Posterior and anterior cortex — where is the difference that makes the difference?

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Only what exists can cause: An intrinsic view of free will

This essay addresses the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for free will. IIT is a theory of what consciousness is and what it takes to have it. According to IIT, the presence of consciousness is accounted for by a maximum of cause-effect power in the brain. Moreover, the way specific experiences feel is accounted for by how that cause-effect power is structured. If IIT is right, we do have free will in the fundamental sense: we have true alternatives, we make true decisions, and we - not our neurons or atoms - are the true cause of our willed actions and bear true responsibility for them. IIT's argument for true free will hinges on the proper understanding of consciousness as true existence, as captured by its intrinsic powers ontology: what truly exists, in physical terms, are intrinsic entities, and only what truly exists can cause.Comment: 26 pages, 12 figure

Consciousness Regained: Disentangling Mechanisms, Brain Systems, and Behavioral Responses

How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the "mind-body problem") has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness.European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation ProgrammeHermann and Lilly Schilling FoundationGerman Research FoundationCenter for Nanoscale Microscopy and Molecular Physiology of the BrainNational Institutes of Health/National Institute of Neurological Disorders and StrokeSao Paulo Research FoundationJames S. McDonnell Foundation Scholar AwardEU Grant H2020-FETOPENCanadian Institute for Advanced ResearchAzrieli Program in Brain, Mind and ConsciousnessFLAG-ERA JTC project CANONNorwegian Research CouncilNetherlands Organization for Scientific ResearchUniv Oslo, Inst Basal Med Sci, Div Physiol, Dept Mol Med, POB 1103 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, NorwayUniv Wisconsin, Dept Neurol, Madison, WI 53705 USAUniv Wisconsin, Dept Psychiat, Madison, WI 53719 USAUniv Fed Sao Paulo, Inst Sci & Technol, BR-12231280 Sao Jose Dos Campos, SP, BrazilUniv Milan, Dept Biomed & Clin Sci Luigi Sacco, I-20157 Milan, ItalyFdn Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, Ist Ricovero & Cura Carattere Sci, I-20162 Milan, ItalyUniv Amsterdam, Swammerdam Inst Life Sci, Cognit & Syst Neurosci Grp, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, NetherlandsUniv Amsterdam, Res Prior Program Brain & Cognit, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, NetherlandsUniv Med Goettingen, Dept Cognit Neurol, D-37075 Gottingen, GermanyLeibniz Inst Primate Res, German Primate Ctr, D-37077 Gottingen, GermanyLeibniz Sci Campus Primate Cognit, D-37077 Gottingen, GermanyUniv Fed Sao Paulo, Inst Sci & Technol, BR-12231280 Sao Jose Dos Campos, SP, BrazilEuropean Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme: 720270German Research Foundation: WI 4046/1-1National Institutes of Health/National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke: 1R03NS096379FAPESP: 2016/08263-9EU Grant H2020-FETOPEN: RIA 686764Web of Scienc

Measuring consciousness in severely damaged brains.

Significant advances have been made in the behavioral assessment and clinical management of disorders of consciousness (DOC). In addition, functional neuroimaging paradigms are now available to help assess consciousness levels in this challenging patient population. The success of these neuroimaging approaches as diagnostic markers is, however, intrinsically linked to understanding the relationships between consciousness and the brain. In this context, a combined theoretical approach to neuroimaging studies is needed. The promise of such theoretically based markers is illustrated by recent findings that used a perturbational approach to assess the levels of consciousness. Further research on the contents of consciousness in DOC is also needed

Nociception coma scale-revised scores correlate with metabolism in the anterior cingulate cortex.

BACKGROUND: . The Nociception Coma Scale-Revised (NCS-R) was recently validated to assess possible pain perception in patients with disorders of consciousness. OBJECTIVE: . To identify correlations between cerebral glucose metabolism and NCS-R total scores. METHODS: . [18F]-fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography, NCS-R, and Coma Recovery Scale-Revised assessments were performed in 49 patients with disorders of consciousness. RESULTS: . We identified a significant positive correlation between NCS-R total scores and metabolism in the posterior part of the anterior cingulate cortex, known to be involved in pain processing. No other cluster reached significance. No significant effect of clinical diagnosis (vegetative/unresponsive vs minimally conscious states), etiology or interval since insult was observed. CONCLUSIONS: . Our data support the hypothesis that the NCS-R total scores are related to cortical processing of nociception and may constitute an appropriate behavioral tool to assess, monitor, and treat possible pain in brain-damaged noncommunicative patients with disorders of consciousness. Future studies using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging should investigate the correlation between NCS-R scores and brain activation in response to noxious stimulation at the single-subject level

FMRI spectral signatures of sleep

Sleep can be distinguished from wake by changes in brain electrical activity, typically assessed using electroencephalography (EEG). The hallmark of nonrapid-eye-movement (NREM) sleep is the shift from high-frequency, low-amplitude wake EEG to low-frequency, high-amplitude sleep EEG dominated by spindles and slow waves. Here we identified signatures of sleep in brain hemodynamic activity, using simultaneous functional MRI (fMRI) and EEG. We found that, at the transition from wake to sleep, fMRI blood oxygen level–dependent (BOLD) activity evolved from a mixed-frequency pattern to one dominated by two distinct oscillations: a low-frequency (0.1 Hz) prominent in deep sleep and correlated with the occurrence of slow waves. The two oscillations were both detectable across the brain but exhibited distinct spatiotemporal patterns. During the falling-asleep process, the low-frequency oscillation first appeared in the thalamus, then the posterior cortex, and lastly the frontal cortex, while the high-frequency oscillation first appeared in the midbrain, then the frontal cortex, and lastly the posterior cortex. During the waking-up process, both oscillations disappeared first from the thalamus, then the frontal cortex, and lastly the posterior cortex. The BOLD oscillations provide local signatures of spindle and slow wave activity. They may be employed to monitor the regional occurrence of sleep or wakefulness, track which regions are the first to fall asleep or wake up at the wake–sleep transitions, and investigate local homeostatic sleep processes

