Ontology as Transcendental Philosophy

How does the critical Kant view ontology? There is no shared scholarly answer to this question. Norbert Hinske sees in the Critique of Pure Reason a “farewell to ontology,” albeit one that took Kant long to bid (Hinske 2009). Karl Ameriks has found evidence in Kant’s metaphysics lectures from the critical period that he “was unwilling to break away fully from traditional ontology” (Ameriks 1992: 272). Gualtiero Lorini argues that a decisive break with the tradition of ontology is essential to Kant’s critical reform of metaphysics, as is reflected in his shift from “ontology” to “transcendental philosophy,” two notions that Lorini takes to be related by mere “analogy” (Lorini 2015). I agree with Lorini that a thorough reform of ontology is a pivotal part of Kant’s critical plan for metaphysics and that ontology somehow “survives within the critical philosophy” (Lorini 2015: 76). To make this case, however, I deem it important to identify “ontology” and “transcendental philosophy” in the sense of extensional equivalence. While we can detect this identification in Kant’s writings, only from his metaphysics lectures can we get a full sense of its historical and philosophical significance. In this chapter I focus on how it represents a definitive turn from as well as notable continuity with traditional treatments of ontology, particularly the Wolffian one

A Guide to Ground in Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics

While scholars have extensively discussed Kant’s treatment of the Principle of Sufficient Ground in the Antinomies chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, and, more recently, his relation to German rationalist debates about it, relatively little has been said about the exact notion of ground that figures in the PSG. My aim in this chapter is to explain Kant’s discussion of ground in the lectures and to relate it, where appropriate, to his published discussions of ground

Zapora izkustva

Kant ends traditional epistemology and founds the aesthetic approach. He does so by working on the distinction between representation and object. Kant denies the separatability of representation and its object. Representation and object are not separable because one cannot have an object without an representation. Kant, thus interpreted, comes very close to Goodman. Just as the object depends on the appearance, the world depends - according to Goodman — on the version. Not any version, but only true (or right) versions make worlds, is Goodman's thesis. Not imagined intuitions, but only empirical intuitions, that is, appearances, make objects, is Kant's point. Both hold that we are operating within intuitions or versions respectively. This is the closure of experience.Kant zaključi tradicionalno epistemologijo ter utemelji estetiški pristop. To stori z razdelavo razlikovanja med reprezentacijo in objektom. Kant zanika ločljivost reprezentacije in njenega objekta. Reprezentacija in objekt nista ločljiva, ker ne moremo imeti objekta brez reprezentacije. Ce Kanta interpretiramo na tak način, ga zelo približamo Goodmanu. Tako kot je objekt odvisen od videza, tako je svet - po Goodmanu - odvisen od verzije. Goodmanova teza je, da le resnične (ali prave) verzije, in ne katerekoli, tvorijo svet. Po Kantu le empirične intuicije, se pravi videzi, tvorijo objekte - ne pa zamišljene intuicije. Oba trdita, da delujemo znotraj intuicij ali ustreznih verzij. To je zapora izkustva

Intuition and nature in Kant and Goethe

This essay addresses three specific moments in the history of the role played by intuition in Kant’s system. Part one develops Kant’s attitude toward intuition in order to understand how ‘sensible intuition’ becomes the first step in his development of transcendental idealism and how this in turn requires him to reject the possibility of an ‘intellectual intuition’ for human cognition. Part two considers the role of Jacobi when it came to interpreting both Kant’s epistemic achievement and what were taken to be the outstanding problems of freedom’s relation to nature; problems interpreted to be resolvable only via an appeal to ‘intellectual intuition’. Part three begins with Kant’s subsequent return to the question of freedom and nature in his Critique of Judgment. With Goethe’s contemporaneous Metamorphoses of Plants as a contrast case, it becomes clear that whereas Goethe can embrace the role of an intuitive understanding in his account of nature and within the logic of polarity in particular, Kant could never allow an intuition of nature that in his system would spell the very impossibility of freedom itself

From anthropology to rational psychology in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics

If one were to ask a specialist what Kant thought about rational psychology, their first point of reference would undoubtedly be to Kant’s well-known charges against this type of dogmatic reasoning in the Paralogisms section of the Critique of Pure Reason. Having spent the first half of the Critique on a description of the manner by which general metaphysics or “the proud name of Ontology” must give way to a mere analysis of the understanding (A247/ B304), Kant had been determined in the second half of the Critique to expose the illusions at work in the “special” metaphysics devoted to topics such as cosmology, the immortal soul or the existence of God. In the case of rational psychology, its doctrines regarding the soul were ultimately taken by Kant to be the result of a simple misunderstanding (B421). Namely, its practitioners, among whom Descartes certainly counted as themost famous, had mistaken a bare sense of the “I think” – a sense responsible for our indexing the I to the unity, constancy and indeed recognizability of one’s inner and outer perceptions – for the whole person, i.e. for not only the person of our constant inner experience, the person whose thoughts, memories and dreams defined us, but for the intelligible person of our moral life, the character whose choices bore the imprint of our immortal soul (B422, n.). This did not mean that there was no place for the latter considerations; on the contrary, Kant was clear regarding our rational need to believe in the soul, and on the practical benefits conveyed by humankind’s concern for it. Rational psychology, as he put it, prevents us “from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism,” even if it fails to provide any actual knowledge or practical doctrines regarding the soul (B421). These positive results could emerge, however, only after the practitioners of rational psychology were ready to give up their “windy hypotheses of the generation, extinction, and palingenesis of souls” (A683/B711), and redirect their efforts instead to outlining the practical employment of their ideas in the moral sphere, since it was in this sphere alone that such ideas could “regulate our actions as if our destiny reached infinitely far beyond experience, therefore far beyond our present life” (B421; cf. GMS, 5:461)