Salience games : private politics when public attention is limited

We develop a theoretical model in which an industry and NGO play salience games - they act strategically to influence public attention to social impacts in the sector. Salience stimulates extra donations for the NGO, and thus firms have incentives to hide the damage they do to avoid public attention. How can an NGO design its mission (how to divide income between campaigning and other projects, and what sorts of campaigns to run) to thrive in such a setting? We show that when public attention is scarce, a greater campaign orientation induces industry to invest in greater obfuscation, starving the NGO of funds. The NGO in turn strategically biases its mission away from campaigns, and in favor of sector-wide versus firm-specific campaigns, but not by as much as a welfare-motivated planner would want. When public attention is avoided by a mixture of substantive and symbolic action, we show that a greater weight on the former induces the NGO to become more campaign-oriented, with social damage lower

Neurotypical privilege in the labour market

Neurotypical people order their thoughts and communicate ideas in the most typical way. They enjoy a privilege that comes from living in a world that favours and is built for this specific neurology. However, the exclusion of neurodivergent people is bad for the workforce. Catherine Bouckley writes that neurodivergence makes an important contribution to cognitive diversity, which drives better performance and limits groupthink within organisations

Overcoming silos in health care systems through meso-level organisations – a case study of health reforms in New South Wales, Australia

Summary: Fragmented care delivery is a barrier to improving health system performance worldwide. Investment in meso-level organisations is a potential strategy to improve health system integration, however, its effectiveness remains unclear. In this paper, we provide an overview of key international and Australian integrated care policies. We then describe Collaborative Commissioning - a novel health reform policy to integrate primary and hospital care sectors in New South Wales (NSW), Australia and provide a case study of a model focussed on older person's care. The policy is theorised to achieve greater integration through improved governance (local stakeholders identifying as part of one health system), service delivery (communities perceive new services as preferable to status quo) and incentives (efficiency gains are reinvested locally with progressively higher value care achieved). If effectively implemented at scale, Collaborative Commissioning has potential to improve health system performance in Australia and will be of relevance to similar reform initiatives in other countries