Perturbation of whole-brain dynamics in silico reveals mechanistic differences between brain states

Human neuroimaging research has revealed that wakefulness and sleep involve very different activity patterns. Yet, it is not clear why brain states differ in their dynamical complexity, e.g. in the level of integration and segregation across brain networks over time. Here, we investigate the mechanisms underlying the dynamical stability of brain states using a novel off-line in silico perturbation protocol. We first adjust a whole-brain computational model to the basal dynamics of wakefulness and deep sleep recorded with fMRI in two independent human fMRI datasets. Then, the models of sleep and awake brain states are perturbed using two distinct multifocal protocols either promoting or disrupting synchronization in randomly selected brain areas. Once perturbation is halted, we use a novel measure, the Perturbative Integration Latency Index (PILI), to evaluate the recovery back to baseline. We find a clear distinction between models, consistently showing larger PILI in wakefulness than in deep sleep, corroborating previous experimental findings. In the models, larger recoveries are associated to a critical slowing down induced by a shift in the model's operation point, indicating that the awake brain operates further from a stable equilibrium than deep sleep. This novel approach opens up for a new level of artificial perturbative studies unconstrained by ethical limitations allowing for a deeper investigation of the dynamical properties of different brain states.GD was supported by the ERC Advanced Grant: DYSTRUCTURE (n. 295129), by the Spanish Research Project SAF2010-16085 and the FP7-ICT BrainScales. MLK and JC were supported by the ERC Consolidator Grant: CAREGIVING (n. 615539) and Center for Music in the Brain, funded by the Danish National Research Foundation (DNRF117). JC was supported under the project NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-000023, supported by the Northern Portugal Regional Operational Programme (NORTE 2020), under the Portugal 2020 Partnership Agreement, through the European Regional Development Fund (FEDER).info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Resting-state Network-specific Breakdown of Functional Connectivity during Ketamine Alteration of Consciousness in Volunteers.

BACKGROUND: Consciousness-altering anesthetic agents disturb connectivity between brain regions composing the resting-state consciousness networks (RSNs). The default mode network (DMn), executive control network, salience network (SALn), auditory network, sensorimotor network (SMn), and visual network sustain mentation. Ketamine modifies consciousness differently from other agents, producing psychedelic dreaming and no apparent interaction with the environment. The authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging to explore ketamine-induced changes in RSNs connectivity. METHODS: Fourteen healthy volunteers received stepwise intravenous infusions of ketamine up to loss of responsiveness. Because of agitation, data from six subjects were excluded from analysis. RSNs connectivity was compared between absence of ketamine (wake state [W1]), light ketamine sedation, and ketamine-induced unresponsiveness (deep sedation [S2]). RESULTS: Increasing the depth of ketamine sedation from W1 to S2 altered DMn and SALn connectivity and suppressed the anticorrelated activity between DMn and other brain regions. During S2, DMn connectivity, particularly between the medial prefrontal cortex and the remaining network (effect size β [95% CI]: W1 = 0.20 [0.18 to 0.22]; S2 = 0.07 [0.04 to 0.09]), and DMn anticorrelated activity (e.g., right sensory cortex: W1 = -0.07 [-0.09 to -0.04]; S2 = 0.04 [0.01 to 0.06]) were broken down. SALn connectivity was nonuniformly suppressed (e.g., left parietal operculum: W1 = 0.08 [0.06 to 0.09]; S2 = 0.05 [0.02 to 0.07]). Executive control networks, auditory network, SMn, and visual network were minimally affected. CONCLUSIONS: Ketamine induces specific changes in connectivity within and between RSNs. Breakdown of frontoparietal DMn connectivity and DMn anticorrelation and sensory and SMn connectivity preservation are common to ketamine and propofol-induced alterations of consciousness

Consciousness and the Fallacy of Misplaced Objectivity

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do

Diagnostic accuracy of the vegetative and minimally conscious state: Clinical consensus versus standardized neurobehavioral assessment

BACKGROUND: Previously published studies have reported that up to 43% of patients with disorders of consciousness are erroneously assigned a diagnosis of vegetative state (VS). However, no recent studies have investigated the accuracy of this grave clinical diagnosis. In this study, we compared consensus-based diagnoses of VS and MCS to those based on a well-established standardized neurobehavioral rating scale, the JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R). METHODS: We prospectively followed 103 patients (55 +/- 19 years) with mixed etiologies and compared the clinical consensus diagnosis provided by the physician on the basis of the medical staff's daily observations to diagnoses derived from CRS-R assessments performed by research staff. All patients were assigned a diagnosis of 'VS', 'MCS' or 'uncertain diagnosis.' RESULTS: Of the 44 patients diagnosed with VS based on the clinical consensus of the medical team, 18 (41%) were found to be in MCS following standardized assessment with the CRS-R. In the 41 patients with a consensus diagnosis of MCS, 4 (10%) had emerged from MCS, according to the CRS-R. We also found that the majority of patients assigned an uncertain diagnosis by clinical consensus (89%) were in MCS based on CRS-R findings. CONCLUSION: Despite the importance of diagnostic accuracy, the rate of misdiagnosis of VS has not substantially changed in the past 15 years. Standardized neurobehavioral assessment is a more sensitive means of establishing differential diagnosis in patients with disorders of consciousness when compared to diagnoses determined by clinical consensus