On Cores and Stable Sets for Fuzzy Games

AMS classifications: 90D12; 03E72;cooperative games;decision making;fuzzy games

The Bird Core for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree problems Revisited: Monotonicity and Additivity Aspects

A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976.The Bird core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for mcst-problems is a selection of the Bird core correspondence.Using the additivity property an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core correspondence is obtained.cost allocation;minimum cost spanning tree games;Bird core;cost monotonicity;cone additivity

Cost Monotonic "Cost and Charge" Rules for Connection Situations

The special class of conservative charge systems for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations is introduced.These conservative charge systems lead to single-valued rules for mcst situations, which can also be described with the aid of obligation functions and are, consequently, cost monotonic.A value-theoretic interpretation of these rules is also provided.cost allocation;minimum cost spanning tree situations;cost monotonicity;sharing values

Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced.For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation.It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.game theory

The P-Value for Cost Sharing in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situations

The aim of this paper is to introduce and axiomatically characterize the P-value as a rule to solve the cost sharing problem in minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations.The P-value is related to the Kruskal algorithm for finding an mcst.Moreover, the P-value leads to a core allocation of the corresponding mcst game, and when applied also to the mcst subsituations it delivers a population monotonic allocation scheme.A conewise positive linearity property is one of the basic ingredients of an axiomatic characterization of the P-value.costs;games;allocation;population

How to Cope with Division Problems under Interval Uncertainty of Claims?

The paper deals with division situations where individual claims can vary within closed intervals.Uncertainty of claims is removed by compromising in a consistent way the upper and lower bounds of the claim intervals.Deterministic division problems with compromise claims are then considered and classical division rules from the bankruptcy literature are used to generate several procedures leading to e .cient and reasonable rules for division problems under interval uncertainty of claims.uncertainty;claims;division problems

Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules

Clan game;Big boss game;Core;Decision making;Fuzzy coalition;Fuzzy game;Monotonic allocation rule

Connection Situations under Uncertainty

cooperative cost games;minimum cost spanning tree situations;robustness;worst-case scenario;input interval data;uncertainty