung der allgemeinen Volksinitiative ist gescheitert. Das er- nüchternde Fazit, sämtliche Volksrechtsreformanläufe seien sowieso von Anfang an zum Scheitern verurteilt, ist jedoch fehl am Platz. Zahlreiche erfoglreiche Reformen belegen das Gegenteil. Der Blick auf frühere Volksrechtsreformen zeigt allerdings auch, dass nur Revisionen, welche am bestehenden System des Zusammenspiels zwischen Föderalismus, Zweikammerparlament, Gewaltenteilung und Volksrechten nichts Wesentliches verändern wollten – sogenannte «Finetuning-Massnahmen» –, eine Chance hatten. Dies sollte beim nächsten Reformanlauf in Erinnerung behalten werden

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions, which first allocates seats in the quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modied version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance (SDA) algorithm, which simultaneously allocates seats in all quotas. Our main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for top-grade students and could thus be a valuable tool for redesigning university admissions in Germany.College admissions, experiment, quotas, matching; Gale-Shapley mechanism, Boston mechanism

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions, which first allocates seats in the quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance (SDA) algorithm, which simultaneously allocates seats in all quotas. Our main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for top-grade students and could thus be a valuable tool for redesigning university admissions in Germany. --college admissions,experiment,quotas,matching,Gale-Shapley mechanism,Boston mechanism

The local environment shapes refugee integration : evidence from post-war Germany

The research in this paper was funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant no. BR 4979/1-1, “Die volkswirtschaftlichen Effekte der Vertriebenen und ihre Integration in Westdeutschland, 1945-70”).This paper studies how the local environment in receiving counties affected the economic, social, and political integration of the eight million expellees who arrived in West Germany after World War II. We first document that integration outcomes differed dramatically across West German counties. We then show that more industrialized counties and counties with low expellee inflows were much more successful in integrating expellees than agrarian counties and counties with high inflows. Religious differences between native West Germans and expellees had no effect on labor market outcomes, but reduced inter-marriage rates and increased the local support for anti-expellee parties.Publisher PD

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralized University Admissions in Germany

Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.Matching university places to students is not as clear cut or as straightforward as it ought to be. By investigating the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions in medicine and related subjects, we show that a procedure designed to give an advantage to students with excellent school grades actually harms them. The reason is that the three-step process employed by the clearinghouse is a complicated mechanism in which many students fail to grasp the strategic aspects involved. The mechanism is based on quotas and consists of three procedures that are administered sequentially, one for each quota. Using the complete data set of the central clearinghouse, we show that the matching can be improved for around 20% of the excellent students while making a relatively small percentage of all other students worse off.DFG, SFB 649, Ökonomisches Risik

Studienplatzvergabe: die cleversten Bewerber kommen zum Zug

Überlastete Universitätsverwaltungen und langwierige Nachrückverfahren sind die Folge der dezentralen Vergabe von Studienplätzen. Um die Studienplatzvergabe künftig schneller und einfacher abwickeln zu können, soll die Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen (ZVS) die Universitäten als Serviceeinrichtung unterstützen. Eine solche Unterstützung ist zwar sinnvoll, sie wird aber nicht ohne Weiteres alle Probleme lösen können. Zentrale Vergabeverfahren, bei denen die Abstimmung zwischen den Auswahlkriterien der einzelnen Universitäten und den Wünschen der Bewerber optimiert wird, stellen eine Alternative dar. Das derzeit von der ZVS angewendete Verfahren zur Vergabe von Studienplätzen in den ZVS- Fächern führt allerdings dazu, dass nicht unbedingt die besten Bewerber zugelassen werden, sondern vielmehr diejenigen, die sich bei der Bewerbung besonders clever verhalten. Anstatt wie erhofft die Bewerber mit dem besten Abitur zugeteilt zu bekommen, müssen zahlreiche Universitäten mit einer größeren Anzahl von Bewerbern mit weniger gutem Abitur vorlieb nehmen. Gleichzeitig werden die Wünsche der Bewerber nicht optimal berücksichtigt. Ineffizienzen, wie sie derzeit auftreten, können nur durch einen anderen Vergabemechanismus überwunden werden, der strategisches Verhalten der Studienbewerber verhindert. Ein solcher Mechanismus kann hochschulspezifische Zulassungskriterien berücksichtigen.Admission to university, Central clearing house, Strategic behaviour