Métodos de Corpus: Un Nuevo Horizonte para la Filosofía Experimental del Lenguaje

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to investigate and evaluate the current state of the experimental philosophy of language. For this purpose, I will present the two principal methodologies in the field: questionnaires and corpus methods, indicating the common and specific problems. Second, to argue that corpus methods represent a new methodological horizon for research in experimental philosophy of language for two reasons. On the one hand, because they have fewer problems than questionnaires. On the other hand, they have certain additional advantages: i) they consider a greater amount of evidence; ii) in employing them, we have the possibility of having additional information that can illuminate other aspects of the research; iii) the count with greater replicability.El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. Primero, investigar y evaluar la situación en la que se encuentra actualmente la filosofía experimental del lenguaje. Para ello, expondré las dos metodologías predominantes en el campo: los cuestionarios y los métodos de corpus, mostrando los problemas comunes y los específicos. Segundo, defender que los métodos de corpus suponen un nuevo horizonte metodológico para la investigación en filosofía experimental del lenguaje por dos razones. Por un lado, porque cuentan con menos problemas que los cuestionarios. Por otro lado, porque tienen ciertas ventajas adicionales: i) consideran una cantidad mayor de evidencia; ii) al emplearlos tenemos la posibilidad de contar con información adicional que puede iluminar otros aspectos de la investigación; iii) cuentan con una mayor replicabilidad

Coordination of contexts and taste disagreements

In this paper, I will defend that there is an asymmetry between straightforwardly factual and non-straightforwardly factual disagreements (Field 2009) in terms of persistency and retraction, and that we can use what I will call coordination of contexts to explain these two asymmetries. To make my point I will focus on the kinematics of this type of disagreements. I will argue that one way to give a proper account of the kinematics of disagreements about taste and to discriminate between these two cases of disagreement is to focus on coordination of contexts

An analysis of the centrality of intuition talk in the discussion on taste disagreements

This article has partly been elaborated in the framework of the project A Computational Dynamic Analysis of Public Debates on Politics, Aesthetics and Taste, No 3180096 of FONDECYT postdoctoral competition 2018, funded by CONICYT/FONDECYT/POSTDOCTORADO/No Proyecto 3180096. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their invaluable comments, and to the audiences of the Seminario de Filosofia y Matematicas (Universidad de Valparaiso, Chile) and the GLiF Seminars (Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Spain), where I presented previous versions of this work.According to Cappelen (2012), analytic philosophers have traditionally used two arguments to defend the role of intuitions in philosophy. On the one hand, The Argument from Philosophical Practice claims that analytic philosophers rely on intuitions when defending their theories. On the other hand, The Argument from Intuition Talk contends that intuitions must play a prominent role in analytic philosophy because analytic philosophers use intuition talk profusely. Cappelen (2012) identifies three questions to be considered when assessing the Argument from Intuition Talk: a quantitative question, a centrality question, and an interpretative question. The available studies have mainly focused on the quantitative and interpretative questions. In this paper, I examine the centrality question, taking as a case study the literature on taste disagreements — a topic that has received significant attention in the philosophy of language in the last fifteen years. To this end, I first build a corpus with the most relevant works in the area and then examine the centrality of intuition talk. The results show that the use of intuition talk is central in the literature on taste disagreements, and that intuitions are taken as evidence in favor of a given theory if the theory can account for them.Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT) CONICYT FONDECYT 318009

