A Formal Specification of the DNSSEC Model

The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is a suite of specifications that provide origin authentication and integrity assurance services for DNS data. In particular, DNSSEC was designed to protect resolvers from forged DNS data, such as the one generated by DNS cache poisoning. This article presents a minimalistic specification of a DNSSEC model which provides the grounds needed to formally state and verify security properties concerning the chain of trust of the DNSSEC tree. The model, which has been formalized and verified using the Coq proof assistant, specifies an abstract formulation of the behavior of the protocol and the corresponding security-related events, where security goals, such as the prevention of cache poisoning attacks, can be given a formal treatment

Formally Verified Implementation of an Idealized Model of Virtualization

VirtualCert is a machine-checked model of virtualization that can be used to reason about isolation between operating systems in presence of cache-based side-channels. In contrast to most prominent projects on operating systems verification, where such guarantees are proved directly on concrete implementations of hypervisors, VirtualCert abstracts away most implementations issues and specifies the effects of hypervisor actions axiomatically, in terms of preconditions and postconditions. Unfortunately, seemingly innocuous implementation issues are often relevant for security. Incorporating the treatment of errors into VirtualCert is therefore an important step towards strengthening the isolation theorems proved in earlier work. In this paper, we extend our earlier model with errors, and prove that isolation theorems still apply. In addition, we provide an executable specification of the hypervisor, and prove that it correctly implements the axiomatic model. The executable specification constitutes a first step towards a more realistic implementation of a hypervisor, and provides a useful tool for validating the axiomatic semantics developed in previous work

Especificación y verificación formal de sistemas críticos : Análisis de modelos de seguridad para dispositivos móviles

Este documento presenta resultados generados principalmente en el marco de una línea de investigación que involucra a dos proyectos de investigación: "Especificación formal y verificación de sistemas críticos", SeCyT-FCEIA, UNR (ING266), Argentina; y "STEVE: Seguridad a Través de Evidencia VErificable", proyecto PDT, DINACYT, Uruguay. Asimismo, algunas actividades de estos proyectos se enmarcaron en un proyecto de cooperación STIC-AMSUD: "ReSeCo: Reliability and Security of Distributed Software Components". El artículo describe esencial y sucintamente los trabajos realizados, las principales publicaciones obtenidas y la formación de recursos humanos en Argentina y Uruguay.Eje: Aspectos teóricos de Ciencias de la ComputaciónRed de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI

Hacia una especificación formal del modelo de seguridad de MIDP 3.0

En la Plataforma Java Micro Edition, el Perfil para Dispositivos de información Móviles (MIDP) provee el ambiente de ejecución estándar para teléfonos móviles y asistentes de datos personales. La tercera versión del perfil, de reciente publicación, introduce una nueva dimensión en el modelo de seguridad de MIDP: la seguridad a nivel de aplicación. Para la segunda versión de MIDP, Zanella, Betarte y Luna proponen una especificación formal del modelo de seguridad en el Cálculo de Construcciones Inductivas, usando el asistente de pruebas Coq. Este artículo presenta una extensión de esta especificación, para incorporar los cambios planteados por la tercera versión de MIDP. La extensión planteada conserva las propiedades de seguridad demostradas en el modelo anterior, y permite seguir razonando sobre nuevas propiedades de seguridad

Uma análise orientada a modelo das propriedades de segurança do Mimblewimble e suas implementações de protocolo

Mimblewimble is a privacy-oriented cryptocurrency technology that provides security and scalability properties that distinguish it from other protocols. Mimblewimble’s cryptographic approach is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography which allows verifying a transaction without revealing any information about the transactional amount or the parties involved. Mimblewimble combines Confidential transactions, CoinJoin, and cut-through to achieve a higher level of privacy, security, and scalability. In this work, we present and discuss these security properties and outline the basis of a model-driven verification approach to address the certification of the correctness of the protocol implementations. In particular, we propose an idealized model that is key in the described verification process. Then, we identify and precisely state the conditions for our model to ensure the verification of relevant security properties of Mimblewimble. In addition, we analyze the Grin and Beam implementations of Mimblewimble in their current state of development. We present detailed connections between our model and their implementations regarding the Mimblewimble structure and its security properties.Mimblewimble es una criptomoneda orientada a la privacidad con propiedades de seguridad y escalabilidad que la distingue de otras criptomonedas. Mimblewimble está basado en Criptografía de Curvas Elípticas lo que permite verificar la validez de las transacciones sin revelar información alguna sobre el monto y las partes involucradas. Mimblewimble combina transacciones confidenciales y las técnicas de CoinJoin y cut-through para alcanzar mayor nivel de privacidad, seguridad y escalabilidad. En este trabajo, presentamos y discutimos estas propiedades de seguridad y describimos un enfoque basado en la verificación de modelos para alcanzar la certificación de la corrección de las implementaciones del protocolo. En particular, proponemos un modelo idealizado que es clave en el proceso de verificación descrito. Luego, identificamos y describimos precisamente las condiciones que nuestro modelo debe cumplir para asegurar las verificaciones de propiedades de seguridad relevantes de Mimblewimble. Además, analizamos el estado actual de sus dos más importantes implementaciones, Grin y Beam. Finalmente, presentamos conexiones detalladas entre nuestro modelo y las implementaciones en relación con la estructura de Mimblewimble y sus propiedades de seguridad.Mimblewimble é uma tecnologia de criptomoeda orientada para a privacidade que fornece propriedades de segurança e escalabilidade que a distinguem de outros protocolos. A abordagem criptográfica do Mimblewimble é baseada na Elliptic Curve Cryptography, que permite verificar uma transação sem revelar nenhuma informação sobre o valor da transação ou as partes envolvidas. O Mimblewimble combina transações confidenciais, CoinJoin e cut-through para alcançar um nível mais alto de privacidade, segurança e escalabilidade. Neste trabalho, apresentamos e discutimos essas propriedades de segurança e delineamos a base de uma abordagem de verificação orientada por modelo para abordar a certificação da correção das implementações de protocolo. Em particular, propomos um modelo idealizado que é chave no processo de verificação descrito. Em seguida, identificamos e declaramos com precisão as condições de nosso modelo para garantir a verificação das propriedades de segurança relevantes do Mimblewimble. Além disso, analisamos as implementações Grin e Beam do Mimblewimble em seu estado atual de desenvolvimento. Apresentamos conexões detalhadas entre nosso modelo e suas implementações em relação à estrutura Mimblewimble e suas propriedades de segurança

A formal specification of the MIDP 2.0 security model

This paper overviews a formal specification, using the Calculus of Inductive Constructions, of the application security model defined by the Mobile Information Device Profile 2.0 for Java 2 Micro Edition. We present an abstract model of the state of the device and security-related events that allows to reason about the security properties of theplatform where the model is deployed. We then state and sketch the proof of some desirable properties of this model

A Certified Access Controller for JME-MIDP 2.0 enabled Mobile Devices

Mobile devices, like cell phones and PDAs, allow to store information and to establish connections with external entities. In this sort of devices it is important to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of the stored data as well as ensure service availability. The JME platform, a Java enabled technology, provides the MIDP standard that facilitates applications development and specifies a security model for the controlled access to sensitive resources of the device. This paper describes a high level formal specification of an access controller for JME-MIDP 2.0. This formal definition of the controller has been obtained as an extension of a specification, developed using the Calculus of Inductive Constructions and the proof assistant Coq, of the MIDP 2.0 security model. The paper also discusses the refinement of the specification into an executable model and describes the algorithm which has been proven to be a correct implementation of the specified access controller