Penetração cognitiva e predicados do gosto: fazendo uma exceção à regra

The relevance of cognitive penetration has been pointed out concerning three fields within philosophy: philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. This paper argues that this phenomenon is also relevant to the philosophy of language. First, I will defend that there are situations where ethical, social, or cultural rules can affect our taste perceptions. This influence can cause speakers to utter conflicting contents that lead them to disagree and, subsequently, to negotiate the circumstances of application of the taste predicates they have used to describe or express their taste perceptions. Then, to account for the proper dynamics of these cases, I will develop a theoretical framework build upon two elements: the Lewisian idea of the score of a conversation (Lewis, 1979), and Richard’s (2008) taxonomy of the different attitudes speakers can have in taste disagreements. In a nutshell, I will argue that speakers can accommodate these conflicting contents as exceptions to the rule that determines the circumstances of application of taste predicates.Keywords: Cognitive penetration, Common ground, Circumstances of application, Accommodation, Exceptions, Score of the conversation, Taste predicates.A relevância da penetração cognitiva foi apontada em três campos dentro da filosofia: na filosofia da ciência, na filosofia da mente e na epistemologia. Este artigo argumenta que este fenômeno é também relevante para a filosofia da linguagem. Primeiro, defenderei que existem situações em que as regras éticas, sociais, ou culturais podem afetar as nossas percepções de gosto. Esta influência pode levar os falantes a proferir conteúdos contraditórios que os levam a discordar e, subsequentemente, a negociar as circunstâncias de aplicação dos predicados de gosto que utilizaram para descrever ou expressar as suas percepções de gosto. Depois, para explicar a dinâmica adequada destes casos, desenvolverei um quadro teórico baseado em dois elementos: a ideia lewisiana da pontuação de uma conversa (Lewis, 1979), e a taxonomia de Richard (2008) das diferentes atitudes que os oradores podem ter nas discordâncias de gosto. Em resumo, argumentarei que os oradores podem acomodar estes conteúdos contraditórios como exceções à regra que determina as circunstâncias de aplicação dos predicados de gosto.Palavras-chave: Penetração cognitiva, Terreno comum, Circunstâncias de aplicação, Acomodação, Excepções, Pontuação da conversa, Predicados de gosto

Faultless Disagreement and Recantation A Defense of Relativism regarding Judgments of Taste

El trabajo se propone, en primer lugar, analizar el desacuerdo sin falta como elemento central en los juicios de gusto, y examinar tres posiciones: contextualismo deíctico, no deíctico y relativismo. En segundo lugar, mostrar cómo el contextualismo deíctico y el relativismo dan cuenta de dicho fenómeno, pero solo el segundo puede hacerlo y acomodarse a un fenómeno central en esos desacuerdos: la retractación.The objective of the article is, first of all, to analyze faultless disagreement as a central element in judgments of taste and to examine three positions: deictic contextualism, non-deictic contextualism, and relativism. Secondly, it shows how deictic contextualism and relativism account for that phenomenon and argues that only the latter can do so and at the same time accommodate a central feature of those disagreements: recantation

Desacuerdos estratégicos y dinámicas de conflicto antagónicas

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to study strategic disagreements, i.e., those situations in which one of the parties uses an expression that allows it to restructure the debate and, in this way, obtain some strategic advantage to advance its political agenda. The paper examines this type of disagreement in a specific context: the parliamentary debates in the Spanish Congress of Deputies during the VIII Legislature (2004-2008). Second, to show that strategic disagreements constitute antagonistic conflict dynamics, i.e., situations in which one or both parties are denied a morally adequate treatment of their points of view. In this way, strategic disagreements prevent the development of the dynamics necessary to manage the conflict in a cooperative way.El objetivo de este artículo es doble. Primero, analizar los desacuerdos estratégicos, es decir, aquellas situaciones en las que una de las partes usa una expresión que le permite reestructurar el debate y, de este modo, obtener alguna ventaja estratégica para hacer avanzar su agenda política. El trabajo examina este tipo de desacuerdos en un contexto específico: los debates parlamentarios del Congreso de los Diputados de España pertenecientes a la VIII Legislatura (2004-2008). Segundo, mostrar que los desacuerdos estratégicos constituyen dinámicas de conflicto antagónicas, es decir, situaciones en las que se niega a una o a ambas partes un tratamiento moralmente aceptable de sus puntos de vista. De este modo, los desacuerdos estratégicos impiden que se puedan desarrollar las dinámicas necesarias para gestionar el conflicto de manera cooperativa

Tres sentidos de relativismo

El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. Primero, distinguir tres sentidos en los que puede entenderse el término ‘relativismo’ en el debate acerca del significado de los predicados de gusto y examinar si las posiciones en el debate –contextualismo deíctico (Stanley 2000; Glanzberg 2007; Schaffer 2011), contextualismo no deíctico (Kölbel 2003; Lasersohn 2005) y teorías contexto-evaluativas (MacFarlane 2014; Field 2009)– son relativistas en alguno de estos sentidos. Segundo, argumentaremos a favor de usar el término ‘relativismo’ para las teorías contexto-evaluativas por dos razones: i) solo estas teorías asignan verdad a las afirmaciones de gusto de manera relativa; y ii) solo estas teorías prestan suficiente atención al fenómeno de la retractación (MacFarlane 2014)

Contexto e intención

The philosophy of language has three different understandings of context: an intuitive notion of context, context-K (Lewis, 1980; Kaplan, 1989), and context as common ground (Stalnaker, 2002). Likewise, from philosophy itself has been advocated that the concrete language we speak and in which we do philosophy could influence the philosophical explanations we develop to account for certain phenomena (Lucy, 1992; Blanco Salgueiro, 2017). More specifically, the possibility of a close relationship between meaning and intention in English has been defended (Avramides, 1989; Blanco Salgueiro, 2017, 2023). This could make the explanations developed by English-speaking philosophers of language be influenced by this relation. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to show that the aforementioned intentional understanding of meaning is present in all three notions of context used in the philosophy of language. Second, to empirically investigate the relationship between meaning and intention in three different languages, English, Arabic, and Spanish, to determine whether the three understandings of context can be extrapolated to other languages.En filosofía del lenguaje existen tres comprensiones distintas de la idea de contexto: una noción intuitiva de contexto, el contexto-K (Lewis, 1980; Kaplan,1989) y el contexto como terreno común (Stalnaker, 2002). Asimismo, desde la misma filosofía se ha defendido la idea de que la lengua concreta que hablamos y en la que hacemos filosofía podría influir en las explicaciones filosóficas que desarrollamos para dar cuenta de ciertos fenómenos (Lucy, 1992; Blanco Salgueiro, 2017). Más concretamente, se ha defendido la posibilidad de la existencia de una estrecha relación entre significado e intención en inglés (Avramides, 1989; Blanco Salgueiro, 2017, 2023). Esto podría hacer que las explicaciones desarrolladas por los filósofos del lenguaje de habla inglesa estuvieran influidas por esta relación. El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. Primero, mostrar que la mencionada comprensión intencional del significado está presente en las tres nociones de contexto usadas en filosofía del lenguaje. Segundo, investigar empíricamente la relación entre significado e intención en tres lenguas distintas, inglés, árabe y español, para saber si las tres comprensiones del contexto pueden ser extrapolables a otras lenguas

Operadores de orden superior y predicados de gusto: Una aproximación expresivista

This dissertation discusses the meaning of taste statements. Specifically, it offers an expressivist explanation of the meaning of this kind of statements that highlights their dynamic features. The rationale for an expressivist treatment are the following: 1. Some expressions that allow speakers to manifest their taste preferences can be treated as second-order concepts. For example, `funny' or `curious' are eligible as second-order concepts. From a syntactic standpoint, they are expressions that produce a grammatically correct sentence not only admitting as their arguments nouns, for example, `Space Balls is fun', but also transitive or intransitive verbal locutions functioning as subject or direct complement, for example, `It is fun to see Peter apologizing for his absence'. From a logical standpoint, these expressions admit as their arguments not only objects, but other concepts or whole propositions. 2. Taste statements usually play an evaluative role. They are not used for describing how the world is. A speaker who says that something is, for example, `tasty', is not ascribing certain property to an object. Rather, she is expressing her pro attitude towards the object. Specifically, it will be contended that taste statements express both pro or con attitudes and states of rule-acceptance. Our intention is to put forward a theory which focuses on certain phenomena related with disagreements about taste. Such an explanation will be independent of the issue of which is the best theory -if indexical contextualism, non-indexical contextualism or relativism- for assigning truth-conditions to taste claims.Tesis Univ. Granada. Programa Oficial de Doctorado en: Filosofí